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Executive Summary 
From local governance regimes to policies and markets, diverse institutions are crucial for 
ensuring effective natural resource management. Payments for Ecosystems Services (PES) 
are being adopted globally as a potential strategy for protecting and increasing forests by 
paying for environmental goods and services not captured in the market. Large-scale 
reforestation efforts have also increased globally, but are mostly aimed at increasing forest 
cover rather than ensuring resilient ecosystems. Many have argued that such incentivised 
reforestation schemes could lead to plantations of limited species diversity. Enhancing tree 
species diversity simultaneously with other forest ecosystem services (e.g. carbon 
sequestration) in reforestation therefore remains a challenge. Since many land managers are 
reluctant to voluntarily plant trees of little market or use value, PES may offer a strategy for 
enhancing tree diversity if stakeholders’ perceptions were understood. I therefore explored 
how PES should be designed to deliver biodiversity-enhancing reforestation. Empirical 
research was carried out in mountainous villages within Lebanon’s newly designated 
Important Plant Areas (IPAs). Semi-structured interviews were conducted with local 
authorities and key informants in 48 villages within nine IPAs exposing numerous socio-
institutional and biophysical constraints to reforestation on municipal lands. I then set out to 
gauge landowners’ perceptions of PES schemes with varying levels of conditionality. In this 
mixed-methods study, I found that private landowners are very diverse in their preferences 
and attitudes towards PES schemes expressed through their discussions about risks and 
reward. I later surveyed national stakeholders’ preferences for native species to be used in 
reforestation. Similarly, these stakeholders (and potential PES buyers) also exhibit preference 
heterogeneity when prioritising native species for reforestation. Finally, I estimate a 
production possibility frontier from a choice experiment conducted with landowners in the 
Bcharre-Ehden IPA. My results indicated that real trade-offs do exist between the extent of 
forest cover and diversity of species used in reforestation. However, while limited in scope, it 
is possible for reforesting private lands with diverse native forest species cost-effectively 
through identifying and targeting willing suppliers (i.e. landowners). Increasing participation 
requires further research to investigate whether absentee residents, with landholdings not tied 
to commercial farming, would be willing to accept low-cost payments for biodiversity-
enhancing reforestation. My thesis provides insights from empirical studies that will 
contribute to both research and policy in designing PES for achieving multiple objectives 
cost-effectively.
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1 Introduction 
1.1 The Dynamics of Land-Use and Land-Cover 
There are approximately 3.8 billion hectares of forests worldwide, accounting for roughly 
30% of total terrestrial land-cover (FAO 2011). While forests have provided humans with a 
wide range of goods and services, they continue to decline globally (Hansen et al. 2010). The 
net loss of global forests was estimated at 66.5 million hectares from 1990-2005, the majority 
of which took place in the tropics (Lindquist et al. 2012). Given that global forests are natural 
habitats to nearly two-thirds of Earth’s terrestrial biodiversity (MEA 2005a), these losses can 
have significant impacts on plant and animal species. Biodiversity loss is also expected to 
accelerate as a result of both deforestation and climate change, potentially impacting poorer 
and marginalised communities around the world (Butchart et al. 2010; Pereira et al. 2010)  
Over 40% of the Earth’s ice-free land surface has been converted to agriculture, urban 
development and other land-uses to meet human needs (Barnosky et al. 2012). Croplands 
(1.53 billion hectares) and pastures (3.38 billion hectares) account for around 38% of those 
landscapes, and are increasing (Foley et al. 2011). Large-scale conversion of primary forests 
– predominantly for agricultural purposes – has led to forest loss and degradation in the 
tropics, contributing directly or indirectly to biodiversity loss and climate change (Thompson 
et al. 2009). Agricultural expansion, driven by global demands of food production as the 
main competing land-use, is therefore expected to lead to more deforestation in the future, 
particularly in less developed countries in the tropical south (Goudie 2007). There is, 
however, a different trend taking place in many countries in the northern hemisphere. Recent 
studies have found that there have been marginal gains in forest area from natural expansion 
and tree planting in temperate and boreal zones (Achard et al. 2002; Gibbs et al. 2010). 
Forest transitions, or the declines or expansions of forest cover changes, are driven by social, 
economic and political factors (Lambin and Meyfroidt 2011). For example, labour scarcities 
resulting from off-farm jobs and scarcities in forest products have led to ‘new forests’ in 
some countries, largely as a result of natural regeneration after land abandonment, but also 
active restoration in some cases (Rudel et al. 2005). Economic development in the tropics, 
however, does not necessarily reduce deforestation. For example, despite economic growth in 
Indonesia, its forests have declined considerably due to illegal logging and fires, followed by 
their opportunistic conversion to agriculture (Abood et al. 2015). Institutional factors 
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influencing land-use and land cover change are therefore important for examining the 
complexities involved in forest restoration and related natural resource management 
practices. 
1.1.1 Definition of Forests and Woodlands 
Understanding of the varying definitions of forests is essential for examining forest-related 
land-use/land-cover change (Watson 2000). Unfortunately, there is no universally accepted 
classification system for forest land cover. The FAO, for example, defines a ‘forest’ as any 
land with trees over 5 meters tall with at least 10% canopy cover, or capable of reaching that 
threshold in situ (FAO 2010). In the Marrakesh Accords (2001) of the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, ‘forests’ were defined as an area greater than 0.5-1.0 hectare 
having trees with a minimum crown cover of 10-30% and define trees as woody plants 
capable of growing more than 2-5 meters tall (UNFCCC 2002, cited from Sasaki and Putz 
2009). These definition can be problematic since planted trees capable of reaching those 
thresholds can be defined as forests, whereas native vegetation having some trees or recovery 
(e.g. after fire) may not. Other definitions exist within specific countries (but may change 
over time), and I discuss Lebanese forest statistics and definitions below. 
Differences also exist in forestry-related activities pertaining to land-use. Rudel et al. (2005), 
for instance, define ‘deforestation’ as the clearing of forests by people with no natural 
regrowth of trees; ‘reforestation’ as the spontaneous regeneration of previously forested land, 
and ‘afforestation’ as the planting of trees on land that was not previously forested 
(plantations are an example of the latter). Evans (1992), on the other hand, emphasises that 
most plantations are ‘man-made forests’ and “distinct from rainforest or savannahs because 
their orderliness and uniformity show they are artificial” (3). This is further elaborated to 
differentiate between afforestation, reforestation, and natural regeneration (ibid: 8): 
1. Afforestation: bare land that has not had trees in the last 50 years, e.g. grasslands, 
sand-dunes, arid/semi-arid rangelands. 
2. Reforestation (a): land that was previously forested in the last 50 years, but which 
had been cleared and replanted with a single species (sometimes introduced), e.g. 
most timber or pulp-producing plantations. 
3. Reforestation (b): land that was previously forested in the last 50 years, but renewed 
(replanted) with the same crop (or native species) as before, e.g. timber plantations, 
but much less common than previous. 
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4. Natural regeneration (a): human-assisted forests established through deliberate 
silvicultural interventions and manipulations, e.g. ‘enrichment planting’. 
5. Natural regeneration (b): forests (re)established without any human interventions. 
 
Although quite precise, these definitions may not be well suited to the specific Lebanese 
context (in particular the 50 year cut-off may be very arbitrary in a region with such a long 
history of land use change). The reforestation considered in the empirical chapters of this 
thesis falls into several of the categories above, including afforestation, reforestation and 
human assisted natural regeneration, since it may take place on land which has been treeless 
for fewer or more than 50 years, and may use single or multiple species (though these have 
usually been native). In this thesis I use reforestation as an umbrella term for these processes, 
taking care to be specific about the species planted and the land use and cover which is 
replaced. 
Emphasis on mixed cropping and forestry systems with productive trees (i.e. agroforestry) 
had made some important social, economic and environmental contributions globally 
(Tougiani et al. 2009; Hall et al. 2011a; George et al. 2012). Some have also shown that 
sustainable intensification of agro-ecosystems with commercial trees, e.g. coffee plantations, 
contributes to reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the tropics (Noponen et al. 2013). The 
majority of forest plantations, however, often consist of introduced/exotic species of 
improved varieties for higher yield in either fibre, fruit or other tree parts. Plantations also 
tend to replace natural forests in many tropical countries, largely for the purpose of timber 
and other forests products, but increasingly for storing carbon. Recently, some have argued 
against plantations attaining the same definition and status as natural forests, particularly in 
light of emerging ‘carbon markets’ (e.g. Sasaki et al. 2011). Most plantations are unlikely to 
maintain similar levels of biodiversity to more diverse forests if they consist of monocultures, 
exotic species, or both (see Figure 1.1). They may also do more harm than good to 
biodiversity if there is the additional element of agrichemical inputs, e.g. pesticides 
(Kanowski et al. 2005). 
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Figure 1.1. Percentage of introduced species in planted forests (Source: FAO 2010, p. 5). 
In general, homogenous forest plantations managed for producing agricultural commodities 
(including timber) provide fewer ecosystem services and have less biodiversity than more 
diverse forests, whether planted or natural (Carnus et al. 2006; Brockerhoff et al. 2008). 
Some have hypothesised that monoculture plantations can also facilitate successive species to 
emerge within the understory but dependent on particular outputs desired and types of land-
cover/land-use, such as rehabilitation of degraded lands or timber production (Lugo 1997; 
Sayer et al. 2004). Bremer & Farley (2010) conducted a review of papers on re/afforestation 
and found a considerable variability of biodiversity in plantations, but argue that natural 
systems should not be converted and that indigenous species should be used in place of 
exotics. While re/afforestation practices are not always detrimental to biodiversity (Hartley 
2002), habitat loss often is. Certain institutional measures, such as appropriate species 
selection on deforested or degraded lands, and knowledge of local ecology and soil 
conditions, should therefore be considered (Lamb 1998; Chazdon 2008; Bullock et al. 2011; 
Hall et al. 2011b).  
1.1.2 Characteristics of Forest Ecosystems (Biomes) 
Biophysical and ecological aspects of forests are defined under broad categories or ‘biomes’ 
and subcategories of each, including tropical moist forests, temperate broadleaved forests, 
Mediterranean forests, etc. Olsen et al. (2001) mapped and categorised 14 terrestrial biomes 
containing 867 ‘ecoregions’ within 8 biogeographic realms (see Figure 1.2). Seven of those 
biomes include ‘forests’ and five contain savannahs (or grassy woodlands with sparse trees 
forming an open canopy) and/or shrubland1. While there is no single typology to describe 
land-cover types in the Mediterranean basin, the biome is characterised as forests bundled 
                                                 
1 Landscapes dominated by woody, multi-branched plants of less than eight metres height. 
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together with woodlands and scrub2. There are also subcategories (or ecoregions), such as 
maquis and garrigue shrub- or scrublands (Blondel and Aronson 1999; Palahi et al. 2008).  
 
Figure 1.2. Global biomes (14) within eight biogeographic realms (Source: Olson et al. 2001). 
The importance of understanding the characteristics and types of forests and biomes in the 
context of my research required its extensive presentation here. For the purpose of 
maintaining consistency and clarity, I use the FAO definition of forests (presented above in 
section 1.1.1) since it is also adopted in the context of Lebanon’s forestry sector (Section 5.4 
below). I refer to ‘woodlands’ based on FAO’s proposed definition: land having trees capable 
of reaching a minimum height of 2 metres at maturity in situ and defined by ecoregion, with a 
canopy cover of more than 5 percent (as opposed to 10% that would define ‘forests’) on a 
minimum area of 0.5 hectares (FAO 2010)3. I also refer to FAO definitions of ‘afforestation’ 
                                                 
2 Other Mediterranean-climate regions with similar forest, woodland and scrub features include the US 
(California), Chile, South Africa, and Australia (Cowling et al. 1996). 
3 ‘Other wooded land’ often used by FAO as land-use/land-cover class for open woodland and scrub 
communities. 
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and ‘reforestation’4, which are based on the Marrakech Accords (2001) under the Kyoto 
Protocol (FAO 2006): 
1. Afforestation: “the direct human-induced conversion of land that has not been 
forested for a period of at least 50 years to forested land through planting, seeding 
and/or the human-induced promotion of natural seed sources;” 
2. Reforestation: “the direct human-induced conversion of non-forested land to forested 
land through planting, seeding and/or the human-induced promotion of natural seed 
sources, on land that was forested but that has been converted to non-forested land.” 
1.1.3 Definition of Biodiversity 
Biodiversity is the overall variety of life on Earth, or as defined by the United Nations 
Convention on Biological Diversity (UN-CBD): “the variability among living organisms 
from all sources, including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine, and other aquatic ecosystems, and 
the ecological complexes of which they are part: this includes diversity within species, 
between species and of ecosystems” (UNCBD 1992, cited in Heywood 1995).  
Natural ecosystems are characterized as having (multi)functional attributes, where various 
biotic and abiotic processes contribute to complex ecological functions for maintaining the 
systems’ resilience (Hector and Bagchi 2007; Gamfeldt et al. 2008). Many authors point to 
the functional effects biodiversity has at various levels of ecosystem services to sustain 
productive and resilient ecosystems (Elmqvist et al. 2003; Folke et al. 2004; Balvanera et al. 
2006; Gamfeldt et al. 2008). Without functional ecosystems, important services for ensuring 
the renewal and maintenance of natural resources, such as wood and non-wood forest 
products, steady flows of clean water, carbon sequestration, soil amelioration, and 
biodiversity, would diminish over time (de Groot et al. 2002). In a review of the projected 
consequences that biodiversity loss would have on ecosystems, Chapin et al. (2000:234-235) 
explain: 
Species diversity has functional consequences because the number and kinds of species 
present determine the organismal traits that influence ecosystem processes. Species traits 
may mediate energy and material fluxes directly or may alter abiotic conditions (for 
example, limiting resources, disturbance and climate) that regulate process rates. The 
components of species diversity that determine this expression of traits include the 
number of species present (species richness), their relative abundances (species 
evenness), the particular species present (species composition), the interactions among 
                                                 
4 Since both types are likely to be used in different contexts, e.g. afforestation in rangelands and reforestation on 
abandoned cropland that was previously forest, I will often refer to them together i.e. re/afforestation.  
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species (non-additive effects), and the temporal and spatial variation in these properties. 
In addition to its effects on current functioning of ecosystems, species diversity influences 
the resilience and resistance of ecosystems to environmental change. 
The composition, number and abundance of species are also influenced by environmental 
factors such as climate (e.g. precipitation, evapotranspiration) soil types and social factors 
such as land-use/land-cover dynamics. The reduction of biodiversity, therefore, reduces the 
ability of an ecosystem, ecoregion, or even biome, to deal with change (Cardinale et al. 
2012). 
1.1.4 Definition of Ecosystem Services 
‘Ecosystem services’ (ES) have been defined as “the benefits that people obtain from nature” 
(MEA 2005b: v), although many definitions have been proposed (Boyd and Banzhaf 2007). 
For example, Daily (1997:3) defines ecosystem services as “the conditions and processes 
through which natural ecosystems, and the species that make them up, sustain and fulfil 
human life” (Daily 1997). The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA 2005b) provides a 
framework which classifies ecosystem services under four main categories: 
- Provisioning services: e.g. food, water, timber and fibre 
- Regulating services: e.g. climate, floods, diseases, wastes, and water quality  
- Cultural services: e.g. recreational, aesthetic, and spiritual benefits  
- Supporting services: e.g. soil formation, photosynthesis, and nutrient cycling 
Although biodiversity is considered to be important in all four categories of ecosystem 
services described above, in many cases its importance stems from the role it plays in the 
complex and ambiguous supporting services. Chapin et al. (2009) describe supporting 
services as “the fundamental ecological processes that control the structure and functioning of 
ecosystems” (31). In addition, social systems, particularly institutions, also play a vital role in 
supporting ecosystem service delivery and maintenance (Figure 1.3). 
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Figure 1.3. A conceptual framework for ecosystem services as proposed by Chapin et al. (2009). 
Few would argue that biodiversity does not inherently have value, yet many agree that it is 
difficult to quantify its option, bequest and existence values (Pearce 2007). Whether or not 
biodiversity is an ecosystem service in itself is debated, though it has clear cultural values in 
many cases and is therefore plausibly viewed as a cultural service (MEA 2005a). Mace et al. 
(2012) suggest that there are generally two perspectives: the ‘ecosystem service perspective’ 
(biodiversity underpins ecosystem services) and the ‘conservation perspective’ (biodiversity 
is an ecosystem service) and argue that both are valid due to the complexity of both 
biodiversity and ecosystem services. But more importantly, they bring these issues into the 
contexts of valuation: 
Equating biodiversity with ecosystem services implies that managing one will 
automatically enhance the other. Alternatively, regarding biodiversity itself as an 
ecosystem service reflects an intrinsic value for biodiversity, whereby organisms have 
value that is by definition unquantifiable and therefore non-transactable. In practice, 
most people intuitively assign very different values to different groups of organisms, so 
that when biodiversity itself is seen as a service, it is particular groups, often charismatic 
ones, whose conservation is sought. Nevertheless, biodiversity has existence value to 
many people who wish it to continue to be there, irrespective of any direct experiences or 
benefits they derive from it. (20) 
Chapter 1   Introduction 
9 
Given that ecosystem services is in part an economic concept (Bateman et al. 2011), the 
status of biodiversity as an ecosystem service can be evidenced by people’s willingness to 
pay for more of it (Hockley et al. 2007). Furthermore, some studies have shown that more 
diverse ecosystems function more efficiently and provide more goods and services. For 
instance, Potvin et al. (2011) found evidence that species-rich forests stored on average 
nearly twice as much carbon as agroforests containing fewer species in the tropics. In a more 
locally relevant example, Vilà et al. (2007) found that species-rich Mediterranean deciduous 
forests were more productive (i.e. significant increase in wood production) than coniferous 
and sclerophyllous (hard-leaf, scrubby) forests. Overall, evidence appears to suggest that 
more specie-rich forests provide greater levels of ecosystem services, including carbon 
sequestration and provisioning services, e.g. wood production (Gamfeldt et al. 2013). 
In Lebanon, and elsewhere, there is a clear desire to preserve and enhance biodiversity both 
for its own sake, and for the role biodiversity may play in supporting other ecosystem 
services. Throughout this thesis, I therefore consider biodiversity as an ecosystem service, 
and incentives for increasing biodiversity as a form of Payment for Ecosystem Service 
(discussed below). 
1.1.5 Definition of Natural Capital 
Natural resources (or natural capital stocks) are the materials and components found in 
nature, often characterised by the amounts of biodiversity as well as the diversity of abiotic 
(e.g. geological) matter found in a particular ecosystem (Common et al. 2003; Chapin et al. 
2009). Ecosystems have been referred to as ‘living natural capital’ where flows of natural 
resources are derived (Turner and Daily 2008). Thus, ecosystems goods and services can be 
conceptualised as the stocks and flows of natural capital. 
Non-renewable natural resources including minerals, e.g. gold, petroleum, etc., are fixed in 
quantity and potentially exhaustible. However, even renewable natural resources such as fish 
and forests, though capable of regenerating after being used, are potentially exhaustible if not 
managed sustainably (Turner et al. 1994). Some have called for cost-effective approaches to 
conserving natural capital through prioritising natural capital ‘hotspots’ (Crossman and Bryan 
2009; Raymond et al. 2009; Kareiva et al. 2011). Examples include maintaining upland 
watersheds, wetlands and riparian ecosystems for ensuring water flow and quality, which also 
create habitats for biodiversity. Conserving natural capital for its benefits to society is not a 
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new concept, but has been emphasised in public policy more recently largely because of the 
ecosystem services approach.  
1.2 Causes of Forest Loss: Externalities and Institutions 
1.2.1 Externalities and Public Goods 
Economists view externalities as either a cost or benefit not captured in the market by the 
parties making a transaction or exchange, thus affecting a third party’s welfare (Laffont 
2008). Externalities exist when “the market price or cost of production excludes its social 
impact, cost, or benefit” (Hanley et al. 1997). The free market has failed the environment 
partially because there is a lack of incentives for internalizing externalities from 
environmental goods and services (Laffont 1988; Hanley and Barbier 2009). Hence 
environmental goods and services are undersupplied due to being outcompeted by private 
goods (e.g. food and timber) that are bought and sold in markets. 
The theoretical basis of externalities is attributed to A.C. Pigou’s contribution to classical 
welfare economics (Baumol 1972). Whereas Pigouvian taxes (or subsidies) can reduce 
market failures to a degree, Pigou himself noted that government inefficiencies often lead to 
political failures (Pigou 1929). In contrast, Coase (1937; 1960) argued that externalities are 
less prevalent in markets where property rights are well-defined and consumers and 
producers can easily come to mutually beneficial agreements. From this perspective, Coase 
reasoned that externalities are the result of transaction costs being too high due to weak or 
absent institutions for delineating property rights and securing ownership.  
In the real world, however, some externalities are inevitable due to high transaction costs of 
obtaining and processing information efficiently, inability to solve collective action problems, 
and because property rights to some goods and services remain difficult to define (Pascual et 
al. 2010). Transaction costs can be viewed as the inevitable “friction” present when 
exchanging goods and services between at least two people in real world settings 
(Williamson 1985). Arrow defined them as simply the “costs of running the economic 
system” (1969: 48). These include the temporal and spatial factors, e.g. search, distance, and 
technological barriers, where at least one transacting party has to bear the residual costs 
(North 1990). Transaction costs occur because transacting parties have “incomplete 
information and limited capacity by which to process information”, which leads to imposing 
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informal constraints (a type of institution) in order to structure exchange within imperfect 
markets (North 1993:1).  
Public goods5 (goods that are non-excludable and non-rivalrous – i.e. can be consumed 
simultaneously by more than one person) give rise to positive externalities (Table 1.1). 
Table 1.1. Simplified classification of goods; adopted from Pearce & Turner (1990). 
Real public goods often lie along a spectrum from ‘pure’ to ‘impure’ public goods (Ostrom et 
al. 1994). For example, some public goods may be partially rivalrous e.g. public beaches and 
parks at high season (Table 1.2). 
Table 1.2. Spectrum of goods; adopted from Turner et al. (1994), p. 78. 
Type Private Goods Public Goods 
Sub-type 
Pure private 
goods 
Quasi-private 
goods (impure) 
Quasi-public 
goods (impure) 
Pure public goods 
Characteristic 
Exclusive 
(excludable) & 
rival (divisible) 
Non-exclusive & 
rival 
Non-exclusive & 
partially rival 
Non-exclusive & 
non-rival 
Examples 
Goods bought 
and sold in 
markets, e.g. 
commodities 
Regular payment 
is required for 
good, e.g. co-op 
for groundwater 
Congestible 
goods, e.g. Public 
beaches or parks 
in high season 
Biodiversity, 
ozone layer, 
climate-change 
protection 
 
1.2.2 Why Agriculture Increases at the Expense of Forests  
The majority of ecosystems on Earth have been modified for the production of private goods 
bought and sold in markets such as crops, livestock, timber and so forth. This often happens 
at the expense of ecosystems that supply non-private goods, or positive externalities, which 
are not traded in markets (Foley et al. 2005). In natural resource management, social (or 
                                                 
 5 There are also “public bads” that have external costs, such as pollution, which impacts social welfare 
negatively (Kolstad 2000). 
Category Rivalrous Non-rivalrous 
Excludable Private Club 
Non-excludable Open-access Public 
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allocative) inefficiencies occur when institutions fail to adequately incentivise the production 
of these non-private goods. Ecosystem services other than those for producing private goods 
(generally ‘provisioning services’) are often externalities because there are no market prices 
to signal the scarcity of the goods produced from those services, resulting in inefficient 
resource allocation (Daily and Matson 2008). 
1.2.3 Externalities of Ecosystem Services and Biodiversity 
The production of private goods may give rise to externalities in a variety of ways. The most 
common and recognizable form are negative externalities, e.g. pollution from a factory or 
fertiliser runoff from a farm, that escape the ‘private property boundaries’ and affect others 
(Kolstad 2000). On the other hand, positive externalities can be produced on private property 
as well. An example of this would be private land with an abundance of trees and wildlife 
that produce some public goods, such as landscape beauty or carbon storage. The owner of a 
given property with these characteristics, however, may rationally decide to do something 
more ‘productive’ with his or her land because there is no financial incentive6 for maintaining 
it in its current state. Hence, excessive deforestation can be largely attributed to market 
failure since the benefits from forest ecosystems not captured in the market cannot compete 
with other ecosystems services, e.g. agriculture (Godden 2006; Zilberman et al. 2008). Land 
cover change driven by agricultural activities often results in losing other ecosystem services, 
e.g. nutrient and water cycling, pollination, climate regulation, etc. However, diversified 
agro-ecosystems can also provide a wide range of ecosystem services along with marketable 
commodities (e.g. Kremen et al. 2012). 
1.2.4 Environmental Valuation in the Context of Policy and Governance 
Environmental policies in natural resource management have frequently been analysed 
through an economic lens (Bowles 2008; Barbier 2011; Muradian and Gómez-Baggethun 
2013). Examinations of how environmental policies are influenced by (or even influence) 
social norms and local perceptions have also been growing recently (Chen et al. 2009; St 
John et al. 2010; Kinzig et al. 2013; Entenmann and Schmitt 2013). However, quantifying (or 
estimating) social values placed on nature and ecosystem services (and the benefits 
therefrom) remains one of the biggest challenges for ensuring that efficient and equitable 
                                                 
6 One could argue that there might be other motives for keeping the land in its current state, such as altruistic 
motives or perhaps for hunting or aesthetic reasons (Field and Field 2009). 
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resource governance is achieved (Turner et al. 2003; Bateman et al. 2011). There are also 
limitations to aggregating benefits and costs across individuals at temporal scales (Hockley 
2008). However, analysis of the social costs and benefits (or social CBAs) applied in the 
context of social learning can help to identify collective values and social perceptions placed 
towards ecosystem services and biodiversity (Wilson and Howarth 2002; Spash 2008; Kumar 
2010). Since values and perceptions are complex and may differ between individuals within 
the same community (Kenter et al. 2015), the need arises for organising public deliberations 
(or forums) to engage community members in a social learning environment of knowledge 
exchange, or a change in understanding, to be put into practice (Reed et al. 2010). 
Community engagement also enables for adaptive co-management and capacity-building 
efforts to be made possible, which includes shared responsibilities in designing projects and 
organising workshops, awareness campaigns, fundraising, and so forth (Berkes 2009). 
Engaging numerous stakeholders may result in inefficient decision-making (Irvin and 
Stansbury 2004), yet environmental management decisions often deal with benefits (or 
ecosystem services) that are public goods (difficult to charge for and prevent those from 
enjoying). Understanding the roles, responsibilities and viewpoints of multiple stakeholders 
are necessary for identifying synergies and complementarities in the objectives (e.g. kinds of 
environmental benefits or improvements desired in the future and why) as well as reducing 
potential conflicts from differences in opinion (Reed et al. 2009). 
Since biodiversity and ecosystem services are complex and ambiguous concepts in and of 
themselves, it is not uncommon for land managers (or even the general public) to question 
whether biodiversity is even worth conserving (Pearce 2007). In addition to social learning 
and public deliberations, social benefits (or positive externalities) from conserving or 
enhancing biodiversity are directly or indirectly related to the effectiveness of institutions, 
e.g. policies and markets, in disseminating information thoroughly and convincingly (Vatn 
2009). But this mainly pertains to the existence values society places on biodiversity as 
indirect consumers of this public good. Stern (1999) suggests that pro-environmental 
behaviours are influenced partially by information and partially by incentives, each having 
their specific functions on behaviour, and both important facets of institutions. 
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1.3 Institutional Responses 
1.3.1 Definition and Overview of Institutions  
A simplified definition of institutions is offered by Young et al. (2008: xxii) as “[a] cluster of 
rights, rules, and decision-making procedures that give rise to a social practice, assign roles to 
participants in the practice, and guides interactions among occupants of these roles”. 
Institutions are essentially “complex social forms that reproduce themselves such as 
governments, the family, human languages, universities, hospitals, business corporations, and 
legal systems” (Miller 2011). North (1990: 3) defines institutions as “humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction”, reduce uncertainties, and “structure incentives in 
human exchange, whether political, social or economic”. Thus, institutions play a vital role in 
determining the outcomes of human-environmental relationships (Gibson et al. 2000; Tucker 
and Ostrom 2005; Young et al. 2008).  
Institutions are often distinguished as being either “public” (the state) or “private” (the 
market), yet there are also institutions for more complex systems of governing common-
property, such as common-pool resource (CPR) regimes (Ostrom et al. 1994). Additionally, a 
competitive market, i.e. private institution, is also essentially a public good where individuals 
or groups (e.g. firms) have the freedom to buy and sell goods and services (Ostrom 1990). 
Institutions, therefore, can be seen as lying along a spectrum from local (e.g. local-level 
public administrations) to national and international (e.g. the UN). The theoretical basis of 
institutions combines social and economic concepts pertaining to decision-making (e.g. 
public choice and game theory) that are fundamental to understanding how human behaviours 
are shaped over time through evolving rules, norms, and constraints (North 1990; Ostrom 
2005). 
Informal constraints are cultural (or context) social norms that may not be explicitly stated or 
written, e.g. whether to bow or shake hands, physical proximity during conversations, eye 
contact, etc. Informal constraints are important features of institutions that arise from 
repeated interactions defined as “extensions, elaborations and modifications of formal rules” 
derived from “socially sanctioned norms of behavior, and … internally enforced standards of 
conduct” (North 1990: 40). Informal constraints play a central role within the transaction cost 
framework in that they enable more effective enforcement and sanctioning measures. Such 
arrangements for enforcement and sanctioning, such as those for common ownership of 
property (or common-property regimes), may gradually become more efficient due to 
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repeated interactions, self-organizing, learning and negotiating (Agrawal 2001; Lebel et al. 
2006). Local participation in this process builds trust and social capital, which enables more 
efficient ways of identifying the most effective modes of governance, e.g. sanctions or 
compensations, in order to ensure higher levels of social welfare in the long run (Blomquist 
2009; Baliamoune-Lutz 2011). Thus, informal constraints are essential components and the 
building blocks for developing local institutions. 
The importance of local institutions in governance and development studies has been 
demonstrated in great depth by Uphoff (1986). His analysis points to how local institutional 
development is essential for effective governance in five main areas: 1) natural resource 
management, 2) rural infrastructure, 3) human resource development, 4) agricultural 
development, and 5) non-agricultural enterprises. Uphoff illustrates the various institutional 
categories and types under three sectors: public, voluntary, and private (Table 1.3): 
Table 1.3. Continuum of local institutions by sector; adopted from Uphoff (1986), p. 5. 
Sector types Public Voluntary Private 
Categories Local Admin. 
(LA) 
Local Gov’t 
(LG) 
Member 
Organization 
(MO) 
Co-
operative 
(Co-op) 
Service 
Organization 
(SO) 
Private 
Business 
(PB) 
Institution 
types 
Bureaucratic 
Institutions 
Political 
Institutions 
Local Organizations7 (based on the 
principle of membership and control; 
these can become institutions)  
Profit-
oriented 
Institutions 
 
In Uphoff’s framework, organizations and institutions share common attributes, but are also 
distinguished from each other depending on the context. Some institutions are systems of 
institutions; for instance, judicial courts are both institutions and organisations whereas a law 
(or a language), is simply an institution (Miller 2011). While not all organisations are 
institutions, they have the capacity to become “institutionalized” through utilising their 
membership base and social capital for attaining political mobilisation. For example, 
organisations can become institutions if they have “… acquired special status and legitimacy 
for having satisfied people’s needs and for having met their normative expectations over 
                                                 
7 These can also include local, national and international organisations, e.g. clubs, societies, NGOs, community-
based organisations 
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time” (Uphoff 1986). Hence, non-governmental organisations (NGOs)8 may start out as 
voluntary and non-profit establishments that later gain political power through social capital 
and broad based support (e.g. funding, petitions, etc.), thus acting as an institutional 
intermediary within the public-private interface (Uphoff 1993).  
Institutions are by no means static paradigms frozen in time and space. In fact, institutions 
that do not change and evolve to meet societal demands essentially fall out of use (North 
1990). In more extreme cases, they generally fail to survive as a result from not being passed 
on from one generation to the next. An unfortunate yet very real example of this would be 
that of languages going ‘extinct’. Contrary to this are examples of extremely robust 
institutions such as the market. All institutions, one can argue, are in some way or another 
economic, especially since social and political institutions are largely driven by economic 
decisions on issues related to private and public life (Denzau and North 1994; Evans 2004). It 
can also be argued that macroeconomic institutions operating at the global level are far from 
perfect (Arrow et al. 1995; Levin et al. 1998), but they too have the capacity to change and 
evolve, albeit at incremental levels and stages (Faber et al. 1997; Bowles 1998; Dietz et al. 
2003). 
Local institutions must change and evolve in order to maintain efficient and optimal states in 
order to compete and adapt in a highly complex, growing and increasingly globalized world 
(Bennett and Balvanera 2007; Berkes 2007). Hence, institutions at various scales help address 
the importance of biodiversity through combining biodiversity conservation, business 
development and local community empowerment (Yorque et al. 2002; Barbier 2011). In 
retrospect, determining which incentives motivate local actors to participate in conservation 
or restoration project redirects us to how institutions influence and are influenced by the 
social learning process. 
One of the key challenges for enabling effective decentralised local governance regimes is 
learning and adapting strategies within the local context (Brosius et al. 1998; Andersson and 
Gibson 2007). From a research perspective, identifying local needs, constraints and 
opportunities are perhaps best understood through a participatory approach (e.g. Chambers 
2008). Participatory learning is essential for obtaining information for the development of 
                                                 
8 Uphoff (1986) considers non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as private voluntary organizations rather 
than ‘third sector’ (see Uphoff 1995); although there are numerous categories of NGOs that cannot be ignored 
(see Vakil 1997). 
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institutional arrangements for managing natural resources (Bouwen and Taillieu 2004; Pahl-
Wostl and Hare 2004; Keen et al. 2005; Berkes 2009). This theoretical framework is intended 
to analyse how local actors develop adaptive co-management strategies to identify risks and 
incentives, build capacity, and deliberate on causes for (or against) participation (Cooke and 
Kothari 2001; Plummer and Armitage 2007; Armitage et al. 2008; Reed et al. 2010). 
1.3.2 Protected Areas: Pros and Cons 
Establishing protected areas (PAs), such as national parks and nature reserves, has been the 
most common approach employed for preventing deforestation and conserving biodiversity. 
Globally, protected areas cover roughly 13% of the Earth’s terrestrial surface and are on the 
rise (Coletta 2010; FAO 2011). They continue to be viewed as the most effective means of 
protecting biodiversity and scarce natural resources (Bruner et al. 2001; Rodrigues et al. 
2004; Andam et al. 2008). However, PAs have been criticised as neo-liberal policies (West et 
al. 2006; Roe and Elliott 2010), relying on ‘command-and-control’ measures that are costly 
and often undermine the rights and livelihoods of forest-dependent communities (Holling and 
Meffe 1996; Agrawal and Gupta 2005; Ferraro et al. 2012). While there has been a gradual 
expansion of PAs, debates continue to surround their effectiveness (Hayes 2006), impacts on 
livelihoods of the poor (Hutton and Adams 2007; Andam et al. 2010; Pullin et al. 2013), as 
well as displacement of pressures onto neighbouring forests (e.g. Andam et al. 2008). 
From the start, conservation agencies and governments came under attack for displacing 
indigenous and traditional forest societies through establishing PAs, while displaced 
deforestation at their margins became more severe (Brockington et al. 2006; Andam et al. 
2008). Moreover, PAs provide little insurance for biodiversity conservation as isolated 
islands (or fragmented habitats), reducing the natural range of species (particularly large 
mammals) as well as the flow of genetic diversity (Wilson et al. 2014)9. In turn, protected 
areas do little for biodiversity-rich forests around their periphery that are liable to becoming 
concessions for other land-use practices, e.g. timber, soy, cattle, palm oil (Margules and 
Pressey 2000; Wilson et al. 2007; Gibbs et al. 2010).  
                                                 
9 Some have argued for low-impact, multipurpose land-use strategies for ‘greening the agricultural matrix’ 
(including plantations) in helping to reduce the edge effects from intensive land-use practices in biodiversity-
rich areas (Lindenmayer and Franklin 2002; Perfecto and Vandermeer 2010). 
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1.3.3 Decentralisation in the Context of Natural Resource Management 
Efforts to place local communities at the forefront of more participatory natural resource 
management grew largely out of global trends in decentralisation of public policy (Agrawal 
and Ribot 1999; Agrawal and Ostrom 2001; Andersson et al. 2006; Coleman and Fleischman 
2011). Democratic decentralisation is the transferring of decision-making power from central 
authority (or national governments) to local-level administrators and governments (Ribot 
2003). Its stated objective is to increase efficiency and equity via “public decisions being 
brought closer and made more open and accountable to local populations” (Larson and Ribot 
2004:3). Devolution is one form of administrative (or political) decentralisation and consists 
of transferring specific decision-making power, such as administering and monitoring local 
rules and rights (Blaser et al. 2005).  
Decentralisation and devolution10 of natural resource management responsibilities were 
initially sought as a strategy that would lead to economic development for more marginalised 
groups, such as indigenous peoples (Bardhan 2002; Grindle 2004). Central governments from 
numerous less developed countries have begun the process of decentralising some aspects of 
natural resource management (NRM from here onwards), e.g. reforestation and forest 
management, to local-level governments and organised groups (Agrawal et al. 2008). Under 
these policies it was assumed that popular participation and local empowerment would 
increase, which in turn would result in more equitable benefit sharing through providing fair 
access (Ribot 2005). However, international agencies seeking to integrate community 
members into their agenda often undermined existing local institutions and favoured elites 
(Cooke and Kothari 2001; Mansuri and Rao 2004; Iversen et al. 2006)11. Not surprisingly, 
decentralisation outcomes have been largely disappointing, with little evidence that it has 
resulted in both social and environmental improvements (Larson 2005; Blaikie 2006; Palmer 
and Engel 2007; Larson and Soto 2008; Ribot et al. 2010; Loayza et al. 2011; Bowler et al. 
2012). 
While conventional top-down policies have been criticised (Holling and Meffe 1996), 
decentralised policies have not always resulted in efficient and equitable outcomes for certain 
                                                 
10 Meinzen-Dick and Knox (1999) provide an extensive framework on devolution in the context of institutions 
and community-based natural resource management. 
11 Cooke and Kothari (2001) also argue that these agencies often promote “participation” as a strategy to attract 
funding. 
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groups (Litvack et al. 1998). Successful outcomes depend on factors ranging from socially-
embedded institutions at the group level (e.g. local norms and values) to the accountability, 
capacity, incentives, and commitments of local political actors (Agrawal and Ribot 1999; 
Larson 2002; Berkes 2010). More importantly, these factors are contingent upon the 
multifunctional role of institutions in securing property rights while reducing transaction 
costs (Ménard et al. 2005). Some of the key factors limiting the effectiveness of 
decentralisation include insecure property rights for marginalised groups and elite capture 
(Leach et al. 1999; Kellert et al. 2000; Mansuri and Rao 2004). For example, the process of 
allocating rights and responsibilities to local governments often results in the consolidation of 
power amongst the elite within the community and unfair outcomes for local users of natural 
resources (Mansuri and Rao 2004; Colfer and Capistrano 2005; Iversen et al. 2006).  
Critical analyses of institutional dynamics and processes have helped to address the 
importance of understanding how polycentric institutions perform and evolve (Ostrom 2005). 
For instance, it is apparent now that central governments must also play a role in fostering 
good relations and assisting local governments through capacity building and extension 
services (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001; Ribot et al. 2006). These are also important factors for 
ensuring that new types of institutions (e.g. market-based) perform and adapt within existing 
government policies at different scales, and how they would be perceived in the context of 
local institutions.  
1.3.4 Incentive-Based Mechanisms 
Environmental externalities caused by land-use change can theoretically be solved by 
internalising them through marketS-based policy instruments such as payments for ecosystem 
(or environmental) services (PES). Incentive-based strategies such as PES provide rewards or 
compensations, such as paying the opportunity costs of conserving forest that would likely 
have been converted to other land-uses, through direct payments (Wunder et al. 2008; 
Swallow et al. 2009; Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010). PES is often viewed as an umbrella term 
for most incentive- or market-based strategies for internalising environmental externalities, 
which also include Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation 
(REDD/REDD+), conservation contracts or auctions (e.g. Jack et al. 2009; Porras et al. 
2011), as well as many agri-environmental schemes (e.g. Bryan 2013). PES is currently being 
adopted in many parts of the world for conserving scarce natural resources, biodiversity, and 
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other benefits from ecosystems (Landell-Mills and Porras 2002; Ferraro and Kiss 2002; 
Salzman 2005; Wunder et al. 2008). 
1.4 Payments for Ecosystem Services: Definition and Overview with Cases  
1.4.1 Conceptual and Theoretical Foundations of PES 
PES are economic strategies aimed at capturing external benefits from the environment 
through ‘quasi-markets’ and transforming them into real financial incentives for local actors 
stewarding those services (Wunder 2005; Engel et al. 2008; Sommerville et al. 2009). It has 
been described as the inverse of the ‘polluter pays’ principle to control negative externalities 
to the ‘supplier gets paid’ for providing positive externalities (Engel et al. 2008). The 
theoretical foundations for a PES scheme are defined by Wunder (2005:3) as: 1) a voluntary 
transaction where 2) a well-defined environmental service (ES), or a land use likely to secure 
that service, is 3) being ‘bought’ by at least one ES buyer 4) from at least one ES provider 5) 
if, and only if, the ES provider secures ES provisions (i.e. meets the conditions agreed upon). 
Costa Rica’s Pagos por Servicios Ambientes (PSA) scheme has received a great deal of 
attention as a PES, most notably with an increase in areas designated for biodiversity 
conservation (Thacher et al. 1996; Rojas and Aylward 2003; Zbinden and Lee 2005; Pfaff et 
al. 2006; Pagiola 2008). Its success has been partially attributed to the numerous support 
mechanisms in place, e.g. local NGOs, coupled with political stability and quality of 
infrastructure in the country (Wunder et al. 2008). In addition, it has a relatively long history 
for PES in a developing country context and has been extensively studied (Rojas and 
Aylward 2003; Miranda et al. 2003; Zbinden and Lee 2005; Pagiola 2008; Morse et al. 2009). 
Another important factor to consider is that most forested land in Costa Rica is privately 
owned12 (Arriagada et al. 2009). 
Other nations have also begun to show some progress through newly established PES 
schemes, although they differ substantially in objectives and institutional design (Brouwer et 
al. 2011). The Chinese government has launched perhaps the most ambitious ‘PES’ through 
its Sloping Lands Conversion Program (SLCP) by retiring and re/afforesting millions of 
hectares over the past decade (Bennett 2008; Bullock and King 2011; Yin and Zhao 2012). A 
review of the PES schemes from around the world has shown that user-financed programs 
                                                 
12 Over 50% according to the FAO (2010). 
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had more effective outcomes in both design and additionality than those that were 
government-financed (Wunder et al. 2008). However, governments are more likely to accept 
schemes with high transaction costs than private entities, whether buyers or users of ES (pers. 
comm. S. Wunder, Apr. 2013). 
1.4.2 Common Property Problems with PES 
PES schemes are favoured in situations where property rights are well-defined, e.g. 
private/individual landowners or strong local regimes/institutions (Pattanayak et al. 2010; 
Rode et al. 2013). While PES has also been used to improve community-based conservation 
projects, fair distribution of benefits can be a contentious issue (Sommerville et al. 2010). In 
some cases, PES schemes geared towards wildlife protection may require collective 
participation efforts on common-property, as is the case with conserving large mammals in 
sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Nelson et al. 2010). In addition, PES or other policies (e.g. 
subsidies) may crowd out already existing institutional arrangements or introduce perverse 
incentives if it replaces cooperation with competition (Kerr et al. 2012). In case where PES is 
targeted for restoration projects (e.g. re/afforestation), there might be the risk of undermining 
collective action processes that helped to secure access and ownership rights in the first place 
(Agrawal and Ostrom 2001). There is also the additional risk that destabilising socially-
embedded institutions, making property rights less secure, would result in increased 
transaction costs (Ménard et al. 2005; Swallow and Meinzen-Dick 2009).  
1.4.3 Principal-Agent Problems with PES 
Principal-Agent dilemmas are common economic problems relating to conflicts of interest, 
moral hazard, and asymmetrical (incomplete or imperfect) information (Holmstrom and 
Milgrom 1991; Bolton and Dewatripont 2005). They occur in both the marketplace and 
political arena, generally between a ‘principal’ who hires (or delegates a task for) an ‘agent’. 
From a political perspective, bureaucrats can be seen as the agent while voters are their 
principals. In the free market, the objectives of land managers and contracted agents, for 
example, might be conflicting since both parties intend to maximize their own utility 
(Shogren et al. 2010). Moreover, cases where private information, e.g. costs of land, labour 
and capital, is withheld lead to either moral hazards (or hidden action) or adverse selection 
(or hidden information). Optimal institutional designs (or contracts) are intended to minimise 
principal-agent dilemmas through revealing the incentives of each party (Grossman and Hart 
1983; Rogerson 1985; Eisenhardt 1989; Gibbons 1998; Laffont 2003). Contract (or agency) 
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theory, therefore, helps frame issues related to principals and agents within the context of 
incentive-based mechanisms (e.g. PES) used to internalise benefits from the environment. 
In the context of PES, the ‘service buyer’ can be considered as the contracting ‘principal’ and 
the ‘service seller’ the contracted ‘agent’ (Grossman and Hart 1983). In such contractual 
arrangements, a conditional agreement is reached between both parties with the expectation 
of increasing or enhancing a clearly defined environmental (or ecosystem) service (ES). This 
includes alternative land-use practices, where payments may be based on estimating the 
opportunity costs of foregoing to land conversion, e.g. avoided deforestation (Wunder 2007). 
While some PES schemes (e.g. REDD/REDD+) are strictly aimed at reducing net carbon 
emissions from land-use changes (e.g. deforestation) by conserving existing forests, wetlands, 
and other natural ecosystems, there are concerns that such narrowly focussed PES could lead 
to the planting of monocultures of faster-growing exotics (Murray 2000; Sayer et al. 2004; 
Pagiola et al. 2004a; Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006; Montagnini and Finney 2011). This 
issue arises partly because of difficulties in specifying and quantifying non-commodity 
ecosystem (or environmental) goods or services (Ferraro 2008). North (1992) illustrates the 
complexities involved in estimating the costs of difficult goods and services for principals: 
The costs of transacting arise because information is costly and asymmetrically held by 
the parties to exchange. The costs of measuring the multiple valuable dimensions of the 
goods or services exchanged or of the performance of agents, and the costs of enforcing 
agreements determine transaction costs. 
Thus, more narrowly focussed PES (e.g. carbon-only) would likely have lower transaction 
costs than broader-based PES (e.g. bundled or layered ES) or those focussed on ES that are 
harder to define and estimate, like biodiversity. 
1.4.4 Carbon Markets, Climate Change & the Biodiversity Paradox 
International market-based policies have emerged to boost forest protection and restoration 
efforts under the United Nations’ Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation 
(REDD/REDD+) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Meanwhile, governments 
have begun adopting large-scale tree planting (re/afforestation) driven by these and other 
objectives, motives and incentives (Edwards et al. 2010). Current net gains of global forest 
cover are partially due to large-scale afforestation efforts, particularly in India, the US and 
China (Houghton 2003). In fact, China was the biggest contributor of ‘new forests’ in the last 
two decades through government-sponsored PES schemes (Bennett 2008). However, these 
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achievements have also had negative social and ecological impacts (e.g. Cao et al. 2011) in 
spite of increases in carbon storage from afforestation (Fang et al. 2001). Despite the general 
trends of marginal expansion of forest cover, conversion of species-rich areas (e.g. primary 
forests13 and wetlands) has continued to increase in many parts of the world contributing to 
both carbon emission and biodiversity loss (Hansen et al. 2010; FAO 2011). As a result, the 
expanding of the new “carbon markets” could contribute to biodiversity loss (or exacerbate 
it) if there are no institutional mechanisms for integrating biodiversity as a co-benefit (Busch 
et al. 2011). In turn, these efforts could result in moral hazard, displacement, and “leakage” 
issues for forests and biodiversity outside protected areas or under these schemes (Wunder 
and Albán 2008; Edwards et al. 2010; Busch et al. 2011; Harrison and Paoli 2012).  
1.4.5 Challenges and Constraints with PES as a Policy Instrument 
PES has been conventionally applied as a mechanism for preventing deforestation, but is also 
being increasingly applied to incentivise restoration efforts for enhancing different kinds of 
ES, also referred to as asset-building PES (chapter 3). Many studies have emphasised 
adopting ecologically-sound restoration practices through selecting the right native tree and 
shrub species and prioritising degraded areas (Mansourian et al. 2005; Chazdon 2008; Rey-
Benayas et al. 2009; Hall et al. 2011a). Some have also advocated targeting ecologically 
important areas for restoration, such as riparian systems (e.g. Rodrigues et al. 2011). Yet, 
there are numerous challenges when attempting to enhance biodiversity simultaneously with 
other ecosystem services, particularly under private property regimes. For instance, 
restoration efforts that emphasise attaining broad-based ES in multifunctional landscapes can 
theoretically enhance biodiversity, yet are likely to face higher transaction costs, e.g. 
compliance monitoring. Hence, PES schemes that are designed for compensating land 
managers for ‘inputs’ that are ‘action-based’, such as number of trees planted, may or may 
not produce the same effects as PES that are ‘performance- (or results-) based and focussed 
on ‘outputs’ (Ferraro 2011; Gibbons et al. 2011; Montagnini and Finney 2011). Institutional 
designs are therefore of considerable importance to ensure the ES buyer(s) obtain the 
expected additionality being paid for since conditions and objectives are agreed upon through 
contracts14. (Paoli et al. 2010; Bullock et al. 2011; Busch 2013).  
                                                 
13 Classified as forests with no previous signs of human interference by FAO (2010) 
14 Issues of PES contract design for biodiversity are examined in more detail in chapter 3. 
Chapter 1   Introduction 
24 
It is necessary to view PES as one of many kinds of environmental policy options, 
particularly for correcting market failures through addressing the ‘free rider’ problem, or 
society’s failure to pay for the external benefits from the environment (Salzman 2005). As 
opposed to other environmental policy mechanisms such as regulations, e.g. restriction on 
cutting trees or protected areas forbidding entry, which also require strong public institutions 
able to cover the transaction costs, PES relies on incentives and voluntary participation, 
similar to new institutions being introduced in private markets (e.g. carbon trading or 
government tax breaks). As a voluntary policy option, use-restricting PES are considered to 
be more efficient and equitable than ‘command-and-control’ policies for regulating 
deforestation. However, asset-building PES often requires incentivising people to plant trees 
they normally would not plant and quite often rely on social and institutional factors ensuring 
effective outcomes, such as secured property rights (chapter 2). These are important aspects 
to consider when designing PES schemes in contexts where they have not been fully 
introduced or experimented with, such as in Lebanon. 
1.5 Lebanon: Overview of a Relevant Case-Study 
1.5.1 Public Administration and Decentralisation 
Lebanon gained its independence in 1943 following the French Mandate period (1918-1943) 
during which it was annexed with Syria. It has an unconventional political system based on 
confessional ties15 ruled as a parliamentary republic with a legislative branch forming the 
National Assembly of a 128-seat unicameral cabinet (Chamber of Deputies). Deputies 
(including ministers) are voted in through public elections (5 year terms) who then elect with 
two-thirds majority the president (always a Maronite Christian)16. The president leads the 
executive branch government and is head of the army, and therefore quite often a former 
general. Once voted in, he appoints a prime minister (always a Sunni Muslim), who then 
assembles the Council of Ministers (roughly 20). The Speaker of the House of Parliament 
(always Shi’a Muslim) is elected by the parliament and has a significant amount of 
negotiating power. He is in charge of setting the legislative agenda with laws and policy 
                                                 
15 Consociationalism is a form of government and power-sharing in deeply divided or fractured societies (ethnic, 
religious, linguistic, etc.) where there is a lack of majority rule but rather a coalition of communal autonomy that 
is intended to serve all (see Harb 2006). Note that Lebanon’s political structure is an example of confessional 
consociationalism, meaning that members are associated through religious confessional lines (Salamey 2009).  
16 This arrangement changed at the 2008 Doha Agreement in which there are 1/3 seats equally distributed to 
Christians, Sunni and Shiite. 
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presented by the central government and judiciary committee. The deputy parliamentary 
official represents the speaker’ district, which is characterized by sectarian and political party 
ties (CEIP 2008; ROL 2008). 
Lebanon’s political administration is divided into 6 governorates (mohafazet), each led by a 
governor (muhafez). Each governorate contains a number of districts17 (aqdiya) led by a 
district commissioner (qa’immiqam). There are 26 districts (including Beirut) each containing 
a variable number of municipalities, the lowest level of local administrative government. 
Municipalities are defined as having municipal councils consisting of a set number of council 
members whose numbers (9, 12, 15, 18, and 21) are determined by population of the village. 
Of the 1,296 towns and villages Lebanon, 963 have municipal councils as of the 2010 
municipal elections (MOIM 2011). Towns and villages without municipal councils are 
sometimes represented by neighbouring municipalities. The rest are represented by a mukhtar 
(or mukhatir, plural [Arabic]) that are administratively connected to the district commissioner 
rather than to the Ministry of Interiors and Municipalities (MOIM). There are few recent 
references that describe the differing roles and responsibilities between mayors and mukhtars 
in Lebanon. However, Salem (1965) describes this quite succinctly (presuming their roles 
have not changed dramatically over the last few decades):  
The ra’is18 presides over the council of the municipality, and in consultation with his 
council, supervises the opening of roads, repairing schools, installing electricity and 
administering the internal affairs of the municipality. The mukhtar, on the other hand, is 
the official link between the village and the central government. He verifies births, deaths, 
and signatures, and performs a variety of para-governmental services requested by the 
qa'immaqam, such as helping the gendarmes (rural police) in locating a criminal. (380-
381) 
Virtually every town and village contains at least one mukhtar who is also elected by their 
constituents during municipal elections that take place every three years19. During these 
elections Lebanese citizens vote in their constituency (i.e. town or village where they were 
born) and not their permanent place of residence. This means that while a town or village 
may have a small number of permanent residents or households, the number of constituents 
                                                 
17 With the exception of the governorate of Beirut. 
18 Ra’is baladiyeh translates to ‘president of municipality’, i.e. mayor. 
19 There are approximately 2,753 mukhtars in Lebanon as of 2010. 
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may be much higher. Similarly the number of council members in municipalities reflects that 
of the number of constituents, not the number of residents. 
Lebanon has been described as a nation under ‘regularised instability’ due to its political 
culture and weak legitimacy that result in constant political gridlock and crises (Al-Khouri 
2006; Nasnas et al. 2007). According to the Carnegie Endowment of Peace, Lebanon could 
benefit from a shift towards a bicameral parliament through the establishment of a Senate to 
represent the 28 districts (majilis cadat). Each district would be represented by a 
democratically elected senator (rayeez cadat) who would not be bound by sectarian or 
confessional lines, but rather ensure that a proper consensus is developed towards improving 
services and local infrastructure of each of the municipalities within their district (CEIP 
2008). This effort towards decentralisation might enable more empowerment and capacity 
from the bottom up while the Senate would balance that process as a means of 
‘recentralizing’ authority and confidence back to the central government (Atallah 2002). This 
would perhaps be the most optimal means of sharing power while sustaining a certain level of 
authority, e.g. reducing ethnic conflicts (Ciepley 2013) and awareness of broader national 
interests, e.g. social and environmental (Bissat 2002). 
1.5.2 Ecological Significance of the Mediterranean Basin and Lebanon 
Mosaic landscapes of the Mediterranean basin have been shaped by humans over millennia 
(Blondel 2006; Zohary et al. 2012). Domestication of plants and animals began as early as 
10,000 years ago in the eastern basin, followed by population growth and decline, wars and 
invasions, which have all had profound social and ecological implications for biodiversity 
therein (Barbero et al. 1990; Naveh 1998; Braudel and Reynolds 2002; Thompson 2005; 
Reyers et al. 2009; Blondel et al. 2010). This co-evolutionary process, along with climate 
change and diverse topography, has contributed to the high levels of plant species richness 
and endemism around the basin, recognised as a biodiversity ‘hotspot’ (Médail and Quézel 
1999; Mittermeier et al. 2011). Of the 25 biodiversity ‘hotspots’ identified by Myers et al. 
(2000), the Mediterranean basin is the second richest in plant diversity after the tropical 
Andes in spite of losses of forests and other woodlands over the ages (Médail and Quézel 
1999; Myers et al. 2000)20. While dry forests around the basin offer relatively lower carbon 
                                                 
20 Historical patterns of gradual disturbances, both natural and human caused, may have contributed to this 
increase in biodiversity (Blondel et al. 2010). 
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sequestration services than the humid tropics, its biodiversity is a major yet undervalued 
ecological asset (Merlo and Croitoru 2005). 
1.5.3 Lebanon as a Centre for Plant Diversity 
Lebanon is a relatively small (10,452 km²), predominantly mountainous country located in 
the eastern Mediterranean. Despite its small size it still harbours over 2,600 vascular plant 
species, of which around 12% are endemic to the eastern Mediterranean region (Zohary 
1973). Of these, over 300 are endemic to Lebanon alone (Davis et al. 1994), with some 
occurring exclusively in isolated areas within the country (Tohmé and Tohmé 2007). Some of 
these steno-endemics occur in high altitude landscapes above the tree line (jurd in Arabic) 
while the majority of rare and endemic species documented are found in forest and woodland 
ecosystems (Yazbek et al. 2010; Sattout and Caligari 2011).  
Inspired by the success of Important Bird Areas initiated by Birdlife International, leading 
botanists from around Europe discussed the urgent need to prioritise areas of exceptional 
plant diversity under threat. Important Plant Areas (IPAs) was the outcome initiated by 
Plantlife International in the mid-1990s. The initiative was developed as a means for 
identifying and protecting a “network of the best sites for plant conservation throughout 
Europe and the rest of the world...” (Anderson 2002:6). Objectives include the documentation 
of wild plants and their habitats with special attention placed on promoting education, 
awareness and capacity building on the sustainable use and conservation of plant diversity. 
The programme’s Guidelines have gained broad support from multinational stakeholders, 
including the UN’s Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the International Union 
for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), with contributions to both policy and practice 
(Anderson 2002). 
With threats to plant diversity in the eastern and southern Mediterranean basin increasing, a 
project was initiated for rapid assessment of IPAs in North African and Middle Eastern 
countries (Radford et al. 2011). A team of scientists from the American University of Beirut’s 
Nature Conservation Center (AUB-NCC) and experts from other institutions participated in 
defining IPAs in Lebanon (Yazbek et al. 2010). The team identified endemic plants in 
Lebanon and neighbouring countries using the most recent reference on the flora of Lebanon 
(Tohmé and Tohmé 2007) along with several published reports and regional references on the 
flora of the eastern Mediterranean Basin (e.g. Post 1932; Mouterde 1966; Zohary 1973). The 
authors defined a total of twenty IPAs in Lebanon using the discussed methods presented in 
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Figure 1.4 below. Nine IPAs are located on the western slopes of the Mount Lebanon range, 
with an average elevation of approximately 1200 metres (ranging from sea level to 3,04421 
meters). The majority of Lebanon’s protected areas (e.g. nature reserves, Biosphere reserves, 
Ramsar sites) occur within these IPAs. Designated IPAs are shown to represent the major 
ecosystems and unique habitats of Lebanon. 
Figure 1.4. Google Earth map showing the 20 IPAs of Lebanon in green developed by Yazbek et al. 
(2010). 
Endemic and/or threatened species are found in virtually all IPAs, most containing more than 
10 nationally endemic species. Agricultural intensification, particularly through overgrazing, 
was considered the main threat for over two-thirds of the 144 IPAs across the 10 participating 
countries in the Middle East and North Africa (Radford et al. 2011). However, development 
(through urbanisation) was considered to be biggest threat to most IPAs in Lebanon. In 
addition to urban development are threats from quarrying activities taking place in most of 
                                                 
21 Qornet es-Saouda (highest peak in Lebanon). 
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the mountainous IPAs as well as Hermel (LB02) and Aarsel (LB03) IPAs, and tourism 
development along the coast (Yazbek et al. 2010).  
Deforestation, quarrying, and urbanisation are the major land-use changes that have 
contributed to the degradation of natural forests and woodlands. This was especially acute 
during the civil war period when forest protection and regulations on land-use were virtually 
absent (Abi-Saleh et al. 1996; Masri 1999; Nasr et al. 2009; Darwish et al. 2010a). Forests 
containing large trees are sparse and highly fragmented, mainly occurring on the western 
ridge of Mount Lebanon (Talhouk et al. 2003). Some contiguous forests (coniferous and 
broadleaved) are now protected by law under nature reserves since the establishment of the 
Ministry of Environment shortly after the civil war (Abu-Izzeddin 2000). However, the 
majority of the forests and other woodland types outside these protected areas lack 
management arrangements for effective conservation (Sattout et al. 2005). Forest ecosystems 
and biodiversity in Lebanon continue to be threatened by land conversion and habitat 
fragmentation (Talhouk et al. 2005). To a certain extent, land abandonment has led to natural 
regeneration in some parts of the country. But the lack of proper management, partially a 
result of the current forestry laws (discussed in chapter 2), as well as inadequate response to 
more frequent and destructive forest fires, are major threats to Lebanese forests today (Jomaa 
et al. 2009; Mitri and Gitas 2011). 
Aside from greater efforts needed for improving the nation’s forest management policies, 
some national stakeholders in Lebanon, particularly NGOs, have expressed interest in long-
term reforestation efforts taking place in some IPAs (discussed in more detail below), such as 
the corridor separating Bcharre-Ehden (LB09) and Tannourine (LB11) IPAs (see Figure 1.4). 
Their aim is to connect the Tannourine and Haddath el-Jobbe cedar forests with the Cedar of 
God forest patch in Bcharre (LRI, 2012. pers. comm.). In addition to these two IPAs, 
reforestation campaigns have recently taken place in various other IPAs as well, for example 
the Keserouan (LB14), Chouf (LB16), Jabal ech-Cheikh (LB05), and Rihane (LB20) regions. 
Since re/afforestation can also have adverse impacts on biodiversity through excessive 
planting of monoculture or limited species (Alrababah et al. 2007), IPAs serve as important 
research sites for this study.  
1.5.4 Historic Deforestation in the 19th – 20th Centuries 
Much like the rest of the Mediterranean, deforestation in Lebanon has had a long history 
(Thirgood 1981). The Phoenicians were perhaps one of the first cultures to trade timber 
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(mainly cedar) for gold and other precious metals with early Egyptians (c. 3000 BCE) (Hitti 
1967; Chaney and Basbous 1978). As one of the provinces (villayet) of the Ottoman Empire 
(1299-1923), settlements in Mount Lebanon began increasing, predominantly with mixed 
agriculture (e.g. wheat, grapes and mulberry22) and livestock (mainly goats and sheep). The 
last major impact on forests in Lebanon took place during the end of the Ottoman rule when 
wood resources were used to fuel the First World War (1914-1918) followed by the 
construction of railway networks (Hitti 2002). Effects of grazing, wood collection, and 
gradual land-use change from urbanisation and agriculture in the highlands have contributed 
to forest degradation in the early half of the 20th century (Beals 1965; Mikesell 1969). 
1.5.5 Forest Characteristics and Tenure 
Lebanon currently has around 13% forest cover (1,394 km2)23 classified as subtropical 
mountain (48%), subtropical dry (38.1%) and subtropical steppe (13.9%). Of these, 97.4% 
are classed as ‘production’ and 2.6% as nature reserves. Another 10% of land-cover in 
Lebanon is classified as ‘other wooded land’ (or 1,084 km2)24, having canopy cover of less 
than 10%, and also largely classed as production (3% within nature reserves). The majority of 
Lebanon’s forests and other wooded lands occur along the western and eastern flanks of 
Mount Lebanon, beginning from Akkar in the far north to Marjayoun in the far south (Figure 
1.5). Patches of forests and other woodlands also occur to a much lesser extent along the 
Anti-Lebanon mountain chain (e.g. Mount Hermon in the southeast). 
                                                 
22 For silk production, predominantly in the 18-19th centuries (see Salibi 1988). 
23 Based on FAO classification of land having trees of at least 5 meters with a minimum canopy cover of 10%. 
24 Of which 44.3% is subtropical mountain, 31.7% is subtropical dry and 24% is subtropical steppe (Estephan 
and Beydoun 2005). 
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Figure 1.5. Forest map of Lebanon developed by the Ministry of Agriculture and FAO. 
Approximately 70% of forests and other wooded lands are under private tenure (Estephan 
and Beydoun 2005). Similarly, land tenure in Lebanon is predominantly under private 
ownership (Figure 1.6). 
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Figure 1.6. Total land tenure (forest and other land cover) in Lebanon (10,452 km2) based on data 
from Estephan & Beydoun (2005). 
Forest tenure in Lebanon is loosely categorized under private and public (state) ownership 
based on FAO land cover categories (FAO 2010). The National Forest and Tree Resources 
Assessment and Monitoring report for Lebanon (FAO, TCP/LEB/2903) classify private 
forests as those “owned by individuals, private co-operatives, corporations and other business 
entities, private religious institutions (waqf)25”. Private forest comprise roughly 73% of total 
forests (not including ‘other wooded lands’) in Lebanon (Table 1.4). Public ownership of 
forests falls under the category of ‘State’, which include “administrative units of the public 
administration; or by institutions or corporations owned by the public administration”26. 
Other categories of forest ownership fall under either ‘Municipality’ (Arabic – ‘mesheaa’)27, 
                                                 
25 Religious institutions own approximately 35% (or roughly 300 km2) of private forests in Lebanon. 
26 The FRA 2010 Categories and Definitions for private forests also include families, communities, educational 
institutions, pension and investment funds, NGOs, nature conservation organizations and other private 
institutions. 
27 Owned by the municipality, union of municipalities, or the population (community) of the concerned villages 
or towns. 
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‘Community’28, and ‘Not known’, classified as subcategories of ‘Private ownership (FRA 
2010:9-12).  
Table 1.4. Distribution of forest tenure types and area (in hectares) in Lebanon based on FAO Forest 
Resource Assessment categories (FRA 2010) 
National Category FRA Category Area (ha) 
   (subtotal) 
State Public ownership  37,388 
Private Private ownership  99,636 
   Individuals/families 47,745  
   Private businesses/institutions 34,673  
   Local communities 14,216  
   Indigenous/tribal 1,637  
   Other types 1,365  
Total    137,024* 
*Indicates land with forest cover of known tenure only and includes communal tenure 
 
1.5.6 Recent Land-Use and Land-Cover Change 
The earliest aerial forest mapping of Lebanon was conducted by the FAO in collaboration 
with the Ministry of Agriculture and the Directorate of Geographic Affairs of the Lebanese 
army (1963-65). Results from the report indicated a forest cover of roughly 7% (El-Husseini 
and Baltaxe 1965; Baltaxe 1966). These earlier maps, however, did not provide sufficient 
data on density of forest stands. More recent studies using satellite images indicate that while 
the general trend has been marginal increases in forest cover, they have become highly 
fragmented and patchy (Jomaa 2008). Forest loss during the civil war period was acute in 
many parts of the country, but the war also contributed to land abandonment (Khuri et al. 
2000). For example, some highland areas of Mount Lebanon have shown gradual recovery of 
forests following agricultural abandonment with relatively little impact from urban 
development (Jomaa et al. 2009). On the other hand, significant losses of juniper (Juniperus 
excelsa) forests were detected in the foothills of eastern Bekaa Valley (Anti-Lebanon 
                                                 
28 Forest owned by a tribe, or a family without having a clear share of its members (Arabic ‘waqf thurri’). 
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Mountains) and along the eastern flank of Mount Lebanon over the last 40 years (Jomaa et al. 
2008).  
Grazing has been a contentious issue with respect to forestry in Lebanon. Much like in other 
parts of the Mediterranean, the forestry sector tends to be at odds with herders 
(Dumrongrojwatthana et al. 2011). The lack of policies for controlling grazing limited 
regeneration in different Mediterranean countries at different phases of their history 
(Thirgood 1981). On the other hand, grazing has also played an important role in shaping 
Mediterranean landscapes and biodiversity while reducing the risk of forest fires 
(Perevolotsky and Seligman 1998; Joffre et al. 1999; Cingolani et al. 2005). Such complex 
social-ecological systems may have also contributed to high plant diversity around the basin 
over long temporal scales (Blondel et al. 2010; Zohary et al. 2012). While integrated 
strategies were used to manage agro-silvopastoral systems in many rural Mediterranean 
societies for hundreds of years (e.g. dehesa), many began to fade under increasing land 
pressure, economic development and wars (Blondel 2006), as well as poorly planned policies 
(e.g. Lorent et al. 2009). Interestingly, rangelands in Lebanon have been gradually lost to 
cultivated land while livestock has increased by nearly 50% in the last few decades, resulting 
in land degradation due to overgrazing on marginal, erosion-prone areas (Darwish and Faour 
2008). Pastoral to cultivated land-use changes are becoming increasingly problematic to 
rangeland ecosystems resulting in fragmentation and loss of biodiversity, especially wild 
cereals and forage plants. Rangeland in the Beqaa Valley, the breadbasket of food production 
in Lebanon, have decreased by 60% while irrigated land increased twofold in the last 30 
years (Darwish and Faour 2008). Issues pertaining to grazing pressures due to competing 
land-uses and agricultural policies, including afforestation activities, have also been 
problematic in other Mediterranean countries (Bengtsson et al. 2000; Alrababah et al. 2007; 
Lorent et al. 2009). 
In spite of having higher than the global average of forest cover (FAO 2011), forests and 
biodiversity in Lebanon still face numerous threats and challenges. Rural emigration has, on 
one hand, led to natural regeneration of woodlands in previously cultivated lands. However, 
the lack of incentives for sustainable forest management has made existing forests more 
vulnerable to pest outbreaks, storms, and more frequent and aggressive forest fires (FRA 
2010). Additionally, legal constraints may be limiting the development of sustainable 
measures for collecting fuelwood and charcoal production, as well as non-wood forest 
products. The lack of common-property regimes and other institutional mechanisms (e.g. 
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property/access rights) lowers socioeconomic conditions of many forest-dependent 
communities, inhibiting their capacity to manage common-pool resources effectively, and 
instead contribute to rather than deter overharvesting (Gibson et al. 2000).  
1.5.7 Forestry and Environmental Policy 
Lebanon’s ‘Forest Code’ was drafted in 1949 and served as a legal benchmark for forest 
policies related to forest protection, tenure, management, restoration and investment (Regato 
and Asmar 2011). In spite of the Forest Code being amended over the years through 
numerous decrees and decisions, certain aspects remain counterproductive in promoting 
sound forest management practices. For example, local authorities and landowners are 
required to obtain permission from the Ministry of Agriculture (or other ministries) to cut 
down or even remove dead limbs from mainly coniferous trees. This not only constrains 
measures to prevent forest fires, e.g. thinning, but also discourages tree planting in general. 
Outdated infrastructure29 and understaffing, compounded by the lack of cooperation between 
ministries, has resulted in a fragmented public sector unable to efficiently respond to 
applicants requesting forestry-related permits. In addition, pervasive rent-seeking behaviour, 
e.g. extracting bribes, has also weakened Lebanon’s public institutions and undermined any 
efforts in building public trust (Svensson 2005; MOIM 2011). Consequently, rejected 
applicants seeking such permits could (and often do) obtain them from another ministry30 
(pers. comm. AFDC, July 2012), especially if they have special privileges or connections.  
Public opinion in Lebanon tends to favour reforestation. A reason for this could be attributed 
to ‘historical fidelity’ (Cole et al. 2010); a general belief that the country at one point in time 
was predominantly covered in forests, which are now lost. While reforestation accounted for 
23% of environmental activities reported from 1994-2002 (Djoundourian 2009)31, such 
efforts in post-war Lebanon appeared to be sporadic in subsequent years, suggesting that 
these efforts are strongly linked to the economic and political stability of the country. Sattout 
et al. (2007) provided evidence of strong public support for protecting cedar forests in 
Lebanon based on a recent stated preference study indicating willingness-to-pay for non-use 
values of these forests. However, this support was predominantly for Lebanese cedars 
                                                 
29 Most documents are still paper based. 
30 Ministries of environment (MOE), energy & water (MOEW), and interiors & municipalities (MOIM). 
31 These were indexed as number of activities, seminars, workshops, publications, etc. recorded monthly. 
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(Cedrus libani Rich.) given the symbolic and cultural significance this species has to 
Lebanese citizens. The authors of that study further stated that research is needed to move 
beyond focusing on single species to one that broadly encompasses forest ecosystems. While 
there are a substantial number of native trees and shrubs that can be used in reforestation in 
Lebanon, only a limited number are used32. There are no clear indications as to why, but one 
assumption may be the lack of familiarity with most native species by the general public. 
Another possibility might be their availability in private nurseries. In response, some NGOs 
and research centres with interests in conserving forest biodiversity have recently published 
books and technical manuals on the propagation and planting of various indigenous tree 
species (chapter 4). Similarly, a small number of private nurseries have begun producing a 
variety of native species that were previously unavailable, largely incentivised by those 
NGOs and research centres (pers. comm., LRI, June 2012).  
1.5.8 Reforestation Stakeholders in Lebanon 
Public and private sector stakeholders in Lebanon sharing similar concerns over historic 
deforestation have given considerable priority towards funding re/afforestation efforts over 
the last few decades. The Lebanese government intends to increase forest cover from 13 to 
20% (an increase of roughly 73,000 ha) over the next few decades through active replanting, 
mainly targeting ‘other wooded lands’ (Regato and Asmar 2011). This ambitious goal raises 
some important questions pertaining to policy and management decisions. Yet no rigorous 
evaluation has been conducted to calculate the costs of establishing planted forests or how to 
account for natural regeneration of forests taking place on abandoned private farmlands in 
many parts of the country. There are also numerous technical and social challenges for 
ensuring acceptable rates of tree establishment, from planting and maintenance to measures 
for ensuring protection of trees (which also includes establishing secured tenure). Aside from 
these, there are also critical issues pertaining to biodiversity and ecosystem services that 
includes examining the potential effects large-scale re/afforestation (or plantations) may have 
in ecologically sensitive areas such as IPAs. Below I present the main stakeholders involved 
in Lebanon’s past, present and future reforestation efforts (please see Appendix 1.1 for the 
matrix of reforestation stakeholders).  
                                                 
32 Some endemic tree and shrub species to Lebanon include three-lobbed crabapple (Malus trilobata), Lebanon 
oak (Quercus libani), and Lebanese willow (Salix libani). 
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Ministry of Agriculture’s ‘Green Plan’ 
The first major national reforestation campaign in Lebanon was conceived in 1959, led by the 
Ministry of Agriculture in partnership with the Lebanese Army and FAO consultants. The 
‘Green Plan’ (MOA/GP) was launched in the early 60s as part of a national effort to improve 
the Lebanese highlands through land rehabilitation, irrigation and large-scale reforestation33. 
In addition to 14,200 ha of land rehabilitated (or re-terraced) from previous land-uses (e.g. 
old wheat fields and rangelands), there was the objective to reforest some 142,000 ha of 
mountainous landscapes over a 20 year period (Regato and Asmar 2011). Large-scale tree 
nurseries were established with the help of foreign funding and technical aid, mainly from the 
British and French governments, to facilitate the production of millions of saplings 
(predominantly conifers). With the help of the Lebanese army and volunteers from civil 
society, reforestation activities took place in terraced mountainsides from Bcharre in the 
north to the Shouf mountains further south (Mikesell 1969; Chaney and Basbous 1978). Yet 
these efforts ceased shortly after the start of the civil war in 1975 with only a fraction (around 
2,000 ha) of the proposed area planted (Regato and Asmar 2011).  
National Reforestation Plan (NRP)34 
Both the ministries of environment (MOE) and agriculture (MOA) share forestry related 
responsibilities. The former was allocated funds towards large-scale tree planting campaigns 
under the National Reforestation Plan (1998 – 2013). However, reforestation activities were 
traditionally the responsibility of the MOA (e.g. the Green Plan described above), who until 
recently, have focused solely on enforcing protective and regulatory measures (e.g. forestry 
guards, issuing harvesting permits) in public (‘State’) forests and rangelands. They are also 
responsible for managing forest tree nurseries (most of which are in need of renovation) and 
distributing seedling to municipalities. On the other hand, the MOE, along with a growing 
number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), are undertaking reforestation in 
municipal lands (mesheaa) with municipalities and, in some case, with local associations.  
                                                 
33 Established as a Decree No. 13335 on 07 October, 1963 (MOA 2014). 
34 Details of this section were acquired from interviews with stakeholders from the MOE and MOA at various 
phases between October 2011 and July 2012. However, permission was not granted (and consent forms were 
never signed) from those higher up in the MOE for conducting formal semi-structured interviews with project 
staff. 
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The Directorate General of Environment of the Ministry of Environment (MOE) was given 
the mandate and funds (UN-GEF and Lebanese Government) for executing all reforestation 
activities in Lebanon from 2002-2012. They commissioned a multi-phased project coined 
National Reforestation Plan (NRP) with an overall target to plant 200,000 ha (roughly 20% of 
Lebanon’s surface area) over the next 3-4 decades, incorporating villages from each of the 26 
districts (cadat). In the first two phases, all aspects of reforestation were subcontracted 
through biddings in which 3rd party agents were then required to plant in public (state or 
municipal) lands and manage seedlings for at least 2 years.  
Following mixed results and with less than 700 ha being subcontracted by the end of 2004, 
the MOE recognised the need for incorporating municipalities as agents. They adopted an 
incentives-based approach in the last phase (2008-2013) of its NRP. A ‘payment for 
reforestation’ scheme was developed that offered conditional payments for the planting and 
care of seedlings for a duration of two years to heads of municipalities in around 60 villages. 
A budget of US$2,225,000 was allocated for the last phase, half of which was covered by 
UN-GEF and the other half was in-kind contributions by the Lebanese government. Since 
permission was not granted to obtain quantitative data on which municipalities the MOE 
selected, it was difficult to determine planting and survival outcomes or obtain feedback from 
mayors on the programme. However, a brief overview of Phase III of the NRP was presented 
by my informants35 as followed: 
1. formal call for participation was sent via fax to all municipalities (> 900) from the 
MOE headquarter with over 200 responses 
2. municipalities were short-listed based on previous reforestation efforts36 and were 
required to provide cadastral maps of their municipal areas and attend a workshop 
3. municipalities selected for the program were required to provide a purchasing order or 
invoice of saplings purchased from ‘designated tree nurseries’ in order to receive first 
payment (conditionality 1) 
4. subsequent monitoring sessions were conducted; the first directly following the 
planting to assess planting outcomes and the second the following year to estimate 
survival, respectively; and payments were made based on outcomes (conditionality 2) 
                                                 
35 Project manager for the NRP at the MOE (interviewed in October, 2011). 
36 Municipalities that participated in previous reforestation efforts with the MOE were not eligible. 
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The payment scheme was based on a 60-20-20 format, where 60% would be paid up front 
once the municipality had submitted a plan (e.g. cadastral map of planting area, number of 
seedlings, and purchase order/invoice for seedlings). The second payment (20%) would be 
paid based on planting results and the last payment (20%) based on survival results after 
monitoring in the second year after planting. Requiring that municipalities provide a copy of 
the purchase order was a criteria for receiving payments as a measure to ensure that only 
forest (and not fruit) trees were planted. In addition, municipalities were required to purchase 
seedlings from local commercial nurseries rather than acquiring them by other means, e.g. 
gifts.  
While it is not clear whether or not the Ministry of Environment will continue with its 
reforestation programme, the Ministry of Agriculture has set forth its own forestry agenda for 
the coming years. However, political instability in the central government continues to 
hamper progress in forestry and other environmental sectors in Lebanon.  
National Forest Programme (NFP) 
The MOA is currently campaigning to produce 40 million forest saplings to meet its target 
for planting 70,000 ha. Similarly, it intends to increase forest cover from 13 to 20 per cent 
over the next 20 years. Entitled the “National Afforestation Program”, the Ministry’s forestry 
policy aims “to encourage investments towards stimulating economic functions of forests, to 
enhance the value of biologically diverse forests, both aesthetically and environmentally” 
(translated from Arabic, see footnote #37). They identify eight ‘benefits’ (or ecosystem 
services) that are recognised as important goods and services provisioned from forest and 
other woodlands (OWLs)37: 
1. Biodiversity Conservation 
2. Ecotourism and recreation 
3. Soil and water conservation 
4. Fuelwood and charcoal 
5. Pine nuts production 
6. Medicinal, aromatic, and edible plants 
7. Honey production 
8. Mitigate impacts of climate change 
                                                 
37 Found on the News and Events web page of the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA 2015). 
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In terms of reforestation, there was no mention of whether the order of these benefits listed is 
hierarchical and even less clarity on the kinds of trees and their proportions that would need 
to be produced and planted for provisioning these ecosystem goods and services. The title of 
the program, on the other hand, suggests that the objectives are leaning more towards 
afforestation, but it is unclear whether they foresee having enough public or municipal land to 
plant trees on. 
At present, the MOA (despite at the time of this study having no financial means of 
performing extensive reforestation) have been conducting small-scale pilot projects to test 
new planting techniques. However, under the developing NFP, the MOA is exploring various 
financial mechanisms, such as PES and CDM, to finance its forestry efforts (pers. comm. C. 
Mohanna, 2011). Additionally, the Ministry is working towards developing a National Forest 
Center and various local extension offices in order to provide training on mapping, 
reforestation and forest management. 
In the meantime, the majority of reforestation is being undertaken by a small number of 
NGOs in Lebanon. These NGOs have contributed tremendously to reforestation efforts over 
the last few decades. There are three major reforestation NGOs working at the national level: 
1) Association for Forests, Development & Conservation (AFDC), 2) Jouzour Loubnan (JL), 
and 3) Lebanese Reforestation Initiative (LRI). Organisations working at the regional (or 
district) level include Al-Shouf Cedar Society (Shouf Mountains) and Association for the 
Protection of Jabal Moussa (APJM). Other NGOs and community-based organisations 
(CBOs) working at the village level include Cedar Friends (Bcharre municipality), TERRE 
Liban (Baabda Forest area), and Reforest Lebanon (Qalayaa municipality, South Lebanon).  
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Figure 1.7. Community tree planting event organised by the Nature Conservation Centre of the 
American University of Beirut (AUB-NCC) in the village of Ain Zebde, West Beqaa. 
In addition, specialised tree planting initiatives, such as the Nature Conservation Center of 
the American University of Beirut (AUB-NCC), have emerged to promote biodiversity 
conservation and community involvement in reforestation efforts (Figure 1.7 and Figure 1.8). 
Many of the NGOs mentioned have also recently begun to engage in more biodiversity-
oriented reforestation efforts, which includes the diversification of species and types (e.g. 
shrubs) produced from seeds sourced from the wild38. National-level NGOs and research 
centres have also begun partnerships with other local organisations and private nurseries to 
provide expertise and new technology to improve the quality of tree production and 
knowledge of those species. At present, there are about nine forest tree nurseries producing a 
variety of native species that were previously not available. 
                                                 
38 Both AUB-NCC and AFDC have published materials to inform the general public about Lebanese native 
species, their uses and production, in order to promote the diversification of indigenous tree species (Navarrete-
Poyatos et al. 2011; Talhouk et al. 2014). The latter has recently partnered with the IUCN, which has helped to 
encourage a move away from plantation-type reforestation to produce and plant other species besides stone pine 
and cedar. 
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Figure 1.8. Restoration of a biodiversity corridor in the Chouf Cedar Reserve led by the Nature 
Conservation Centre of the American University of Beirut (AUB-NCC) with volunteers from the 
Lebanese Scouts Association. 
 
1.5.9 Forest Cover vs. Tree Diversity in Reforestation 
An important objective for informing policy is to identify trade-offs and synergies between 
agricultural development, forestry and biodiversity conservation. Agricultural development 
projects are partially subsidised by the MOA’s (current) Green Plan, where landowners are 
offered financial and technical support for infrastructure (e.g. terraces, irrigation, and trees). 
Additionally, there are internationally funded projects in various ‘poverty pockets’ in the 
country ranging from canalisation and constructing of farm roads along with farm-scale 
infrastructural improvement, e.g. terracing, irrigation networks, and integrated pest 
management (pers. comm. ADELNORD, 2012). However, there are fewer incentives to 
landowners for planting forest trees other than those that produce commodities, e.g. nut-
bearing trees. 
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There are important alternatives to consider in restoring forest ecosystems to generate more 
goods and services. For instance, the use silvicultural species that are easy to propagate (be 
they native or exotic) can help establish well-functioning ecosystems while also creating 
habitats for other species. Silvicultural species may also be more cost-effective (and 
potentially take less time to establish) than reforesting with diverse, poorly known natives 
that are well-suited, require fewer inputs, and have better survival rates. While the evidence I 
have come across varies considerably, there are valid arguments pointing to cost-effective 
restoration using silvicultural treatments that also help create habitats for biodiversity, 
particularly in heavy degraded ecosystems (e.g. Lugo 1997; Hartley 2002; Brockerhoff et al. 
2008)39. However, in the case of Lebanon, silvicultural practices are virtually non-existent 
and further hampered by current policies (Law 85/1996), which prohibits the cutting or 
removing of native conifers (chapter 2)40. If these laws were to be amended or relaxed in the 
future, it may encourage more silvicultural activities in the country, particularly in the Beqaa 
Valley. Yet given that stone pine (Pinus pinea L.) is the main plantation species in Lebanon, 
and that its management often requires clearing any understory vegetation (including native 
shrubs) for ease of collecting cones (pers. comm. K. Slim, 2012), it would seem unlikely that 
land managers would plant rarer native species under the canopies of these forests without  
incentives (e.g. payments).  
Finally, some stakeholders expressed concerns and even objected to the recent policy trends 
pushing for large-scale reforestation in the country, especially with regards to the limited 
kinds of species being used (pers. comm. AUB-NCC, LRI, AFDC, 2012). Moreover, while 
goats are considered a major threat by reforestation stakeholders, others view them as 
providing beneficial services (e.g. fire prevention) if grazing were managed properly. 
Prioritising landscapes in need of restoration is also being overlooked in the policy sphere. 
For example, little attention has been paid towards restoring quarries using methods other 
than reforesting with trees, such as seeding with native shrubs and other perennials (Khater 
and Arnaud 2007; Darwish et al. 2010b). Hence there are numerous challenges faced and 
                                                 
39 Although in most Mediterranean climate-types, poor soils and extreme climatic conditions (low precipitation 
and very hot, long summers) often requires using drought-tolerant silvicultural species, while caution should be 
taken on the use exotic species that may have long-term ecological implications on ecosystems (Gritti et al. 
2006). 
40 Moreover, Lebanon imports virtually all of its timber products from abroad mainly for furniture production in 
Tripoli (pers. comm. MOA, 2011). Wood harvesting is usually done for the production of charcoal and 
household firewood in more rural areas, particularly in forest-dense areas such as Akkar and Dinniyeh (IPA# 
LB-07 in chapter 2). 
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objectives to fulfil with respecting reforestation in Lebanon, and one critical aspect of that 
involves trade-offs between increasing forest area (or cover) and enhancing biodiversity. 
1.6 Overview of the Thesis and Research Questions 
The undersupply of environmental goods and services necessitates devising institutional 
mechanisms for internalising externalities, and Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) is a 
potential strategy for correcting these market failures. As discussed, public and private sector 
reforestation stakeholders in Lebanon are investing heavily in reforestation efforts to meet 
ambitious forest cover targets over the next few decades. Most of the concerns are cost-
related, given recent experiences with suboptimal tree survival, and interests in exploring 
cost-effective incentives-based strategies like PES have increased. Other concerns are 
environmental, particularly with respect to the limited number and proportions of forest 
species used in re/afforestation. I therefore set out to investigate how to design asset-building 
PES that would incentivise planting and managing an appropriate mix of native tree species 
as an institutional measure for enhancing biodiversity in reforestation efforts. 
My study areas were located in highland villages within Important Plant Areas (IPAs) along 
the Mt Lebanon chain. In chapter 2, I examined the potential for incentives-based 
reforestation targeting municipalities within nine of Lebanon’s 20 IPAs. I employed semi-
structured interviews to engage local authorities, key informants, and residents in dialogue 
about the prospects for and constraints on reforesting municipal lands. In chapter 3, I 
conducted a mixed-methods survey with landowners from 17 villages within those IPAs to 
gauge their willingness to accept reforestation incentives of varying degrees of conditionality. 
In chapter 4, using online surveys, I asked 34 stakeholders from Lebanon’s public and private 
sector institutions to rate 22 native forest trees in order to derive a list of native trees 
considered to be of high conservation value in reforestation. In chapter 5, I employed this list 
of mixed-native species as one of three reforestation options in a choice experiment 
conducted with landowners in the Bcharre-Ehden IPA in North Lebanon. The choice 
experiment was aimed at estimating the trade-offs between diversity (number of species used) 
and extent (or area of forest increase) in reforestation, producing a production possibility 
frontier. Finally, in my discussion (chapter 6) I review key findings relevant to PES policies 
in a global context and conclude with some recommendations for Lebanon’s reforestation 
stakeholders. 
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2 Prospects for Designing Biodiversity-Enhancing Reforestation 
Incentives with Highland Municipalities in Lebanon 
Many of the costs and benefits of environmental management are felt locally, therefore local 
governments can be important actors and often have substantial landholdings. As 
administrative decentralisation efforts continue to progress in Lebanon, national stakeholders 
have begun exploring ways to incentivise municipalities to reforest municipal lands in an 
effort to increase its current forest cover by 7%. Reforestation in Lebanon faces threats from 
grazing while concerns have been raised about ecological impacts of reforesting with a 
limited number of species. In this chapter I examine the prospects for involving 
municipalities in native species reforestation efforts by asking how promising are 
municipalities as ecosystem services suppliers through biodiversity-enhancing reforestation? 
A conceptual model was developed to identify opportunities and constraints based on 
institutional and biophysical attributes of villages (with municipal governments) in my 
sample. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with local authorities, experts, and 
residents from a stratified sample of 48 highland villages located within Important Plant 
Areas along the Mount Lebanon range. The results indicated that few municipalities in the 
sample had sufficient or suitable municipal land for reforestation. For those that do, most are 
rangelands that are difficult to guard from grazing, and transactions costs are expected to be 
high given their remoteness. Unclear tenure, principal-agent dilemmas, patronage politics and 
the potential for crowding out pro-environmental behaviour are the main socio-institutional 
constraints in designing reforestation incentives for municipalities. Policy constraints also 
hamper effective forest management in municipal lands leading to dense woodland thickets 
and increasing the risk of forest fires. Biodiversity-enhancing reforestation incentives should 
be targeted towards municipalities that have enough suitable land with clearly defined 
cadastral boundaries and mechanisms for monitoring to ensure tree retention. Since these are 
rare, alternative strategies, including contracting directly with private landowners, should be 
explored. 
Keywords: biodiversity; land tenure; local government; native species; natural resource 
management; incentives; Payments for Ecosystem Services; semi-structured interviews; 
SWOT analysis  
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2.1 Introduction 
Many developing countries have been decentralising responsibilities, including over natural 
resources, to local-level governments over the last few decades (Larson 2005; Agrawal et al. 
2008). National-scale re/afforestation initiatives often gain a lot of public support and 
funding, yet objectives are often political and short-sighted (Ribot et al. 2006). Since the 
costs and benefits of environmental management are felt locally, local governments are 
therefore important stakeholders in re/afforestation. Establishing new forests in 
Mediterranean climates require long-term management where underestimating maintenance 
costs and effort result in poor outcomes and mortality of saplings (Scarascia-Mugnozza et al. 
2000; Vallejo 2005). Decentralising forest management responsibilities and decision making 
to local authorities therefore requires providing technical expertise to administrations that 
may not have prior experience in reforestation. Furthermore, ensuring long-term tree 
retention requires well-developed local institutions involving participation from members of 
the community that go beyond those of political terms of local administrations (chapter 1).  
Governments, international agencies and NGOs have begun adopting incentive-based 
mechanisms such as payments for ecosystem services (PES) aimed at directly paying people 
to plant, manage and conserve forests (Larson 2011; Barr and Sayer 2012). PES initiatives 
geared towards reforestation efforts often frontload planting costs while using productive 
trees to help cover long-term maintenance costs (Hegde and Bull 2011). Some studies have 
shown that plantations of mixed native species can produce viable economic and 
environmental benefits (Bremer and Farley 2010; Piotto et al. 2010). However, PES can 
potentially incentivise monoculture plantations with narrower objectives, ultimately 
threatening biodiversity and other ecosystem services (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006; Boyd 
2010; Cao 2011). One of the overarching challenges with PES includes increasing high-
conservation-value species used in reforestation, especially since many of these species offer 
few private benefits. There are also many challenges and constraints in designing 
biodiversity-enhancing PES with local-level governments. Recognising these social, 
institutional and ecological (or biophysical) constraints can help for more effective targeting 
of biodiversity-enhancing reforestation incentives.  
2.1.1 Socio-Ecological Dimensions of Payments for Ecosystem Services 
Numerous social and ecological factors determine the effectiveness of Payments for 
Ecosystem Services (PES). Insecure (or unclear) tenure and ownership often have undesirable 
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implications for PES outcomes (Swallow and Meinzen-Dick 2009; Bennett et al. 2011). For 
example, parallel regulatory (institutional) measures that restrict access (e.g. protected areas) 
may conflict with decentralised institutional arrangements secured under PES contracts 
(Ferraro 2011). On the other hand, the lack of parallel (or coercive) institutional measures for 
ensuring that property rights are protected, particularly in remote and difficult-to-police areas, 
obstruct the efficacy of PES (Börner et al. 2010)41. PES can also result in perverse incentives 
such as legitimising illegal land-use practices, and ‘crowding out’ embedded social 
institutions such as norms, values, and local rules (Van Hecken and Bastiaensen 2010a). 
These factors have implications for the cost-effectiveness of schemes by raising transaction 
costs (e.g. costs of monitoring and enforcing compliance) and increasing leakage (Vatn 2010; 
Muradian and Gómez-Baggethun 2013). PES contracts may have lower transaction costs if 
geared towards private landowners who are sole decision-makers (Engel et al. 2008). Yet 
socio-institutional problems can exist even when contracting parties are minimised to a single 
‘buyer’ of ecosystem services (ES) and a single ‘supplier’ of those ES (Van Hecken and 
Bastiaensen 2010b). Some of these problems are rooted in agency theory that I discuss below. 
2.1.2 Principal-Agent Framework 
Agency (or contract) theory examines the relationships and interactions between transacting 
parties (groups or individuals) based on a set of formal institutional agreements, e.g. terms 
and conditions, developed by the parties (Laffont and Martimort 2002). The principal-agent 
framework therefore can be simplified as any given individual (or ‘principal’) seeking a good 
or service from another individual (or ‘agent’) willing to provide those goods and services in 
a voluntary market (Laffont 2003). Incentives are what drive transactions between principals 
and agents (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991). PES and related incentives-based mechanisms 
are sometimes analysed from a principal-agent framework (e.g. Hanley et al. 2012), in that at 
least one principal (or ‘ES buyer’) is willing to pay (or compensate) a potential agent (or ‘ES 
supplier’) for a good or service rendered. In the case of PES, this entails conditional 
payments for an incremental supply42 of a well-defined environmental (or ecosystem) service 
(Wunder 2005).  
                                                 
41 While institutional measures may obstruct the efficacy of PES in some contexts, it is evident that markets 
need strong and supportive public institutions particularly for public goods-related PES (Wunder et al. 2014).  
42 The theoretical definition of additionality is where it is assumed that no incremental increase in supplies of a 
given ES from a given baseline would have occurred in the absence of the incentive (Pattanayak et al. 2010) 
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Transactions under imperfect markets also involve hidden costs due to incomplete or 
asymmetrical information, potentially resulting in moral hazard (or risk-taking behaviour) 
and conflicts of interest (Bolton and Dewatripont 2005). PES contracts inevitably incur 
variable transaction costs resulting from principal-agent dilemmas (e.g. costs of monitoring). 
One of the main challenges for ensuring efficiency in PES schemes is to keep these costs to a 
minimum. Studies on PES and related mechanisms (e.g. conservation contracts) have 
addressed principal-agent dilemmas when buyers lack sufficient information about ES 
suppliers’ actions (Shogren 2005; Ferraro 2008; Zabel and Roe 2009; Ando and Chen 2011). 
Asymmetric information surrounding tenure and property rights are common principal-agent 
problems, as are biophysical characteristics of property under a contract that may be 
strategically withheld, such as natural regeneration or existence of rare species (Shogren 
2005). In the latter case, information on existing land-use and land-cover is needed in order to 
measure additionality of biodiversity or other ecosystem services over time. 
2.1.3 Perverse Incentives and Crowding-Out 
PES can result in unintended consequences that reduce rather than increase environmental 
benefits, thus acting as perverse incentives. For example, if a criterion under a PES scheme is 
for land managers to plant a certain number of trees, there is the potential to incentivise the 
clearing of existing forests if the agent’s land already has trees or natural regeneration 
occurring (Pagiola et al. 2004a; Lamb et al. 2005; Montagnini and Finney 2011). In addition, 
PES schemes lacking mechanisms for conserving biodiversity may incentivise the planting of 
inappropriate species or mono-cropped plantations in ecologically sensitive areas (Niesten et 
al. 2002; Barr and Sayer 2012; Pandey et al. 2014). Perverse incentives are almost impossible 
to eliminate, but are exacerbated by poorly designed policies or contracts that lack 
institutional measures for targeting, monitoring and enforcement (Vatn 2010; Pattanayak et 
al. 2010). Similarly, incentives also have the potential to ‘crowd-out’ existing pro-
environmental behaviours. Several studies have shown how PES and related incentive-based 
mechanisms have the potential for crowding out pre-existing altruistic motives, such as 
environmental stewardship, which have repercussions for long-term participation and 
sustainability (Frey and Jegen 2001; Bénabou and Tirole 2005; Fisher 2012; Kerr et al. 2012; 
Rode et al. 2013). The difficulties in specifying desirable outcomes, such as reducing the 
risks of perverse incentives and crowding out, are principal-agent problems themselves. 
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2.1.4 Elite Capture 
Elite capture has been a contentious issue referred to in many case-studies involving 
decentralised NRM43 (Iversen et al. 2006; Saito-Jensen et al. 2010). An example relates to 
efforts to decentralise REDD+ schemes that have been met with resistance from political 
elites in central governments seeking to capture the majority of the (financial) benefits from 
such schemes (Sandbrook et al. 2010). Issues with equity and fairness as a result of elite 
capture have also been raised in recent literature on PES, especially where payments are 
allocated to groups (Sommerville et al. 2010; Clements et al. 2010; Muradian et al. 2010; 
Dickman et al. 2011). It is also possible for local elites to abuse their social (and political) 
capital by siphoning off benefits from social or environmental projects, thus creating 
opposition towards such initiatives by other members of the community (Woolcock 1998). 
While donor agencies require mechanisms for ensuring funds reach the right beneficiaries 
(Platteau 2004; Dasgupta and Beard 2007), reducing elite capture under REDD+ and 
community-based PES will likely depend on how well decentralised institutions deal with 
land tenure and use rights (Larson 2011). 
2.1.5 Political Patronage 
Political patronage refers to a type of social obligation involving client-patron relations. 
Much like elite capture, patronage politics are subject to local norms and customs, frequently 
involving rent-seeking behaviour, and largely driven by political forces and alliances (Ribot 
et al. 2010). Exchanging of favours and gifts, as well as allocation of local public goods, are 
common strategies employed by political incumbents (or parties they represent) to ‘buy’ 
votes (Moser 2008). Patronage is not exclusively related to political factions, but also 
includes social networks of patronage. Mosse (2001) described how donor-driven 
programmes implemented by NGOs in India developed strong patronage relationships with 
villagers in order to ensure their participation and timely delivery of the programme’s 
objectives. Social and political capital play an inherent role in patronage politics, which often 
shows path dependency and can influence policy outcomes (Putnam et al. 1994; Woolcock 
1998).  
                                                 
43 I consider decentralised natural resource management (NRM) as the managing of existing forests as well as 
the planting and managing of new forests by local-level organisations (including municipalities) on non-private 
lands. 
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Patronage politics could also undermine decentralised decision-making by local (e.g. 
municipal) authorities, particularly where NRM is concerned. Self-interested political actors 
may seek to establish strategic ties to patronage networks that are not in accordance with 
others in their administration or constituency (Klopp 2012). Case-studies examining NRM 
have shown that patronage politics interferes with democratic decision-making processes, 
hindering local institutional development and further weakening existing institutions 
(Mwenda and Tangri 2005; Larson 2005; Nelson and Agrawal 2008). Decisions surrounding 
access to natural resources are largely influenced by those in control of local government, but 
tend to favour local over outside interests in some developing countries (Kaimowitz et al. 
2001). External agencies have begun to recognise the prospects of working with local rather 
than national governments, which may then have implications (positive or negative) for 
patronage networks as well as elite capture by national stakeholders.  
2.1.6 Biophysical Constraints 
Availability and suitability of land is the main limiting factor for participation in 
re/afforestation (or other kinds of restoration) incentives (Zbinden and Lee 2005; Bastiaensen 
and Van Hecken 2009; Cole 2010). Trade-offs need to be considered when planting trees, and 
poorly thought-out re/afforestation programmes could potentially have adverse impacts on 
other ecosystem services and local biodiversity (Sayer et al. 2004; Alrababah et al. 2007; Cao 
2011; Whitfield et al. 2011). Targeting incentives for restoring degraded lands seems logical, 
particularly where there is evidence of high soil erosion and desertification. Yet these 
strategies are replete with their own set of risks and challenges (Bullock et al. 2011). While 
opportunity costs may be considerably lower in remote or degraded areas, other costs could 
be unexpectedly higher due to soil conditions, topography (e.g. slope and aspect) and 
accessibility. Unlike agricultural areas that have been worked through terracing and 
enrichment, re/afforestation may be too costly in semi-arid landscapes shaped by historical 
deforestation, extensive grazing and degradation due to exposure (Rey-Benayas et al. 2008). 
Having sufficient information on both land-use and land-cover characteristics is critical for 
estimating the potential costs and benefits of biodiversity-enhancing PES schemes on 
common property. Yet as discussed, obtaining the right information is both costly and 
challenging, particularly from local authorities who may not possess sufficient knowledge or 
experience in NRM. 
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2.1.7 Lebanese Municipalities 
There are 963 Lebanese villages with municipal governments as of the 2009 municipal 
elections (MOIM 2010a). Municipalities are led by an elected mayor and appointed vice-
mayor, secretary and treasurer, and consist of council members in the local administrations. 
The number of council members assigned is based on the population of voters in the village 
(MOIM 2011)44. Most villages with municipalities have both private and public land tenure, 
the latter split between municipal and republic land. Conversely, villages without municipal 
government (i.e. no cabinet/council members) have no registered municipal lands (mesheaa 
in Arabic). These villages are usually headed by another type of elected official called a 
‘mukhtar’ with much less political or decision-making powers (Salem 1965)45. Some villages 
without municipalities have communal (or tribal) lands within property belonging to the 
republic (amiri in Arabic). Lebanon’s Municipal Act (Decree law #118/1977) does not 
specify the roles and responsibilities of municipal administrations in managing municipal 
lands (MOIM 2010b), but rather a general requirement to protect the environment (Article 
74, p. 29). With public attitudes towards forests conservation and expansion becoming more 
favourable (Sattout et al. 2007; Djoundourian 2009), national reforestation stakeholders46 (or 
‘principals’) have begun exploring PES as a viable policy instrument and municipalities have 
become the prime focus as potential reforestation ‘agents’. 
2.2 Research Questions 
This chapter examines the advantages and disadvantages of incentivising biodiversity-
enhancing reforestation activities with Lebanese municipalities within ecologically important 
areas (IPAs). Lebanese villages can be characterised as having certain institutional (social, 
economic and political) and biophysical attributes that either limit or permit desirable 
re/afforestation outcomes. Institutional factors include existing policies, socio-political 
dynamics (e.g. elite capture and patronage politics), and variable transaction costs contingent 
upon the principals and agents involved, competing land-uses, and property or access rights. 
Biophysical attributes pertain to land availability, remoteness, existing land-cover, climate, 
elevation, topography, and soil conditions. Some attributes are common to (and would 
                                                 
44 Voters are not required to be permanent residents of their village, but vote according to the village they were 
born in (please see chapter 1). 
45 Please see chapter 1, section 1.5.1 for details. 
46 Public sector (MOA and MOE) and NGOs that are aligned with their interests (chapter 1). 
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therefore affect) all Lebanese villages, such as national policies, climate change and 
international markets. Others may only pertain to specific villages, such as local politics and 
decision-making behaviour, land-cover/land-use and degree of development. Institutional 
attributes could invite varying degrees of principal-agent problems, perverse incentives and 
crowding-out, thus affecting PES programmes. Within this context, I address the main 
research question and following sub-questions for this study: 
1. If incentivising reforestation efforts at the village level, how promising are 
municipalities as suppliers of biodiversity-enhancing reforestation? 
2. Which municipalities are most suitable for incentivising through PES and why? 
3. Is current policy and its implementation favourable towards reforesting non-private 
lands, and if not, how can this be improved and what are possible alternatives? 
In section 2, I present the methods employed for obtaining descriptive and qualitative data 
and conducting qualitative analysis on issues pertaining to tree planting at the village level. 
Section 3 follows with results and discussion where I present the three outcomes relating to 
themes and attributes introduced. I conclude with some general recommendations and future 
prospects. 
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2.3 Methods 
2.3.1 Selection of Research Sites  
Natural and semi-natural habitats within Lebanese IPAs face numerous threats, largely from 
urban development (Yazbek et al. 2010). Of the twenty, I excluded five smaller IPAs along 
the developed coast which have little reforestation potential, one (LB01) with average 
elevation above the tree line (> 2,500 m), and IPAs (and parts of IPAs) in regions with high 
security risks. These included five IPAs within the Beqaa Valley, a riparian IPA bordering 
the northern border with Syria (LB06), parts of the Qammouaa-Dinniyeh-Hermel IPA (LB07) 
in North Lebanon (Akkar and Hermel districts) bordering Syria, and some villages within the 
Rihane IPA (LB20) below the Litani River in Nabatiye. The nine remaining IPAs included in 
the study stretch from the Akkar Mountains in North Lebanon to Nabatiye along the western 
ridge of Mount Lebanon (Figure 2.1). Their average elevation is approximately 1200 m.a.s.l. 
and villages within these IPAs are mainly located on the western slopes of the Mount 
Lebanon range. Most of the country’s forests and protected areas lie within these nine IPAs, 
which also contain the majority of native tree and shrub species found in Lebanon (Tohmé 
and Tohmé 2007). Biodiversity-enhancing reforestation has the potential to reduce 
fragmentation through creating future habitats and corridors for wildlife (Honnay et al. 1999; 
Perfecto and Vandermeer 2010; Wilson et al. 2014) and this was the main justification for 
choosing these sites (chapter 1). 
Chapter 2   Municipal Reforestation 
54 
 
Figure 2.1. Land-cover map of Lebanon showing 9 of the 20 Important Plant Areas (Yazbek et al. 
2010) within the grey borders. 
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I identified villages within the selected IPAs using Google Earth images embedded with IPA 
layers that were copied and transposed over administrative maps showing all villages with 
and without municipalities (MOIM-IFES 2010). After identifying all villages within and 
around the periphery of the nine IPAs, I then stratified them based on their associated IPA, 
administrative district, land area (‘Size’), number of council members (used as a proxy for 
population size), average elevation, percentage of area within IPA, and rurality47 (Table 2.1). 
Data on the number of council members, populations (based on the number of council 
members), and other information about the village (e.g. cultural and environmental features) 
were gathered from online sources (e.g. L’association du Local Liban 2009) and public 
documents. 
Table 2.1. Stratification criteria for sampling of villages within Important Plant Areas (IPAs) 
Strata Details 
IPA# 9 identified for inclusion 
Villages 248 in total 
Districts 14 in total 
Size* From ‘very small’ (1) to ‘very large’ (5) 
Rurality ‘very rural’ (1); ‘rural’ (2); ‘urbanising’ (3); ‘very urban’ (4) 
Ave. Elevation central location of village 
No. of Council Members†  None, 9, 12, 15, 18, or 21 
% of village within IPA < 25%, 25-75%, or > 75%  
*Strata refers to relative land area that were subjective estimates based on 2-D maps and coded 1-5 
† Used as a proxy for population 
A total of 248 villages were identified within the nine IPAs (Table 2.2). Seventy-two villages 
within this sample did not have council members, and therefore no municipal governments. 
While I focused mainly on the villages with municipalities, I chose not to omit the rest given 
their frequency in the sample (nearly 30%). This was also motivated by the need to 
understand how decisions are made in villages without mayors or council members. 
However, only three were represented in the sample because of the difficulty in finding 
telephone numbers of most mukhtars.48  
                                                 
47 Rurality is an attribute/variable that is independent from size (i.e. surface area); for example, a ‘very rural’ 
village is sparsely populated, remote, and had few buildings whereas a ‘very urban’ village is one that was 
densely populated, had many buildings, a commercial centre, hospital, etc. 
48 Villages from the Wadi Jannah IPA (LB13) were omitted due to sensitivities between the Jabal Moussa 
Biosphere Reserve stakeholders and local authorities of the villages. I therefore considered the potential ethical 
implications of conducting interviews that may reveal sensitive issues surrounding proposed reforestation in that 
region. A pilot interview was, however, conducted with the mayor of Zaytre.  
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2.3.2 Participant Recruitment 
The main target group for this study were local authorities, which included mayors, vice-
mayors, council members, and mukhtars49. In addition, I conducted interviews with national 
stakeholders in biodiversity conservation and forestry fields (e.g. public sector, NGOs, 
research institutions). These began with largely informal (unstructured) interviews that were 
conducted between October 2011 and June 2012 to help me understand the broader context of 
national reforestation objectives. I also conducted more in-depth, structured interviews with 
directors/project managers from the MOA and the main reforestation NGOs in that same 
period. Information from these interviews is cited in the results as personal communications. 
Recruitment of the main target group involved contacting local authorities from the sampled 
villages by telephone and took place between May and June 2012. A standardised recruitment 
script was read by one of two field assistants with a brief description of the study and free 
prior informed consent was obtained orally. Meetings for interviews were then scheduled 
with participants at a location of their convenience. All respondents were reassured over the 
telephone that their participation was completely voluntary and confidentiality would be 
respected through anonymity50.  
The second target group interviewed were residents. The aim was to assess their involvement 
in (or perceptions of) tree planting activities in their village. Local participants were mainly 
farmers and non-farming landowners as well as key informants (described in Section 3.1). 
Key informants were referred to me by national stakeholders, municipal officials or other 
village contacts (through snowballing)51. A total of fifteen local residents were approached 
opportunistically (convenience sampling) while in the field and asked with prior informed 
consent to participate in a short interview. The research received ethical approval from both 
AUB’s (Institutional Review Board) and Bangor University’s ethics boards.  
                                                 
49 Most villages with municipalities also have mukhtars. 
50 Please see Appendix 2.1 for a copy of recruitment phone script and consent form. 
51 I consider certain biases that this type of sampling could lead to for some research questions, e.g. would 
respondents chosen by municipal officials criticise the municipality? However, I believe interviews with 
national stakeholder helped to balance these biases. 
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2.3.3 Piloting and Initial Findings 
Unstructured interviews were first piloted with the mayor and a mukhtar of a village in the 
Chouf region (LB16) in early spring 2012. Subsequent piloting of semi-structured interview 
questions was conducted with local authorities representing four randomly selected villages 
from different IPAs in April and early May of that year. This was followed by extensive 
fieldwork (formal and informal interviews, and field visits) carried out with field assistants in 
a village within the Qammouaa IPA (LB07). Residents and farmers from the Qammouaa 
region in the nearby highlands were also approached opportunistically and informally 
interviewed. Important insights from the pilot study not only helped determine appropriate 
follow-up or probing questions but also led to understandings of future research objectives.  
2.3.4 Main Survey 
Semi-structured interviews were designed to obtain quantitative and qualitative data on tree 
planting at the village level. Interviews aimed to gather data on tree species used, where 
trees/saplings/seedlings were obtained (and how), quantity planted, estimated planting area, 
and approximate survival rates52. Respondents were asked to provide us with the surface area 
of municipal lands (if known) and, where appropriate, average planting and management 
costs. Supplementary questions related to land-use/land-cover in the villages were also asked, 
such as grazing grounds, existing forest cover and estimated areas of abandoned agricultural 
land.  
An important qualitative inquiry was asking all respondents to state any advantages and 
disadvantages they perceived in local reforestation. Local authorities were also specifically 
asked how decisions were made in their administrations with respect to species and site 
selection and what criteria (or incentives) would lead them to engage in tree planting with 
third party organisations. Subsequent questions were more hypothetical and aimed at gauging 
whether they would plant native species on municipal lands voluntarily if saplings were 
provided free of charge53. If they answered no, they were then asked whether they would 
participate in a hypothetical reforestation programme if they were paid to plant and manage 
trees. If they answered yes, they were asked where they would plant trees and why in those 
                                                 
52 I determined whether or not tree planting had taken place recently based on responses from screening 
questions that I discuss in the following section 2.7. 
53 Many reforestation and conservation organisations have been providing municipalities with saplings. 
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specified locations. Lastly, they were asked what would happen to the land after it was 
planted, mainly who would be the responsible caretaker and who would be allowed (or 
prohibited) from using/entering these areas. 
2.3.5 Data Acquisition 
Over 80% of the interviews with local authorities were conducted in their villages while the 
rest took place at either their residences or offices in and around the capital Beirut. All 
interviews were conducted in Arabic by one of two trained field assistants in my presence. 
Interviews lasted between 25 minutes and one hour, although some also involved field-based 
observations guided by our respondents (e.g. to reforestation sites, areas affected by fires, 
etc.). We averaged around seven interviews per week from mid-June to August 2012 
resulting in a total of 67 interviews (Table 2.2 in section 2.4.1 below). 
2.3.6 Additional Data Sources 
Preliminary quantitative data were obtained from telephone interviews during the recruitment 
stage. This included the estimated surface area of the village (within its municipal 
boundaries), and surface area of municipal land (or the area belonging to and managed by the 
municipality, if any). Respondents were also asked to give approximate figures (in ha) of 
abandoned agricultural land in their village (if known). Data were transferred onto a 
spreadsheet and served as a reference for cross-checking responses as well as debriefing and 
probing questions during interviews. Additional quantitative data gathered from interviews 
(e.g. surface area of reforestation, number of trees planted) were added later (Table 2.3). 
Some of this information was also available online or from grey literature (e.g. government 
portals, ministry or NGO websites, etc.). 
2.3.7 Data Analysis 
Audio-recorded interviews were transcribed from Arabic to English text by field assistants. 
Transcripts were reviewed to identify responses that needed clarification. A few randomly 
selected transcripts were reviewed by a colleague at the American University of Beirut’s 
Nature Conservation Centre (AUB-NCC) to check for clarity. Transcripts were then uploaded 
onto Atlas.ti® (qualitative data analysis software), grouped according to respondent types, and 
later coded for grounded analysis (identifying themes and relationships). Coded themes 
included “Aims & objectives of tree planting”, “Decisions made by mayor with municipal 
council”, “Responsibilities of municipality”. Code families (or ‘nodes’) were later created 
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that grouped similar codes. For instance, under the family code “Environmental benefits of 
trees” are the codes ‘landscape beauty’, ‘cleans the air’, ‘prevents erosion’, and so forth. 
Codes were also created to identify species of trees planted, which were grouped as ‘forest 
trees’ (e.g. stone pine, cedar, oaks, etc.) or ‘fruit trees’ (e.g. apple, cherry, pear, etc.). The 
former group was also split between ‘productive’ (e.g. stone pines) and ‘non-productive’ (e.g. 
cedar) types. Qualitative responses to the advantages and disadvantages of tree planting were 
analysed heuristically to identify benefits and costs. The analysis also helped in identifying 
relationships and common themes through conceptual mapping and triangulation with other 
data sources, particularly policy papers. 
2.4 Results and Discussion 
2.4.1 Recruitment Outcomes 
Ninety-six of the 248 villages identified within the nine IPAs were selected randomly (using 
dice rolls) from the stratified sample (Table 2.2). My field assistants were unable to reach a 
representative from the municipality in 32 of the 96 villages contacted by telephone (after at 
least three attempts). Of those contacted, ten were unable to participate due to the lack of 
their availability at the time54. Fifty-four of the 64 local authorities contacted by telephone all 
tentatively agreed to participate in the study with some referring us to meet with other 
representatives (e.g. vice mayor, council member, key informants, etc.). Of the 54 local 
authorities that agreed to participate, nine cancelled or were unreachable at the time of the 
interview. Thus a total of 45 local authorities (representing 45 villages) were interviewed: 36 
were mayors, five were council members, three were mukhtars and one was vice-mayor. An 
additional 22 interviews were conducted with 15 local residents (eleven farmers and four 
non-farmers) and seven key informants, totalling 67 participants representing the 48 villages 
in this study. Key informants comprised heads of agricultural cooperatives, local experts, and 
professionals residing in (or originating from) their associated villages55. Amongst them was 
a forest guard responsible for monitoring and responding to forest-related issues (e.g. fires, 
issuing permits, etc.).   
                                                 
54 Some were clearly uninterested but did not specifically say so while others suggested we meet with other 
village representatives instead. 
55 Three of those key informants were referred to us by local authorities and the rest by national stakeholder (e.g. 
NGOs and public sector). 
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Table 2.2. Sampling frame showing selection and recruitment process of stratified villages within 
associated Important Plant Areas (IPAs) 
Important Plant Areas 
(IPAs) selected for study 
No. of 
villages 
identified 
No. of 
representatives 
of villages 
contacted (SRS)‡ 
No. of 
Interviews set 
with 
representatives 
No. of 
villages in 
the 
sample** 
No. of 
respondents 
interviewed 
LB07 - Qammouaa 76 30 7 7 16 
LB09 - Bcharre-Ehden 28 12 8 5 5 
LB11 - Tannourine 6 3 1 1 2 
LB13 - Wadi Jannah 32 1† 1 1 1 
LB14 - Keserouan 18 6 5 5 4 
LB15 - Sannine-Kneisseh 6 6 4 2 3 
LB16 - Chouf 10 6 5 4 6 
LB17 - Nahr ed-Damour 30 15 12 12 16 
LB20 - Rihane 42 17 11 11 14 
Total 248 96 54 48 67 
* Some villages in these districts were omitted from the sample for safety reasons (based on FCO advisories) 
**Where local authorities (e.g. mayors), key informants and/or residents were interviewed 
‡ Stratified random sampling 
† Originally 13 in the stratified sample but later omitted from the sample (please see Footnote # 50 above) 
2.4.2 Village Tree Planting Details 
The majority of planting campaigns at the municipal level were conducted in small areas of 
less than 3 hectares (13 villages). Four villages in our sample participated in the Ministry of 
Environment’s National Reforestation Plan (NRP) and twelve other villages had partnered 
with third sector organisations (mainly NGOs) in tree planting efforts. Ten local authorities 
reported no reforestation activities in their villages. Mayors from six villages within the 
sample mentioned recent or ongoing reforestation of relatively large-scale (> 10 ha within 
municipal or republic lands, see Table 2.3) largely using Lebanese cedars (Cedrus libani 
Rich.). For example, 100,000 cedar trees were planted in the reserve of Ehden (LB09) within 
the last decade. More recently, the Lebanese Reforestation Initiative (LRI) funded the 
planting of some 70,000 cedars in the Tannourine reserve (LB11). In Kfardebiane (LB14), an 
estimated 30,000 trees, mostly cedars and some Grecian juniper (Juniperus excelsa M. 
Bieb.), were planted in 70 ha of fenced municipal land in partnership with Jouzour Loubnan 
(JL)56. Aside from having available municipal land, these villages also have (or are near) 
protected forests within nature reserves. 
                                                 
56 A relatively new NGO with a focus on reforestation. 
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Table 2.3. Villages in the sample that have conducted reforestation in areas over 10 ha 
IPA Village Est. area (ha) Species Partner Date(s) Details 
LB07 Qobayat 70 Cedars MOA-LA1 2008-2009 Air seeding on 
republic land 
LB09 Ehden > 10 Cedars MOE-NRP2; 
JL3 
Since 2003 Yearly planting in 
the reserve 
LB11 Tannourine > 10 Cedars LRI4 2012 Plans to plant 60-
70,000 seedlings in 
the reserve 
LB14 Kfardebiane 70 Cedars & 
Junipers 
JL 2010 Mentioned plans 
to plant 100 ha in 
2012 
LB16 Bmehray 40 Stone pine None 2005 Planted in former 
sand quarries 
LB20 Rihane > 10 Mainly stone 
pine 
Various Since 2005 Some oak, poplar 
and walnut trees 
1 Ministry of Agriculture and the Lebanese Army 
2 Ministry of Environment’s National Reforestation Plan 
3 Jouzour Loubnan (an NGO) 
4 Lebanese Reforestation Initiative (an NGO) 
While Lebanese cedars have traditionally been used in large-scale reforestation in the past 
(chapter 1), the most common forest tree species mentioned by the majority of interviewees, 
whether in terms of reforestation on municipal land, roadsides, or on private lands, was stone 
pine (Pinus pinea L.). Stone pines are highly valued for their kernels (processed pine nuts 
wholesale at approximately US$40/kg57) and planted extensively on municipal lands in the 
villages of Bmehray (LB16) and Rihane (LB20)58.  
Fifteen local residents (including eleven farmers) from 11 villages were interviewed on 
aspects related to reforestation (both public and private lands). Eleven mentioned tree 
planting in their villages that had taken place in the last 5 years conducted by their 
municipalities. The main types mentioned were stone pine, cedar and carob trees (Ceratonia 
siliqua L.). They mentioned economic benefits from productive trees, e.g. stone pine, 
chestnut (Castanea sativa Mill.), carob, and environmental benefits (mainly landscape 
beauty) as the main advantages of increasing forest cover. None mentioned any 
                                                 
57 Recent spikes in demand compounded by labour scarcities has driven the costs of pine nuts up since 2010 
(Weatherbee 2014). 
58Although Bkessine (in LB20) contains the largest contiguous plantation of stone pine in Lebanon, no major 
reforestation efforts were mentioned there in recent years. 
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disadvantages with reforestation or forest trees, though at least five farmers expressed their 
discouragement with laws preventing them from removing wild trees growing on their 
property. 
Over half the mayors interviewed also mentioned both economic and environmental benefits 
of trees as the main advantages of tree planting and increasing forest cover. In terms of 
environmental benefits, over 80% of local authorities interviewed mentioned increasing 
landscape beauty as an important motive for planting trees. Over a third specifically 
mentioned that trees play an important function as natural ‘filters’ by cleaning dust during the 
long, dry and windy summers. The economic benefits of trees mentioned predominantly 
referred to stone pine, which generates substantial revenues for municipalities managing 
plantations: 
Concerning the [stone] pines, they are a source of incomes for the municipality that 
are used for the municipal work in the village; construction of roads, lighting … 
Stone pine generates 20,000,000 Lebanese Lira59 [USD 13,330] per year for the 
municipality. Our annual budget totals 30,000,000 LL [USD 15,000], so it generates 
a large sum of our total [expenditures]. (P83)60 
As mentioned in chapter 1, public and private sector stakeholders expressed concerns over 
ecological impacts that monoculture plantations (e.g. stone pine) could have on forest 
ecosystems and biodiversity in the future. While efforts have slowly emerged recently to 
promote native species diversity in reforestation, the opportunity costs of diversifying are 
high since stone pine has significant private benefits in addition to other environmental 
services, such as carbon sequestration and landscape beauty.  
2.4.3 Land Tenure and Transaction Costs 
Aside from the challenges in promoting species diversification, interviews with national 
stakeholders (chapter 1) described various institutional factors that affect reforestation 
outcomes in Lebanon. Perhaps the most important relates to unclear tenure due to the lack of 
cadastral maps. Municipalities (and especially villages without municipal councils) from less-
developed regions61 are the most problematic in this subject matter. These issues have created 
                                                 
59 1,500 Lebanese Lira (LL) equivalent to 1 US dollar. 
60 These coded numbers are allocated for each respondent interviewed to maintain confidentiality and 
anonymity.  
61 These include more remote villages in Akkar and Dinniyeh districts (LB07). 
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conflicts between landowners and local authorities, especially where municipal lands are 
concerned. An official from the Ministry of Agriculture’s (MOA) forestry sector stated that 
their department has been facing land disputes with residents due to outdated entitlements 
that used impermanent landmarks to delineate property, such as forest borders. He mentioned 
that it was not uncommon for landowners to cut into (or burn back) the boundaries of the 
forest in order to claim more property (pers. comm., C. Mohanna, 2011). This was also 
evident from an interview with one of the respondents: 
We have mesheaa [municipal land], but we don’t have cadastral maps; so all the 
locals are building in the mesheaa... and all the mesheaa is managed by the private 
“owners”. In general, each one has a part of the mesheaa. 70% of the locals are 
enlarging the areas around their houses as if this is their land! If [our municipality] 
wants to get [projects going] in these lands we’ll enter into disputes with the locals. 
We are waiting for the cadastral maps because we don’t want to get into conflicts 
with the villagers. (P52) 
These issues are further complicated by multiple categories of public lands, including 
variations of municipal property and lands belonging to the republic. One mayor, who also 
practiced law, explained that “all the mesheaa lands are private – every piece of land that has 
a cadastral number is private. The owners can be the community, family, or the Lebanese 
republic …” (P55). When asked about the total area (ha) of municipal lands in his village, 
another mayor explained: 
There are many types of mesheaa. There is municipal land [in Arabic: ‘mesheaa 
baladiyeh’] that, like anyone who owns a plot of land, the municipality has a title 
deed for. It’s very easy to register it under certain laws. There is the mesheaa of 
public residents [‘mesheaa 3oumoum al-ahāli’]; this is considered as ownership to 
the villagers… and it is managed by the municipality. Most of the forests are mesheaa 
but the municipality invests in them and the [revenues] generated62 go to the 
municipality. (P86) 
Evidently, registering of public lands was also met with some resistance by local residents, 
and actually posed a risk to community tenure, as reported by a mayor here: 
We don’t have mesheaa because there are no cadastral maps. We don’t know how 
much land belongs to the municipality or to the republic. The problem is that when 
[they63] come to survey this land and see that it’s not being used and has some trees 
or shrubs, they’d consider it [republic land]. This is a problem for the residents 
because they would no longer be able to access or use the land. So the residents are 
                                                 
62 This was specifically referring to harvesting cones from stone pine plantations. 
63 Referring to surveyors, generally appointed by the Ministry of Interiors and Municipalities (MOIM) through 
the Council of Development and Reconstruction. 
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against the surveyors coming and would rather register the land as private so they 
can have access and use the land. (P53) 
Any attempts at incentivising municipalities or other agents to enhance biodiversity or other 
public ecosystem services requires taking into account the transaction costs resulting from 
insecure property rights, something addressed in many other studies (Boyd et al. 2007; 
Corbera et al. 2011; Lockie 2013). Perhaps the most important limiting factor pertaining to 
institutional attributes shared by the majority of the villages in this sample concerns 
transaction costs associated with tenure and opportunity costs of displacing land-uses. 
Roughly speaking, there may be an inverse relationship between opportunity costs (which 
may be highest on private lands) and transaction costs (which may be highest on public 
lands), though with considerable variation (Figure 2.2). Transaction costs are expected to be 
high in municipal rangelands if institutional mechanisms (e.g. herder fees or social fencing64) 
are not in place to prevent open-access grazing65. Communal rangelands that are on the 
property of the republic (amiri) may incur high transaction costs since they lack formal 
management regimes such as municipalities, yet would also depend on the effectiveness of 
the existing local regime66. However, transaction costs may also be considerably lower if 
users are relatively small and homogenous groups with local governance regimes in place, 
such as arrangements between tribal elders and herders that have rules-in-use (e.g. informal 
constraints). 
                                                 
64 Social fencing is a term used to describe an institutional mechanism for delineating property boundaries 
without constructing actual fences (Saxena et al. 2003). 
65 I consider these as transaction costs as they are the costs of marking and protecting property rights. 
66 In the case of Dinniyeh (in LB07), this usually consists of a council of tribal elders. 
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Figure 2.2. The main land tenure types in Lebanon arranged according to transaction and opportunity 
costs. Latinised Arabic names are underlined. Under this conceptual model, transaction costs in 
reforestation are likely to be higher in republic lands (open-access rangelands), with variable 
opportunity and transaction costs in municipal lands based on tenure, land-use and accessibility67. 
In my sample, four out of the twelve municipalities (see section 2.4.8) with land available for 
reforestation expressed concerns that they would likely face problems with tree retention. The 
main reasons mentioned were insecure tenure from lacking cadastral maps or that 
reforestation would result in displacing local herders’ grazing grounds. Land tenure issues 
also stem from ambiguous land classification systems, which have been reported in carbon-
based reforestation project in Africa as well (Unruh 2008). These issues ultimately require 
revisions to the land registry at different administrative levels. Evidently, limitations to 
                                                 
67 Republic lands (amiri) are largely rangelands (jurd), but also contain some farmlands granted to tribal 
communities by the state (usually through the MOA). Municipal lands (can be rangeland or forest) that are the 
responsibility of municipalities are mesheaa (the two types above), but some also contain nature reserves or 
other protected areas (administrative responsibility of the MOE, but sometimes shared with municipalities). The 
two main classes of private land are religious institutions (awqaf) or private owners (mulk khass).  
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excludability from other land-uses when establishing new forests also exist, particularly with 
respect to herders and recreational users68. The long-term benefits of diverse native forests on 
municipal lands may require substantial short-term costs of establishment (up to 5 years or 
so). For future PES buyers in Lebanon (e.g. national stakeholders), transaction costs in 
monitoring municipalities for compliance and success could be significantly higher under 
circumstances where weak tenure and competing land-uses threaten tree establishment as 
discussed in other case-studies (Pagiola et al. 2002; Swallow and Meinzen-Dick 2009). 
Where the potential risks, e.g. trees damaged or destroyed from grazing livestock, are 
partially but not completely under the control of ES suppliers, PES initiatives become more 
vulnerable to moral hazard since it is difficult to observe suppliers actions. 
Such issues surrounding tenure have further hampered effective forest management across 
Lebanon, particularly fire prevention measures at the municipal level. In this study some of 
the biggest threats to forests that mayors and other respondents pointed to were regulatory 
constraints prohibiting tree cutting and wood removal (Article 85, MOE/96). For example, a 
mayor from a village within LB07 expressed concerns with access in order to manage forests 
for preventing fires: 
We are not benefitting from the forests on these lands, only benefitting from them 
from a visual standpoint. [Our municipality] doesn’t have the ability to fight forest 
fires effectively because of water shortages and access [e.g. fire roads]. I wanted to 
bring workers to prune trees and open paths, but the government won’t allow it since 
these lands belong to the republic. (P54) 
A similar lack of vertical cooperation between state agencies and local authorities is one of 
the principal-agent problems presented by Andersson’s (2004) study of Bolivia’s 
decentralised forestry sector. In Lebanon, these constraints are counterproductive to effective 
forest management. In contrast, adopting locally regulated coppicing and biomass removal 
(or thinning) has been shown to reduce the risk and magnitude of forest fires (Barbero et al. 
1990; Allen et al. 2002). Villages in North Lebanon, particularly where Calabrian pine (Pinus 
brutia Ten.) forests dominate69, have experienced extensive forest fires over the past few 
decades. Fires have been a natural part of Mediterranean landscapes (Cowling et al. 1996; 
                                                 
68 Some respondents mentioned seedling mortality caused by snowmobiles and off-road vehicles. 
69 Pinus brutia is considered by many experts to be an extremely aggressive and proliferous species that largely 
occupies abandoned agro-pastoral lands in North Lebanon (Sattout et al. 2005). 
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Bond and Keeley 2005), yet it appears that many of those in Lebanon are caused 
intentionally: 
There are lots of fires in the region because there are lots of forests. Each year we 
have forest fires between June and October. Since 10 years we’ve had an increase of 
forest fires… And the forest fires are 95% human-caused, where 50% are due to the 
negligence and 50% are intentional. (P95) 
Arson is not uncommon in other parts of the Mediterranean and often viewed as an act of 
protest in response to government policies, poor socioeconomic conditions, or both (e.g. 
Skouras and Christodoulakis 2013). Similar concerns were shared by other mayors further 
south. One mayor expressed his discouragement with current forest policies and poor 
infrastructure: 
Imagine that in the biggest forested area in the village we don’t have a centre for 
forest management. Each year we have two to three fires and we try to control them 
all by ourselves. Two years ago, a pine forests with an area of 1 km2 located between 
[us] and two other villages, burned down because the civil defence couldn’t reach the 
area [in time]. (P73) 
Lebanese institutions have been critically weakened since the civil war (c. 1975-1990) due to 
lack of oversight and accountability (Makdisi 2004). Given that many public sector offices 
are lagging in infrastructural improvements, compounded by political conflicts within 
parliament and between ministries, permits and licenses for managing forest even on private 
property are rarely expedited efficiently. For example, one mayor [P119] explained how a 
major forest fire that required the evacuation of residents from his and four surrounding 
villages could have been prevented if the MOA had granted a permit to trim the trees around 
the power lines that sparked the fire. Forest fires consumed over 4,000 ha of forest and “other 
wooded lands with trees” in 2007 alone; the vast majority (> 90%) that took place on private 
property (Fanous 2007)70. This constituted over half the area reforested during nearly two 
decades of the Green Plan (Regato and Asmar 2011). 
2.4.4 Elite Capture 
Participation, as discussed in the introduction, is perhaps the most complex factor in 
reforestation campaigns and related activities. The focus has been predominantly on 
mobilising the ‘local community’ to plant a substantial numbers of trees in public or 
                                                 
70 This report states that “land owners tend to burn their lands in order to change their lands’ classification to get 
permits to use their lands in different ways that were prohibited according to the previous classification” as one 
of the possible explanations to fires concentrated on private lands (p. 15). 
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communal areas (e.g. mesheaa). Yet post-planting costs are often underestimated by 
implementing agencies and borne by municipalities, especially maintenance (e.g. irrigation) 
and protection from grazing. Consequently, the main disadvantage of tree planting expressed 
by most local authorities pertained to post-planting follow-up and care. It seems evident that 
most of the funding is allocated (or frontloaded) towards planting events and very little 
towards covering management costs, specifically watering and additional care for the first 
few years after planting.  
As mentioned in chapter 1, reforestation was one of the predominant environmental activities 
in Lebanon in the last decade alone (Djoundourian 2009). Major international governmental 
funding agencies mentioned by interviewees involved in extensive reforestation included the 
European Union (EU), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), and Agence Française de 
Développment (AFD). Yet the real objectives of donors investing in social and environmental 
project such as tree planting campaigns are often unstated (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006; 
Springate-Baginski and Blaikie 2007; Braverman 2009). Similarly, a few of my informants 
also expressed disdain with externally funded reforestation programmes, claiming that they 
only serve the interest of donors and political elite: 
All these [reforestation] projects that come to our village and others around here 
representing their particular nations or national governments, the people responsible 
for implementing these projects don’t give the best benefits to the local community, 
and instead are doing these projects for their own interests. (P100) 
Another major criticism was the short-sighted motives of most reforestation campaigns: 
We have lots of [reservations about] the planting campaigns in Lebanon. Each year 
lots of money is being spent on reforestation and planting; and what are the results? 
Each year there are planting campaigns and most of them end in a short period 
because there is no follow up. (P90) 
We tried to collaborate with other NGO’s but it didn’t work because their main 
purpose was to advertise their planting campaign in the media, instead of providing 
care after the planting. (P68) 
Some mayors expressed concerns over how this has hampered and even politicised NRM. 
Many community-based initiatives around the world tend to be dominated by elites who not 
only capture the majority of the benefits but also influence decisions, particularly in social 
contexts where members are heterogeneous and unequal (Mansuri and Rao 2004). For 
instance, Platteau et al. (2014) investigated how local elites under these circumstances 
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strategically propose projects to major agencies by distorting information, especially in cases 
where donors may possess imperfect knowledge (or asymmetric information) of project 
details. In essence, there are consequences and unforeseen risks involved when municipalities 
decide to partner with external organisations given the volatile socio-political conditions in 
Lebanon. In fact, some of these issues surrounding politicised obligations are directly related 
to patronage politics. 
2.4.5 Political Patronage 
There are numerous players in Lebanon’s reforestation scene currently, which include 
organisations that have both religious and political affiliations. Gaining support from local 
residents is one of the strategies political actors employ through complex patronage networks 
involving political parties, local associations (generally registered as cultural NGOs), public 
institutions, and to some extent, foreign agencies71. An interesting issue raised by more than 
one mayor pertained to how political parties use trees provided to them from the MOA as 
political leveraging (or campaigning) by passing them on to farmers and other local 
authorities (or candidates). Three respondents raised issues relating to political patronage 
between the ministries, political parties, and certain associations/NGOs: 
Most of the NGOs follow certain parties [and] are providing trees received [from the 
MOA]. They sometimes provide fruit trees and sometimes wild trees. We are trying to 
push the MOA to give more [seedlings to municipalities] than it is giving currently... 
(P85) 
The MOA gives political parties seedlings to distribute to the farmers, most of which 
were distributed to their followers only. (P74) 
I would only like to add that we don’t believe it is right for the MOA to provide us 
with seedlings through political parties. We would all benefit if they would work 
directly with the municipalities and not [through] the political parties. (P79) 
Past studies in patronage politics have shown that it not only hinders democratic processes of 
institutional development but also tends to legitimise corruption (e.g. rent-seeking), further 
empowering elites while increasing economic inequities for more disadvantaged communities 
(Mosse 2001; Mwenda and Tangri 2005; Nelson and Agrawal 2008).  
                                                 
71 Braverman (2009) makes a compelling argument on how Zionists agencies based in the US raise funds for 
reforestation efforts in Israel, involving mainly exotic trees, with the objective of transforming the landscape to 
accommodate ideological objectives of occupation. 
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2.4.6 Principal-Agent Problems  
Potential investments in biodiversity-enhancing reforestation projects would require 
contractual agreements between stakeholders and municipal authorities. Some reforestation 
NGOs have begun to employ contracts with their municipal partners, but details on how 
responsibilities would prevail if another administration came into office were not discussed. 
Contracting with municipalities would require some form of institutional mechanisms for 
ensuring the subsequent administrations continue to meet obligations agreed upon by 
previous ones. Collective action from local groups, such as environmental committees or 
community-based organisations, are potential strategies for ensuring new administrations 
maintain the duties of previous ones (Nygren 2005). However, even these efforts are often 
undermined through patronage politics and elite capture. Internal conflicts were mentioned by 
eight local authorities, ranging from power struggles between decision-makers in 
municipalities, with elite landowners over quarries, and historic conflicts over land and 
resources between powerful families (or tribes). In Lebanon, legal institutions are 
undermined through a customary system of bribery known as ‘wasta’. Similar to rent-seeking 
behaviour of client-patron relations, information can be easily distorted by powerful elites. 
While wasta is often discussed as an impediment to democratic governance, it is perhaps so 
culturally ingrained that it has become accepted as a norm: 
Today if [someone] wants to make a project he should know someone with power. 
And the papers that are needed are sometimes impossible and incapacitating; you will 
need 1,000 “wastas” to get [an applications processed]. In the law there are 
obstacles; most of the laws are delicate and complex. [An] employee can hinder the 
operation so he can benefit or… make it easy [for himself]. (P85) 
Considering the extent of historic deforestation in North Lebanon over various eras (Mikesell 
1969; Thirgood 1981), there has also been a fair amount of natural regeneration in return. Yet 
information regarding land cover dynamics as well as ownership (e.g. communal land) could 
be incomplete or asymmetrical (Shogren et al. 2010), and therefore prone to perverse 
incentives. 
2.4.7 Perverse Incentives & Crowding Out 
Some of the largest villages in the sample had extensive tracts of natural and managed forests 
as well as a fair amount of forest recovery (particularly in Mtein, Qobayat, Akkar Atika, Ain 
Zhalta, Hrajel, and Kfarselwen). One key informant, for instance, expressed his opposition to 
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reforestation despite it taking place in his village and preferred more effective forest 
management strategies to be implemented instead: 
As you saw, the area is very green and all the mountains are [already covered with 
trees]. So our problem is not the lack of [forests] but in the protection of the existing 
trees. Therefore, we [as a committee] haven’t implemented many planting projects. 
The region needs protection; and when we protect, nature will [regenerate] on its 
own. (P95) 
Such instances could pose dilemmas for PES buyers targeting reforestation funds not only in 
areas that have sufficient natural regeneration but that are also biologically diverse. If the 
criteria involve land cover characteristics to fit a certain description, such as ‘treeless’ or 
‘degraded’, this could potentially incentivise municipalities to clear existing (shrubby) trees 
and other native vegetation in order to qualify entry into the programme (Wunder 2007; 
Porras et al. 2011). PES schemes targeting municipalities could therefore potentially 
incentivise the clearing of native vegetation, or transforming native forests or woodlands into 
mono-cropped plantations. 
Intrinsic pro-environmental behaviours may motivate certain local authorities to effectively 
manage forests on common (or municipal) property without financial incentives. 
Consequently, for those who have the capacity and goodwill to do so without financial 
incentives, PES schemes could potentially crowd out these motivations and undermine long-
term management (Rode et al. 2013). Much like other formal policies have already done in 
Lebanon (Makhzoumi et al. 2012)72, PES could act as a perverse incentive by crowding out 
local customary rules in use (Pattanayak et al. 2010). Sattout et al. (2005) pointed out that 
laws and regulations on forest resource use have crowded out traditional management 
regimes and created animosity between local communities and state agencies. Evidently, 
cases where social institutions or altruistic motives are crowded out once policies (e.g. 
rewards or punishments) are introduced may trigger principal-agent problems, such as 
information distortion and non-compliance discussed earlier (Frey and Jegen 2001). 
2.4.8 Biophysical Suitability – Land Cover & Accessibility 
Quantitative data gathered from both telephone and face-to-face interviews are presented in 
Table 2.4 below. This was an important criterion to determine re/afforestation potential for 
                                                 
72 Mainly subsidies and regulations 
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each village. Surface area of villages was obtained through interviews and online sources73. 
Estimated area of municipal land (in hectares) was determined for 37 of the 48 villages 
during interviews. Thirteen of the villages in the sample did not have significant municipal 
land (other than roadside verges, etc.). Some large villages without municipal lands were 
either without municipal councils, e.g. Jurd Mrebbine, or lacked cadastral maps, e.g. Kfar-
Bebnine. Of the 25 villages with municipal lands, around half claimed to have municipal 
areas of 10 ha or more available for tree planting. The remaining indicated having extensive 
municipal lands that are already forested (or are naturally regenerating after fires, e.g. 
Rechmaya) or have relatively small plots of less than 5 hectares. Hence around a dozen 
villages (all with municipalities) were identified as having suitable land for reforestation74. 
Table 2.4. Geographic and land-use data of villages gathered from telephone calls during recruitment 
and face-to-face interviews 
 N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. Sum 
Valid* Missing 
No. of villages in sample 48 0 -- -- -- -- -- 
Est. surface area of village† 
(ha) 
48 0 1,230 1,632 110 8,583 59,041 
Elevation (average) 48 0 926 318 425 1,800 -- 
Est. area of municipal land, 
mesheaa baladiyeh (ha) 
37 11 482 1,480 0 7,2001 17,825 
Est. area of abandoned 
farmlands (ha) 
36 12 416 583 5 2,000 14,975 
*Figures based only on valid villages within the sample 
† Areas based on boundaries of municipalities; areas of villages without municipalities were not determined. 
1Kfardebiane 
Hence, from a biophysical perspective alone, few montane villages in Lebanon with available 
municipal lands are suitable for reforestation. In addition, accessibility of municipal lands by 
road and other biophysical limitations, such as gradient and slope, was a limiting factor for 
many larger villages. Most land-use/land-cover types that could be reforested are at higher 
elevations (mainly rangelands, often referred to as jurd in Arabic), which are characteristic of 
scrub type systems (or maquis) that are often remote and typically grazed. 
                                                 
73 Preliminary findings indicated that the total surface area of the villages with municipalities in my sample 
accounts for approximately 6% of Lebanon’s total surface area (10,452 km2). While there were a few very large 
municipalities in my sample (e.g. Kfardebiane, Tannourine, and Ehden), these estimates do not include areas of 
villages without municipalities as there was no spatial data available. 
74 Local authorities from four of those mentioned potential threats from grazing (Section 2.4.3 above). 
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2.4.9 Outcome 1: Are Municipalities Promising Agents as Biodiversity-Enhancing 
Ecosystem Service Suppliers? 
In the conceptual framework introduced in this chapter, I laid out important institutional and 
biophysical attributes derived from the literature on decentralised NRM in the context of 
incentivised reforestation. Using a mixed methods approach that allowed for rich discussion I 
determined how promising municipalities are as biodiversity-enhancing PES agents. Results 
suggest that investing in biodiversity-enhancing reforestation efforts with Lebanese 
municipalities would involve numerous challenges. This is illustrated using a strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) diagram in Figure 2.3 below.  
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Figure 2.3. ‘Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats’ chart for employing biodiversity-
enhancing reforestation incentives with Lebanese municipalities. 
Endogenous (strengths and weakness) as well as exogenous (threats and opportunities) 
factors should be considered when targeting municipalities as biodiversity-enhancing 
reforestation agents (Figure 2.3). In short, there are a limited number of municipalities that 
can serve as biodiversity-enhancing reforestation agents based on analyses of those in my 
sample.  
2.4.10 Outcome 2: Which Municipalities are most Suitable for Incentivising through PES 
and Why? 
As shown, biophysical suitability is a limiting factor in supporting large scale reforestation, 
therefore likely affecting a number of smaller villages along the Mount Lebanon chain. From 
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an institutional perspective, municipalities with clearly defined cadastral boundaries 
indicating the formal extent (ha) of their municipal lands, along with institutional 
mechanisms (inclusion/exclusion) in place for accessing or using these areas, are likely to 
produce better reforestation outcomes than those without these measures. Thus, villages with 
municipal lands that have cadastral numbers and are free (or guarded) from grazing could be 
considered as candidates for PES reforestation. If re/afforestation efforts were to take place in 
rangelands with active grazing, some funds would need to be allocated towards fencing off 
areas (or hiring guards). The success of extensive reforestation efforts in Kfardebiane and 
Bcharre, for instance, was partly attributed to having fences around planting sites (pers. 
comm. P16 and key informant, 2012). Key informants involved in reforestation efforts in 
Bcharre (LB09) and within the Chouf Biosphere Reserve (LB16) also mentioned 
arrangements made with local herders whose grazing paths were taken over by reforestation. 
In both cases, hill lakes were constructed away from the planting sites where herders were 
granted access on condition that they would keep livestock away from the newly planted trees 
(an example of social fencing).  
Forestry experts from the MOA discussed reforestation in the Barouk reserve (within the 
Chouf Biosphere Reserve) as an example where the Green Plan was successful (chapter 1). 
Bcharre and Jezzine also had extensive reforestation under the Green Plan but failed to meet 
targets. There is, however, a common agreement amongst experts that the managed stone 
pine forests of Bkessine could serve as a good model for effective forest management (pers. 
comm. M. Khouzami, 2011). They also mentioned that NRM was better controlled under the 
French Mandate period up to the 1950s through state-imposed taxes on wood resources and 
livestock. Herding on public lands was also managed through rents. More importantly, 
herders were integrated into re/afforestation projects to supplement their incomes. 
Notwithstanding, the three key issues raised by stakeholders from the MOA were; 1) political 
divisions between ministries resulting in unclear aims, objectives, and responsibilities, 2) 
concerns over imported trees, and 3) issues pertaining to property and tenure. 
Interestingly, one of the criteria for selecting villages mentioned by a project manager of the 
Lebanese Reforestation Initiative (LRI) was the existence of community-based organisations 
working directly with municipalities (pers. comm. R. Patton, 2012). Similarly, participation 
criteria for the biodiversity award scheme initiated by the Nature Conservation Centre of the 
American University of Beirut (AUB-NCC) required the creation of local municipal 
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committees (pers. comm. L. Tawk, 2012). Ensuring successful reforestation efforts on 
municipal lands often requires strong local support and collective action. Decentralised 
institutions in the form of local committees can help reduce transaction costs through 
assigning members tasks and duties that aim to protect collective assets. But nested 
institutions take many years of collective experience and trust-building to become robust 
(Ostrom 2005). Any reforestation stakeholder acting as a ‘principal’ must therefore consider 
developing sound and fair conditions in order to ensure the objective of establishing and 
retaining trees met by the contracted ‘agent’. In the absence of contracts or formal 
agreements, the ability of principals to gauge whether or not objectives are met becomes 
limited and the success of projects less likely. Local participation would probably be unlikely 
in villages with a large number of absentee residents, which also raises interesting questions 
as to who the real beneficiaries of potential biodiversity-enhancing reforestation initiatives 
would be. 
While there are advantages in targeting municipalities with well-established environmental 
committees or community-based organisations75, this may be difficult or even 
counterproductive if there are competing patronage networks already in place. While many 
local authorities mentioned collective decision-making regarding reforestation prospects, the 
final decision is often undertaken by mayors: 
When it comes to the decision making, if the municipality acquired land and wants to 
plant it the decision could be taken by the president of the municipality [i.e. mayor] or 
by the [municipal] council board. According to the law, both decisions are valid. 
According to the law, the [mayor] manages the properties of the municipality alone 
without consulting the council board. (P65) 
Exogenous institutional factors could potentially hamper the efficacy of contracting with 
municipalities. This appeared to mostly affect a number of middle to small-size 
municipalities in my sample. Reforestation outcomes may therefore depend on how much 
political power and charisma a mayor has in appealing to both national stakeholders and local 
constituents (Avellaneda 2009). But the objectives of local actors are often determined by 
other priorities (or incentives) and immediate needs, as well as fiscal constraints, which 
directly affect environmental management responsibilities (Andersson 2003). Such is the case 
in Lebanon where many municipalities failed to receive funds from the central government 
due to bureaucratic (or political) constraints (Manassian and Majdalany 2011). Even more 
                                                 
75 Some of those mentioned included religious associations, scouts, and youth groups 
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challenging are objectives for encouraging the planting of diverse native trees with little or no 
direct market benefits, unlike stone pine. Thus it is likely that most municipalities would 
require higher payments to cover the opportunity costs for planting other species than purely 
stone pine. With this in mind, I asked municipal authorities whether they would accept and 
plant diverse non-productive native trees voluntarily if seedlings were provided at no charge. 
Seventeen responded that they would, of which only six mentioned having significant 
available municipal lands for reforestation (> 1 ha) and not simply planting roadsides verges 
and small areas.  
Reforesting in areas with existing native vegetation contributes to loss of habitat for these 
species despite other environmental gains (including habitats for other species such as birds). 
Trade-offs must be carefully considered and weighed according to their importance, yet these 
kinds of decisions are never easy to make (Reed et al. 2013). Stakeholders inherently have 
heterogeneous preferences and are therefore likely to disagree. While knowledge and 
information is often contested, decentralised decision- and rule-making surrounding 
common-pool resources are also important (Agrawal 2007). Public opinions matter to 
political actors, which therefore necessitates having venues for public deliberations at the 
village level. The importance of multistakeholder involvement in decision-making is clear, 
yet there are also disadvantages in that important decisions might be made less efficiently. 
With these factors in mind, PES programmes might be broadened to include sole decision-
making landowners with secure titles to property, yet keeping some of these important 
institutional and biophysical factors also in mind. For instance, despite having secure titles, 
contracting with landowners may also present problems including unclear tenure (e.g. 
familial disputes), principal-agent problems, perverse incentives (e.g. clearing of native 
vegetation to plant new trees) and the potential to crowd out intrinsic motives. 
2.4.11 Outcome 3: How can Policy be Improved and what Alternative Considerations are 
there for Targeting PES? 
A viable alternative to reforesting on municipal or state lands would be private lands, whether 
owned by individuals (or households), businesses or religious institutions. Some reforestation 
stakeholders have mentioned an interest in conducting reforestation on religious estates 
(‘awqaf’ [plural] in Arabic), which are lands belonging to churches and mosques (pers. 
comm. LRI, June 2012). Religious estates are the largest landowners of private property in 
Lebanon (chapter 1). The majority of these lands are already forested and generally well-
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protected, such as the UNESCO site of Wadi Qadisha in Bcharre and Ehden (LB09). 
However, similar issues regarding competing land-uses may be faced within these religious 
endowments, especially since many rent lands out to herders and local farmers (pers. comm. 
C. Tawk, July 2012). Interestingly, reforestation stakeholders have been reluctant to consider 
reforesting on private lands belong to individuals (or households). The main reason 
mentioned was that landowners may decide to remove trees, which is why binding 
agreements such as contracts are important for ensuring compliance in much the same way it 
applies to municipalities. Another reason given by stakeholders and professionals is the 
notion that environmental services should come from public lands, but as we have seen, this 
can be complex. Conversely, opportunity costs may be low on abandoned private farmlands, 
which are extensive in the majority of villages in my sample (Figure 2.4). In addition, 
transaction costs in the long-run might be lower on private property because fewer people 
make decisions, while private property may also be better guarded from grazing. Assessing 
whether landowners would consider subscribing to PES is therefore needed. 
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Figure 2.4. Estimated mean areas of abandoned or unused agricultural lands in 36 villages by rurality 
category. More urbanised villages had substantial land abandonment (rescaled at power exp. 0.05). 
Data was estimated by respondents (mainly mayors). 
Farmers and other local residents interviewed were asked to share their thoughts regarding 
reforestation on private lands. The majority stated that if there was support or incentives to 
cover planting and management costs, they would consider this feasible on marginal land: 
The area that doesn’t have any fruit trees on it or wild trees such the range lands 
should be planted with wild trees. If I have an empty land I would plant it with wild 
trees, they will preserve the climate and give a nice view. Plus wild trees need less 
care than fruit trees. If you are planting fruit trees in difficult lands it will be very 
costly and [most] farmers can’t handle those cost. (F20) 
One farmer who expressed interests in the idea of reforestation incentives for landowners was 
not very keen on planting trees of little direct use value, and even considered some productive 
trees to be indifferent from native forest trees: 
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With respect to reforestation [on private land], why would we plant forest tress if we 
can plant fruit trees? Between the oak and the chestnut, what’s the difference? It’s the 
same type [of tree]. Chestnut is a wild tree. And I know of farmers grafting chestnut 
[branches] onto maloul [Quercus infectoria] trees… If you compare oaks and 
chestnuts, they’re the same [to me]. (F15) 
Finally, there are important policy shortcomings that constrain effective forest management 
and may also contribute to a reluctance of landowners to participate in reforestation 
incentives (or future PES schemes targeting private lands). The last research question 
addresses whether current forest policies and their enactment are fit for the purpose of 
reforesting non-private lands. As it currently stands, I view certain policies as being 
counterproductive for reforestation on both public and private lands. Below I present some 
policy recommendations that could help improve current policies and possible alternative to 
consider for better management of existing forests and future reforestation efforts. 
Policy recommendations and future prospects 
Aside from reforestation, protecting and managing existing forests is also an important policy 
measure that has received far less attention and funding than it deserves. Dense thickets in 
many forests in North Lebanon are clearly fire hazards and should be better managed. Yet 
these efforts are currently impeded by policy measures prohibiting the cutting of native 
conifers, resulting in fires that could have otherwise been prevented. The challenge with 
increasing forest cover through planting should run parallel to protecting existing forests and 
encouraging natural regeneration. Anecdotally, goats can help in the first instance through 
controlled grazing in understories of forests. Conversely, they tend to inhibit natural 
regeneration of trees when grazed in open fields. A more holistic, multifunctional approach is 
needed for identifying trade-offs and synergies in order to integrate various land-use needs 
for effective NRM in Lebanon, such as silvopastoral practices. This study highlights three 
important policy needs: 
1. Revision of the Forestry Code to relax (with conditions) forest management 
constraints and introduce locally regulated tree cutting and biomass removal 
2. Reassess the potential for integrating private landowners into incentivised 
reforestation projects (e.g. asset-building PES) 
3. Devise policies that integrate rather than segregate competing land-uses, specifically 
between agriculture, forestry, pastoralism, and conservation 
While it is illegal to harvest wood from coniferous species on public lands in Lebanon, there 
are poverty pockets in parts of Dinniyeh and Akkar districts (LB07) where these practices 
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continue. However, key informants mentioned that it is mainly broadleaved species, 
particularly native oaks (e.g. Quercus coccifera and Q. infectoria) that are harvested through 
coppicing. This activity is largely for the purpose of charcoal production especially since 
there is high market demand for this type of charcoal (pers. comm. August 2012). Since wood 
harvesting remains and contentious issue in Lebanon, I chose not to investigate this topic as it 
given its sensitivities and the potential ethical implications it may have caused. Some 
residents from the villages in my sample mentioned gathering wood from their own property 
(e.g. dead fruit trees) for fuel, though many mentioned burning diesel-burning furnaces as 
their main source of heat. Fuelwood is scarce in the more rural areas lacking forests, such as 
along the eastern facing ridge of Mt. Lebanon (e.g. Hermel district). One landowner I 
interviewed at an early stage in Tripoli was complaining about illegal cutting of forests on his 
property in Akkar from people he claims are from Hermel. While I was informed from some 
respondents that illegal wood harvesting is a common problem both on private and public 
lands in the Akkar and Dinniyeh IPA (LB07), it was beyond the scope of my thesis to 
investigate this. But this also reinforces the need for more research in other parts of Lebanon 
that are facing greater threats of desertification and degradation such as Hermel. In this 
context, research efforts can help in devising policies for encouraging native as well as non-
native silvicultural planting and management of wood resources that can have direct benefits 
to local communities.  
2.5 Conclusion 
Decentralisation has the potential for bringing local governance decisions closer to the real 
beneficiaries. But socio-institutional processes, such as popular participation, collective 
action and democratic deliberations, are never guaranteed to result from this policy measure. 
Local involvement and organisation towards effective natural resource management is 
apparent in circumstances where local people are dependent on a particular natural resource. 
In the case of Lebanon, municipalities face many obstacles and constraints in managing 
natural resources on common (or municipal) lands. Local authorities therefore have an 
important role as managers of common-pool resources in the absence of collective action by 
other members of the community. But they also face numerous institutional constraints 
(endogenous and exogenous), especially with regards to securing tenure, accessing forest 
resources, competing land-uses, and socio-political patronage networks deeply ingrained in 
an ancient and dynamic culture.  
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Results derived from interviews show that municipalities with sufficient and suitable 
municipal land, having clearly defined cadastral boundaries of (and mechanisms for 
protecting) these lands, would likely produce more cost-effective reforestation outcomes. 
However, the analysis conducted suggests that few municipalities located along the Mt. 
Lebanon range fit these criteria. In addition to policy changes that will support future 
reforestation and forest management efforts, alternative strategies for targeting reforestation 
agents are therefore needed. National stakeholders interested in adopting incentives-based 
mechanisms such as PES would find it advantageous to target municipalities with the 
capacity and desire for managing biodiversity-enhancing reforestation efforts (or delegating 
those responsibilities). Municipalities with established environmental committees may be 
better candidates for ensuring long-term tree retention, but efforts should be made to integrate 
these groups into decision-making and design of schemes. Existing incentives to plant trees 
were evident from respondents acknowledging the long-term benefits in having more natural 
forest cover (both aesthetic and functional) in villages. Given that these benefits were clearly 
recognised as a means of attracting visitors while keeping local residents aiding the local 
economy, PES may crowd-out pre-existing intentions, potentially inviting problems such as 
elite capture or fuelling more patronage politics.  
This study presents some of the many challenges and obstacles with community-based 
natural resource management in Lebanon articulated through interviews with various local 
authorities and members of Lebanon’s civil society. It also presented future prospects and 
limitations of working with municipalities and highlights policy considerations for Lebanon’s 
institutions. Given the historical realities of a nation that has faced major social and political 
challenges, there are considerable institutional hurdles at the national scale that still need to 
be overcome for future PES schemes to effectively take shape. Broadening these objectives to 
include private landowners may help reduce some of these obstacles as constraints to 
reforestation. Recognising the implications of these constraints will help in designing more 
cost-effective PES schemes with landowners in mind. But this will also require understanding 
landowner perceptions of asset-building PES, particularly those designed to include mixed 
native forests with few private benefits to landowners.  
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3 Asset-Building Payments for Ecosystem Services: Assessing 
Landowner Perceptions of Risks and Reward from Reforestation 
Incentives in Lebanon 
Incentivising landowners to supply ecosystem services remains challenging, especially when 
this requires long-term investments such as reforestation. I investigated how landowners 
perceive and would respond to different types of incentives for planting diverse native trees 
on private lands in Lebanon. Mixed-methods surveys were conducted with 34 landowners 
from mountainous villages to determine past, present and future land-use strategies. My aim 
was to understand landowners’ attitudes towards three differently structured hypothetical 
Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) contract options; their likely participation; and the 
potential additionality (or estimated area enrolled minus displacement) they would provide. 
The three schemes (results-based loan, action-based grant, and results-based payments) 
differed in their expected risks and benefits to landowners. The majority of reforestation was 
proposed for uncultivated plots, suggesting limited agricultural displacement. Although the 
results-based loan did deter uptake relative to the low-risk action-based grant, results-based 
payments did not significantly increase uptake, suggesting asymmetric attitudes to risk. 
Qualitative probing revealed economic, social (e.g. trust) and institutional factors (e.g. legal 
implications with planting non-productive forest trees on private land) that limited 
willingness to participate in the results-based PES. This study presented a novel approach in 
gauging landowner attitudes and risk behaviour necessary for designing asset-building PES 
schemes. It demonstrates the importance of combining qualitative and quantitative methods 
to better understand landowner perceptions towards incentives and their associated risks. 
Keywords: Agro-ecosystems; biodiversity; displacement; incentives; landowners; Lebanon; 
mixed-methods; payments for ecosystem services (PES); reforestation; risk-behaviour 
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3.1 Introduction 
To date, payments for ecosystem services (PES) have largely focused on use-restricting 
strategies, e.g. avoided deforestation (Wunder 2007). Yet PES are being increasingly 
employed to finance reforestation (or afforestation) efforts, referred to as asset-building 
schemes (Wunder 2008). However, recent studies have criticised carbon-focused PES and 
Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) for incentivising 
monoculture plantations, negatively impacting biodiversity and local livelihoods (Edwards et 
al. 2010; Lindenmayer et al. 2012). It is also well recognised that competitive PES schemes 
could displace agriculture or other productive activities, leading to land conversion and 
intensification elsewhere – a process known as ‘leakage’ (Murray 2008). As a result, PES 
would generate few additional benefits (or overall additionality) at landscape or regional 
scales (Grieg-Gran et al. 2005). While additionality is a defining feature of cost-effective 
PES, it is as important to determine the capacity and willingness of landowners to provide it 
in the future, and what constraints they may face. 
Designing biodiversity-enhancing reforestation schemes (e.g. proportional mixes of native 
species) that are both cost-effective and attract participants remains challenging. This may 
depend on landowners’ perceptions of off-farm ecosystem services (ES) and biodiversity, 
since farmers are used to producing and selling marketable goods (i.e. commodities) and not 
intangible services. Additional challenges exist in contexts where there is interest in asset-
building PES but knowledge of landowner perceptions is lacking, such as with Lebanon. I 
administered a mixed-methods survey to explore the willingness of Lebanese landowners 
from highland villages to accept incentives for planting diverse native tree species of limited 
direct use-value on private lands. Survey participants were presented with three alternative, 
non-randomised PES contracts schemes in the following order: Scheme 1, a results-based 
loan (involving repayments conditional on seedling survival, or negative conditionality); 
Scheme 2, an action-based grant (conditional on planting only); and Scheme 3, results-based 
payments (conditional on seedling survival, or positive conditionality). The main objective 
was to investigate how landowners perceived and evaluated the schemes, which served to 
motivate discussion with the participants. My aim was to understand landowners’ attitudes 
towards these three differently structured hypothetical PES contracts options; what factors 
influence decisions to participate; and the potential additionality (i.e. area enrolled and 
associated land-use/land cover types) they would provide. 
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3.1.1 Factors Affecting PES Uptake 
Recent case studies have shown that participation in PES schemes largely depends on the 
landowners’ opportunity costs determined by, inter alia, land productivity and distance to 
markets (Layton and Siikamäki 2009; Chen et al. 2010). Yet the literature has identified 
several other factors that affect participation, including contract design; social and 
institutional issues; as well as biophysical characteristics. I discuss these factors below. 
Conditionality is a defining feature of PES (Wunder et al. 2014). Payments must be 
conditional on verified actions (e.g. planting trees) or results (e.g. carbon sequestration), 
requiring monitoring of sellers to ensure compliance (Honey-Rosés et al. 2009). For PES 
buyers, contract designs often involve trade-offs between supplier uptake, transaction costs, 
and expected outcomes (Engel et al. 2008; Jindal et al. 2013). For example, contracts that are 
highly bureaucratic or involve excessive conditionality are perceived as being too risky or 
onerous, reducing landowner uptake (Hudson and Lusk 2004). In contrast, lack of 
conditionality or monitoring could result in non-compliance (e.g. hidden action) by sellers 
(Vedel et al. 2010). Cost-benefit trade-offs are therefore important in setting conditions for 
service deliver. The choice of payment by actions or results, together with the optimal level 
of conditionality and monitoring, will depend on the context, the strength of the connection 
between actions and results, the ease of monitoring each, and the level of risk aversion of 
sellers and buyers (Gibbons et al. 2011; Banerjee et al. 2013). Results-based payments may 
also capture existing benefits, thus reducing costs and perverse incentives to clear native 
vegetation in order to plant new trees (Pagiola et al. 2004b). Technical assistance has also 
been shown to help less experienced landowners make better decisions about what to plant 
and where, ensuring existing native trees are not removed, thus increasing benefits at lower 
costs to buyers (Bennett et al. 2011). Allowing PES participants to choose tree species for 
planting has been shown to increase seedling survival rates (Kelly and Huo 2013), but could 
also result in fewer high-conservation-value species being established (Pandey et al. 2014). 
Setting conditions for ensuring mixed native species are used in reforestation and retained ex 
post is therefore vital for safeguarding biodiversity in asset-building PES schemes (Bullock et 
al. 2011; Montagnini and Finney 2011). 
In asset-building programmes like reforestation, with high short-term costs and delayed 
benefits, a fundamental issue of concern to PES buyers is ensuring long term delivery of 
ecosystem services (Pattanayak et al. 2010). Asset-building PES may therefore require a 
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mixture of results- and action-based payments over time to cover high initial costs whilst 
ensuring tree retention (Wunder et al. 2014). In some cases, asset-building PES contracts 
have used payments that are frontloaded and gradually decreased once private benefits from 
planted trees were available to participants, but this is best suited to productive species 
(Pagiola 2008; Hegde et al. 2014). Changing the timing of payments, offering longer-term 
contracts or the option to renew short-term contracts, are possible strategies for ensuring tree 
retention (Ando and Chen 2011).  
Studies have also shown that asset-building PES schemes that vary payments based on 
landowners’ opportunity costs have been shown to be more cost-effective than flat-rate 
payment schemes (e.g. Chen et al. 2010). Yet determining a landowner’s true opportunity 
cost is challenging because private information76 is often costly to obtain (Wünscher et al. 
2011; Jack 2013). Recent studies have investigated ways to reduce landowners’ informational 
rents through offering them a menu of contract options (i.e. screening contracts) as a strategy 
for revealing landowner attributes (Ferraro 2008; Mason and Plantinga 2013). This method 
also serves to reveal landholding characteristics by asking where and why specific planting 
sites are selected by study participants. Asset-building investments are often subject to high 
start-up costs that vary depending on biophysical characteristics, such as level of difficulty, 
topography (e.g. exposure), soil quality, access to roads and water, and microclimates 
(Zbinden and Lee 2005; Ma et al. 2010; Kelly and Huo 2013). For example, landowners may 
rationally decide to reforest only marginal lands with poor soils or conditions unfavourable 
for farming (Crabtree et al. 2001), yet these areas may also be subject to high planting and 
maintenance costs (e.g. protection from grazing). 
Aside from contract design, social and institutional factors such as trust in (or experience 
with) incentive-based schemes (or outside actors in general), local norms and values, and 
income dependence from farm-based activities also influence landowners’ decisions to join 
PES schemes (Miranda et al. 2003; Chen et al. 2009; Van Hecken and Bastiaensen 2010a; 
Fisher 2012). Factors such as age and level of education are important as well (Zbinden and 
Lee 2005). Participants in asset-building PES tend to have relatively large landholdings, with 
enough land unsuitable for agriculture, and have incomes that were largely off-farm (Cole 
2010; Ma et al. 2010). Households’ dependency on forest resources (e.g. firewood, timber, 
                                                 
76 Ferraro (2008) reasons from contract theory literature that sellers (or agents) use their private information as a 
source of market power for leveraging gains in PES transactions. 
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charcoal production) was also found to affect uptake of PES schemes (Hegde et al. 2014). 
The context under which the farming system is structured, along with secure tenure and 
technical or financial know-how, have also been found to be determinants of landowner 
uptake (Pagiola et al. 2005; Kosoy et al. 2008). Building trust in the institutions responsible 
for ensuring payments often takes time, and poorer, more risk-averse landowners may be less 
willing to participate than wealthier ones (Garbach et al. 2012; Fisher 2012). These issues are 
particularly critical in cases where governments are buyers or intermediaries, yet have lost the 
confidence of farmers through previous policies. Beyond this, PES is even more challenging 
to implement under circumstances where legal and property institutions are weak, which is 
common in many developing countries (Swallow and Meinzen-Dick 2009; Van Hecken and 
Bastiaensen 2010b; Matzdorf et al. 2013). Even in more developed countries such as 
Germany, land tenure implications and contractual uncertainties were principle reasons 
behind farmers’ reluctance to join PES schemes (Schleyer and Plieninger 2011). 
Factors affecting uptake in reforestation incentives therefore require understanding of farmer 
identity and how they perceive risks or uncertainties towards livelihood changes (Knoke and 
Wurm 2006; Duesberg et al. 2013; Wynne-Jones 2013b; Blennow et al. 2014). Some of these 
perceptions are reflective of social norms, for example, in how risk-averse farmers make 
decisions based on actions made by other members of their community (Chen et al. 2009; Ma 
et al. 2010). PES programmes rely on informing suppliers about payments for services that 
are difficult to grasp by many people outside the scientific or policy sphere. It is therefore 
important to investigate how landowners would perceive (or even conceptualise) the risks of 
entering into ‘uncharted territories’ of new institutions and markets (Wunder 2007; Knoke et 
al. 2011). This necessitates more thorough investigations into risk behaviour of property 
owners under hypothetical markets. Such studies can help in designing appropriate incentives 
for delivering the environmental benefits being paid for. 
3.2 Materials and Methods 
3.2.1 Study Area 
Lebanon is a small (10,452 km2), predominantly mountainous country located in the eastern 
Mediterranean basin and recognised as a centre for plant diversity (Davis et al. 1994). My 
study area comprised the western slopes of Mount Lebanon where 10 of Lebanon’s 20 newly 
designated Important Plant Areas (IPAs) are located (Radford et al. 2011). This area is 
characteristic of eu-mediterranean (> 1,000 meters) to oro-mediterranean (> 2,000 meters) 
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bioclimatic zones. The vegetation types are typical of Mediterranean forest, woodland and 
scrub communities containing coniferous, deciduous and mixed forest/woodland (Abi-Saleh 
and Safi 1988). Habitats are increasingly threatened by land-use including intensive 
agriculture, overgrazing, urbanisation and quarrying, as well as fires (Talhouk et al. 2001; 
Sattout and Abboud 2007; Darwish et al. 2010a). 
3.2.2 Sampling  
I focused on villages within 877 Important Plant Areas (IPAs) from Akkar to Chouf districts 
given their priority status for conservation and reforestation potential (Figure 3.1). A 
stratified random sample78 of 17 villages within these IPAs were selected from a near-
complete sampling frame of 248 villages (Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1. Sampled respondents and villages and their respective districts and Important Plant Areas 
IPA No.‡ Name District Elevation (Ave.) No. of landowners 
LB07 Qammouaa* Dinniyeh 1695 5 
LB09 Bcharre-Ehden Bcharre / Ehden 1425 3 
LB11 Tannourine Batroun 1500 3 
LB13 Wadi Jannah Keserouan 950 1 
LB14 Keserouan Keserouan 1300 7 
LB15 Sannine-Kneisseh Metn 1325 6 
LB16 Chouf Chouf 1100 5 
LB17 Nahr ed-Damour Chouf 1050 4 
*
Excludes Akkar and Hermel districts 
‡ ‘LB’ denotes Lebanon 
 
                                                 
77 I excluded the whole of LB20, and villages in LB07 in the Akkar district due to security concerns in those 
regions. LB01 was also omitted given its high elevation (> 2,500 m, i.e. beyond the tree line). 
78 Stratified according to IPA, estimated geographic size, population, rurality and elevation. 
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Figure 3.1. Map of Lebanon showing the eight Important Plant Areas (IPAs) in the study area in green 
(Yazbek et al. 2010). Landowners from 17 villages located within these IPAs were sampled for this 
study. Source for base mapping: Google Earth. 
Due to social and political sensitivities associated with conducting research in rural Lebanon, 
especially at the time when the field work was conducted, it was necessary to obtain contact 
details of landowners from mayors and other key informants from these villages who acted as 
my gatekeepers and facilitated my research79. I obtained contact details for 52 landowners 
who were sole proprietors of their holdings, who were then contacted by telephone. After at 
least two attempts I spoke to 46 landowners, informed them of the study objectives, and 
                                                 
79 Gatekeepers distributed recruitment flyers I produced to landowners (an English version is available in 
Appendix 3.1.). Academic experts and national officials also recommended that I take this approach especially 
given my foreign status as a visiting researcher. 
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asked for their oral consent80. Twelve landowners declined to participate for various reasons 
ranging from lack of land, land tenure issues (decisions shared between family members), age 
and inconvenience. The final survey was conducted with 34 participants with their written 
consent; all were newly recruited and had not participated in the pilot (see section 3.2.4).  
3.2.3 Conceptualising PES in Lebanon 
I presented three hypothetical schemes to respondents in order to gauge their acceptability 
and to stimulate discussion of the key research themes identified above. 
Scheme 1 – Results-based loan 
The first scheme presented would provide the landowner with free seedlings81 and technical 
assistance at no charge. In addition, they would receive money up-front to cover the direct 
costs of planting and maintenance, in the form of an interest-free loan, repayable over a 
period of five years. It was explained that repayments would be cancelled each year if 
survival was above 80% of the initial planting, but if below this threshold, participants would 
be required to pay the proportion of the seedlings lost from the total, e.g. 65% survival = 35% 
repayment. Seedling survival would be estimated by a monitoring team using randomly 
selected plots (e.g. Griscom et al. 2005), assessed on a yearly basis during the five-year 
period. Respondents were assured that repayments would be cancelled if the project collapsed 
for any reason, thus reducing external risks to participants.  
Scheme 2 – Action-based grant 
Scheme 2 contained the same baseline support as Scheme 1 (i.e. free seedlings and technical 
assistance) along with the same payments to cover planting and maintenance costs. However, 
in this case these were in the form of a grant, conditional only on planting taking place, but 
unconditional on survival. Comparison of uptake across Schemes 1 and 2, in addition to 
discussion with participants, allowed me to assess their perceptions of risk and negative 
conditionality, without focussing on specific payments levels. 
                                                 
80 Thirty-seven orally consented to participate of whom three declined to participate due to inconvenience 
(surveys were conducted at the height of the apple harvesting period).  
81 A printed list of native tree and shrub species was provided for the respondents that included productive, e.g. 
stone pine (Pinus pinea L.), and non-productive trees (see Appendix 3.2.). The list was derived from a native 
tree species database developed through research conducted by the American University of Beirut’s Nature 
Conservation Center (AUB-NCC). The database also includes GPS data and images of species used for 
monitoring biodiversity and locating specimens for harvesting seeds that are later used in seedling production. 
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Scheme 3 – Results-based payments 
The last scheme offered the same free seedlings and technical assistance as Schemes 1 and 2, 
together with payments to cover direct planting costs82. In addition, participants would 
receive annual performance payments at US$3.00 per seedling conditional on and 
proportional to survival outcomes (e.g. 65% overall survival = 65% payment). Planting and 
survival would be assessed through annual monitoring (same methods as first scheme) over 
five years. Analogously, if survival were less than 25%, participants would receive no results-
based payments.  
3.2.4 Data Acquisition and Survey Instruments 
A questionnaire-based survey was conducted in Arabic by my field assistant in my presence. 
An extensive pilot was conducted with twenty landowners over a two week period in August, 
2012 to ensure it was locally appropriate. Surveys were conducted in the participants’ 
villages, either at their farm, home, workplace, or the municipality office. Each participant 
was given an introduction to the study, and explanation of how and why they were contacted. 
The introduction was kept general in order to reduce biased responses. Participants were 
presented with a written consent form prior to commencing83. Each survey took 
approximately 40-50 minutes to complete and each respondent received a small gift for their 
participation following the interviews84.  
Section 1 of the survey85 focussed on current and intended land-use, including the kinds of 
crops planted, quantities of each and their densities (% coverage), and area in hectares (‘ha’ 
here onwards), how long ago, and land-use/land-cover characteristics. This section also 
contained questions related to planting objectives, any difficulties faced, and whether they 
had received any third-party support (e.g. MOA, cooperatives, NGOs, etc.).  
Section 2 of the survey introduced the first of three hypothetical PES schemes. A preamble 
informed the respondents that this section would involve presenting hypothetical planting 
                                                 
82 Because this scheme introduced specified results-based payments in later years, these planting payments were 
also specified at US$7.00 for every seedling planted. This rate was a generous estimate of the planting costs 
mentioned, but unspecified in Schemes 1 and 2. 
83 The study received ethics approval from both Bangor University and AUB review boards 
84 As compensation, each participant received a book (Plants and People, AUB-NCC publication) at the end of 
the interview. Cost of each book was US$12.99. All books were donated to me by AUB-NCC. 
85 A copy of the survey is included in Appendix 3.3. 
Chapter 3   Landowner Perceptions 
92 
schemes. Follow-up questions were asked after each scheme was presented, which included 
where they would plant the seedlings and on how much land (in 1,000 m2). They were also 
asked whether schemes would change their intended planting plans for that plot, e.g. if they 
had previous plans to plant crop trees. In addition, they were asked open-ended questions 
regarding perceived benefits or advantages of the proposed schemes. Respondents who did 
not wish to participate in any of the schemes were prompted to discuss why they would opt 
out.  
Section 3 of the survey contained questions aimed at determining what sort of constraints or 
possible land-use changes the participants envisaged in the future. Open-ended questions 
were coded with responses seen only by the interviewer, thus encouraging the respondents to 
give more qualitative answers. This was followed by a short section on socioeconomic 
questions (section 4). 
3.2.5 Data Analysis 
Quantitative data was analysed using SPSS version 20 (Pallant 2010) to determine 1) whether 
there was a significant difference in uptake and area enrolled for reforestation under each 
consecutive scheme, 2) whether there was a significant difference in land-use types that 
would be reforested to determine agricultural displacement86, and 3) whether landowner type, 
age or landholding size influenced participation and land enrolment into corresponding 
schemes. Qualitative data was transcribed and translated into English by my field assistant. 
Audio recordings and transcriptions were analysed using Atlas.ti® (qualitative data analysis 
software) to identify important themes. 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Basic Attributes of Sample 
All participants in the sample (n=34) were males between the ages of 30 and 81 with a 
median age of 57. Median household size of respondents was five members. Over three 
quarters of the respondents indicated they were permanent residents of their villages while 
                                                 
86 Land-use types were categorised as those “in use”, e.g. containing orchards / crops, and those “in disuse”, e.g. 
abandoned farms or rangelands not being grazed (maquis / garrigue landscapes).  
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the remainder (n=8) spent only summers there87. Ninety-one per cent indicated that their 
landholdings were located within villages where they resided. Fifteen of the respondents 
(55%) stated “baccalaureate” (end of high school, or 18 years old) as their highest level of 
education, eleven were university graduates and four graduated from technical schools 
(Figure 3.2a).  
Eleven of the respondents were full-time commercial farmers, nine were part-time farmers 
and fourteen were hobby or retired farmers (Figure 3.2). Landholding size per respondent 
ranged from 30 ha to 0.15 ha. The median area of landholdings was 3 ha with around 70% 
owning 6 ha or less. Only three respondents owned property that was contiguous. Nine 
landowners owned property over 10 ha, consisting of mainly hobby / retired farmers. 
Landholding size differed weakly between level of education (Kruskal-Wallis H-test = 7.810, 
p = 0.099). Part-time and hobby farmers did not have smaller landholdings than full-time 
farmers (Kruskal-Wallis H-test = 0.258, p = 0.879; Figure 3.2b). 
  
Figure 3.2. a) Landowner type subdivided by education (left panel). b) Total landholdings by 
landowner type (right panel). Landowner type was divided between full-time farmer (most income 
derived from farming), part-time farmer (e.g. employee) and hobby / retired farmer. 
 
                                                 
87 This is likely to be an artefact of sampling since contacts provided by the municipalities were largely 
permanent residents. While it is possible that I have underrepresented absentee landowners, I believe that my 
sample is broadly representative of the relevant population, i.e. landowners with some active level of interest in 
managing the land. Contracting with other landowners is likely to be difficult. Similarly, the high median age of 
respondents reflects the age composition of villages where many younger landowners are absentee residents or 
have left their native villages to find employment in cities. 
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3.3.2 Past and Intended Future Planting (in the Absence of PES) 
Apples (Malus domestica Borkh) were the main commercial crop trees planted, followed by 
stone fruits (e.g. Prunus spp.). The largest number of crop trees recently planted on a single 
plot by a landowner was 14,000, accounting for roughly 43% of the aggregated total of apple 
trees planted in the sample. Four respondents indicated that they had planted productive 
forest trees, e.g. stone pine, walnut (Juglans regia L.), and chestnut (Castanea sativa Mill.); 
none had mentioned planting other native forest trees (e.g. Lebanese cedar). Nearly 75% of 
the respondents stated they had planted over 100 commercial saplings within the last 10 
years. The sample was highly skewed with respect to total landholding size and area recently 
cultivated, as well as number of crop trees planted per respondent. There was also 
considerable variability in land-use/cover types and motives for planting (Figure 3.3). 
 
Figure 3.3. Mean area planted with commercial crops under different land-use/land-cover types 
subdivided by farmers’ motives for planting the crops mentioned. ‘Low cost / effort’ refers to easy 
management of the trees, ‘Market only’ refers to high market value of the crop, and ‘Profit maxim’ 
denotes respondents who mentioned both low cost and high market value. Note: An outlier was 
excluded in order to better present the results in this figure. 
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Just over half of the respondents (n=18) intended to plant more trees in the near future. 
Fifteen ha was the approximate total area expected to be planted with over 75% taking place 
on abandoned farmlands. Apples, stone fruit, and seed / nut-bearing trees (mainly stone pine 
and walnut) were the main commercial trees to be planted, with mean anticipated areas of 
7.1, 5.5 and 2.1 ha, respectively. None of the respondents in my sample mentioned intentions 
of planting native forest trees in the future other than stone pine. 
3.3.3 Participation and Land Enrolment in the PES Schemes 
Twenty-two landowners (roughly 65%) were willing to participate in the results-based loan 
(Scheme 1), with 21.9 ha of land offered for reforestation. Although the action-based grant 
(Scheme 2) increased participation to 27 with 35.5 ha land enrolled, the results-based 
payments (Scheme 3) did not change the number participating (both around 80%), and only 
slightly increased the land area to 37.5 ha88. There was an average of 0.8 ha increase in 
potential area reforested from consecutive schemes for 6 of the 21 respondents who answered 
yes to all three schemes89. Fifteen of those 21 enrolled the same area for Schemes 2 and 3, of 
which 8 enrolled the same area for all three schemes. A Friedman test indicated there was 
statistically significant difference in land enrolment between schemes (Friedman’s ANOVA 
χ2 (2) = 25.10, p < 0.001). Post hoc Wilcoxon tests found a significant increase in land 
enrolment from Scheme 1 to Scheme 2 (T = 169, r = −0.62, p < 0.001) and Scheme 1 to 
Scheme 3 (T = 198, r = −0.60, p < 0.001), but not from Scheme 2 to Scheme 3 (T = 77.5, r = 
−0.27, p = 0.116). 
3.3.4 Agricultural Displacement under PES Schemes 
Seventeen per cent of reforestation would be on cultivated lands (or land in use) under the 
results-based loan (Scheme 1), 11.5% under the action-based grant (Scheme 2), and 12.4% 
under the results-based payments (Scheme 3). However, over 65% of respondents that 
indicated reforestation taking place on cultivated lands under any of the schemes mentioned 
they would plant only at the margins of existing cultivation, e.g. borders of orchards. Eight 
respondents stated their intended plans would change under schemes (i.e. native forest trees 
                                                 
88 One landowner who was willing to participate in Scheme 1 chose not to participate in Scheme 2, but then did 
participate in Scheme 3. One other who had not participated in either Scheme joined Scheme 3, while two who 
had participated in Scheme 2 were put off by Scheme 3. 
89 This was averaged at 0.95 from Scheme 1 to 2 and 0.65 from Scheme 2 to 3. 
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would be planted in place of intended crop trees) of which four mentioned plantings would 
take place on land in use90. 
3.3.5 Predicting Landowner Uptake and Potential Additionality 
I tested whether total landholding size (in ha), age, and landowner type (divided between 
‘full-time farmer’ and ‘other’91) influenced responses to each of the three schemes (binary 
Yes/No) using logistic regression (Pallant 2010). Higher landholding size and age increased 
and decreased (respectively) participation in Scheme 1, but these effects disappeared for 
Schemes 2 and 3 as a greater number of older landowners and landowners with smaller 
holdings were attracted to the schemes (Table 3.2)92. 
Table 3.2. Logistic regression for predicting likelihood of enrolling in PES schemes 
 
B S.E. Wald d.f. Sig. 
Odds 
Ratio 
95% C.I. for Odds 
Ratio 
Lower Upper 
Scheme 1 (Constant) 3.969 2.235 3.152   .076 52.911   
 Landowner type 1.182 1.079 1.200 1 .273 3.260 .393 27.015 
 Age -.090 .043 4.342 1 *.037 .914 .839 .995 
 Landholding size .368 .183 4.044 1 *.044 1.4450 1.009 2.068 
Scheme 2 (Constant) .689 1.994 .119   .730 1.991     
 Landowner type -1.808 1.271 2.024 1 .155 .164 .014 1.979 
 Age -.009 .036 .065 1 .799 .991 .923 1.063 
 Landholding size .863 .557 2.399 1 .121 2.370 .795 7.064 
Scheme 3 (Constant) 2.574 2.092 1.514   .219 13.112     
 Landowner type -.072 .997 .005 1 .943 .931 .132 6.568 
 Age -.039 .036 1.159 1 .282 .962 .896 1.032 
 Landholding size .319 .236 1.821 1 .177 1.375 .886 2.185 
*p < 0.05 
Respondents who declared they would participate in at least one of the three schemes (n=29) 
were asked if they would foresee any possible land-use changes that may affect the trees in 
the future. Respondents gave open-ended answers but were also prompted by the interviewer 
on possible responses coded in the survey, e.g. land prices increasing, agricultural product 
                                                 
90 0.6 ha under Scheme 1; 1.7 ha under Scheme 2; 2.3 ha under Scheme 3. 
91 For the purpose of analysis I consolidated part-time farmers and hobby farmers (n=23). 
92 Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure assumption of normality, linearity, multicollinearity and 
homoscedasticity were not violated. Collinearity diagnostics showed that there was no violation of 
multicollinearity assumptions with the variables tested (VIF = 1.015). Normal probability plots of the regression 
standardised residuals showed there were no outliers (critical value = 13.82; Mahal maximum distance = 8.84). 
Scheme 1 
Scheme 2 
Scheme 3 
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prices changing, and intrinsic environmental values. Twelve mentioned no foreseeable 
changes in the future, ten indicated they may build on those plots, four mentioned passing 
land onto children, and three indicated possible land-use changes relating to agriculture. Ten 
respondents mentioned on-farm benefits of forest trees as possible factors for maintaining 
trees beyond the life of the scheme. These included the functional role of trees for increasing 
environmental benefits, such as erosion prevention, regulating local climates, filtering the air, 
and as windbreaks. Four respondents also mentioned increasing landscape beauty as a 
benefit, related to possible future investments in ecotourism activities, e.g. bed-and-breakfast. 
Finally, over half of the participating respondents indicated that they would be interested in 
longer term payments, but that this would largely depend on the success of the programme in 
the long run. 
3.3.6 Landowner Perceptions of PES Schemes 
The hypothetical schemes were used to initiate a discussion of landowners’ perceptions of 
PES schemes in general, and specific characteristics of the three schemes. Respondents’ 
general views of PES varied, but a large portion mentioned financial and technical support 
for farmers as being key advantages of schemes. One respondent claimed he would buy more 
land to enrol if these specific types of support from a PES project were genuine and 
trustworthy. Respondents who would participate in one or more of the schemes discussed 
advantages of PES for its role in generating greater environmental benefits, both on- and off-
farm. One respondent, for example, suggested PES schemes should include mainly 
productive native trees: 
“The proposed scenarios may encourage farmers to replant their land that was 
burned during the [civil] war, [but] only if [these] trees are productive such as olive, 
[stone] pine, walnut, fig… consequently, the benefit will be for the farmer and the 
environment.” (Resp. # 16) 
Perceptions towards individual schemes also varied. Unsurprisingly, respondents showed a 
greater keenness towards the action-based grant over the results-based loan due to relaxed 
conditions of the latter (i.e. lower risk). Interestingly, however, while three respondents who 
indicated that they would participate in the action-based grant opted out of the results-based 
payments, two others who opted out previously joined, albeit with very little land enrolled. 
One respondent, who owned 6 ha of largely abandoned farmlands enrolled 1 ha under results-
based loan (Scheme 1) and 4 ha under the action-based grant (Scheme 2), but nothing under 
results-based payments (Scheme 3). His explanation was as follows: 
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“The 3rd [scheme] is like a gambling game and the farmer can’t take [such] risks. I 
can’t trust such [a] scheme especially [since] the success of this plan is mainly 
related to natural [environmental factors] which I can’t [control]. So who will 
compensate the lost investment if for example 30 of 100 seedlings survived after 
[some] unpredictable natural [disaster]?” (Resp. #18) 
This suggests that some landowners may not believe future payments would in fact occur 
under results-based payments for ‘unproductive’ species (since Scheme 3 carried no higher 
risk than Scheme 1 in addition to providing higher payoffs), but trusted they could make 
repayments (Scheme 1). However, there were respondents who also saw advantages in the 
results-based payments (Scheme 3), even by those who decided not to participate for other 
reasons: 
The third scheme can be more applicable especially since the farmer will be paid on 
each planted tree. [This] type of scheme had been implemented in the past by the 
government for silk production, so each farmer who plants a mulberry tree was given 
an amount of money. The more he planted the more money [he received], even if he 
[wasn't] a silk (or silkworm) producer.” (Resp. #20) 
This may suggest that landowners would prefer more autonomy over how many trees to plant 
based on characteristics of their holdings and their own capacity. However, many non-
participants, including Respondent #20, simply did not see any benefit of planting native 
trees regardless of the contract type or money offered. Most of the respondents who opted out 
of all schemes shared a dislike of non-productive native trees and/or diversified land-uses. 
For instance, one respondent mentioned he would not even consider diversifying his 
production, preferring to plant one profitable crop, stating that “nothing beats apples in this 
region”. If given the option to plant native trees, the most likely candidate would be stone 
pine for its revenues from pine nuts. However, even the high returns from processed pine 
kernels are no match for apples. One respondent summarised the following: 
“Landowners won’t grow forest trees on their agricultural lands for the following 
reasons: Fruit trees are more profitable [in the short-run] because they require less 
time to produce as opposed to [productive] forest trees; fruit trees can be secured as 
a source of revenue while the majority of forest [species] don't generate revenues; the 
government has put a lot of restriction on forest trees, [so] once planted they cannot 
be removed.” (Resp. #34) 
In general, respondents’ comments on PES schemes would suggest that opportunity costs 
were considered to be high. Yet institutional factors may also influence uptake of PES as 
mentioned by Respondent # 34 above. At least three of my respondents referred to the legal 
implications of planting forest trees. Since permits are required for cutting or removal native 
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forest species93 even on private lands (Law 85/1996), it is not surprising that landowners 
(especially farmers) would be reluctant to plant non-productive species on productive 
farmlands. While Lebanon’s current forestry policies may have contributed to relative gains 
in forest cover on abandoned farmlands, it may have also hindered effective forest 
management and reluctance of landowners to plant more forest trees: 
“In the past, forests were well managed and protected by the local people because 
they were a source of [fodder], wood, and medicinal and aromatic plants... Today, 
more restrictions have been implemented by the MOA to protect forest areas, but this 
has actually discouraged people from preserving their forested lands because [these 
new laws have made forests] ‘useless’. Now violations, neglect and forest fires have 
increased... [because only] when people find a benefit from something, they will work 
to protect [it].” (Resp. #1) 
Other factors contributing to lack of uptake and land-enrolment mentioned were land 
availability and the land-use types in question (e.g. lack of land unsuitable for agriculture). 
Attitudes towards native species, as well as changing trends in land market prices, were also 
important factors respondents raised that affect participation.  
This brings us to another important research question: What types of landowners would be 
more likely to provide greater additionality? What variables would likely contribute to this? 
Various factors could make future PES projects in Lebanon challenging to implement. Land 
availability was a constraint mentioned by both participants and non-participants alike. It is 
also clear that fewer younger landowners are actively managing their holdings than before, 
hence age will likely be a factor affecting uptake as well. Respondents in my sample were 
quite aged (median 57), which is reflective of a declining agricultural sector driving many 
households into cities in search of work. For instance, one respondent chose not to subscribe 
to any of the schemes both due to his age and the fact that his children no longer live in the 
village. He gave interesting insights that point to potential constraints in implementing a PES 
programme with landowners in Lebanon: 
“Nowadays, the younger generation is not interested in agriculture and the older 
generation is no longer able to maintain the land... so [younger landowners] are 
selling their lands instead of [maintaining] and cultivating them…” (Resp. #17) 
This statement suggests that opportunity costs may be too high for reforesting private lands 
due to either development, lack of human resources to manage land, or both. While 
                                                 
93 This pertains mainly to native conifers (e.g. Pinus spp., Juniperus spp., Cedrus libani Rich., Abies cilicica 
Carr., Cupressus sempervirens L.). 
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landowner type (full-time farmer vs part-time and hobby / retired farmer) did not exert any 
significant influence on PES uptake, there is a trade-off between targeting farmers who would 
have a greater capacity to plant and care for trees, yet may also have higher opportunity costs 
than non-farmers.  
Quantitative results indicated that PES schemes would likely take place on abandoned farms 
or rangelands of low opportunity cost. But this may entail high operational costs since these 
lands are also likely to be remote, lacking access to roads and water. This brings us to my 
final research question: would agricultural land be displaced under PES schemes, and does 
this level of displacement differ between schemes? While it is likely that most landowners 
would choose to plant forest trees on land unsuitable for agriculture, there is a possibility that 
a PES programme could inadvertently bring marginal lands (e.g. abandoned farms or remote 
rangelands) into production. Take for example the following statement: 
“[constructing] agricultural roads is a must [in order for farmers] to access all the 
abandoned land. So when a farmer has land suitable for [production], he will plant it 
with fruit tress because the benefits from these trees will be more than forest trees, 
even if [the latter] is supported by any [reforestation] plan or schemes.” (Resp. #21) 
Increasing land prices may also influence policymakers to build roads to access abandoned 
farmlands in remote areas, thus posing a threat to tree retention under future PES schemes.  
3.4 Discussion 
One of the most important outcomes of this study for policy was a better understanding of 
landowners’ perceptions of PES and how they differed. Asset-building PES such as 
reforestation requires long-term maintenance to ensure future additionality of off-farm ES. 
While frontloading payments to cover direct costs of planting and maintenance is common in 
PES using productive trees with private benefits (Hegde and Bull 2011), it is much more 
challenging under biodiversity-focused PES as in this study. Landowners may be especially 
reluctant to plant trees that offer little private benefit in the long-run (as is the case with most 
native tree species). Although results-based schemes may be more effective in ensuring long-
term tree retention of native trees than action-based schemes, they depend heavily on 
landowners perceiving the credibility of such long-term payments. 
Recent studies on incentives for re/afforestation have shown that landowners are 
heterogeneous in their preferences and their decisions to participate in such schemes may not 
be solely based on present or perceived opportunity costs, but also on non-financial factors 
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related to risks and uncertainties (Knoke and Wurm 2006; Ma et al. 2010; Duesberg et al. 
2013; Blennow et al. 2014). Reasons why landowners in my study (particularly full-time 
farmers) would opt out of schemes relate directly to other studies conducted, particularly how 
livelihoods could be affected from having native species on farms, such as loss of tenure and 
negative perceptions of biodiversity, e.g. native trees attract insects (Zubair and Garforth 
2006). Others have indicated that uptake of re/afforestation initiatives depends more on 
landowner attributes and perceptions than landholding characteristics (e.g. Mahapatra and 
Mitchell 2001). In my sample, there was also considerable heterogeneity amongst farmers 
and their preferences, yet social and institutional aspects appeared to play an important role in 
uptake for most. These included issues with credibility and trust in new institutions as well as 
legal implications of planting native trees on private lands, resulting in high opportunity costs 
and unforeseeable risks in the future. 
Schemes were designed specifically to investigate how landowners perceive risks related to 
conditionality. While it plays an important role in asset-building schemes, conditionality may 
also limit participation if landowners perceive schemes as too risky (Chen et al. 2009). The 
first two schemes (results-based loan and action-based grant) differed substantially in their 
level of risk to landowners, and a reduction in risk predictably increased enrolment. However, 
surprisingly the addition of results-based payments (Scheme 3) did not significantly increase 
uptake. Reasons for this may pertain to landowner perceptions of risk and uncertainty in 
general (Blennow et al. 2014), as well as risks specifically attributed to results-oriented 
schemes (Burton and Schwarz 2013). There is also the possibility that Scheme 3 was not 
considered to be  credible over the long timescale required to ensure tree retention by 
landowners in a country which has experienced considerable turmoil (Makdisi 2004). Since 
results-based payments might ensure greater retention over time, targeting PES involves 
trade-offs for both buyers and potential suppliers with respect to risks. For example, buyers 
would have to weigh trade-offs between efficiency (e.g. low payments and transaction costs, 
displacement- and risk-reduction) and effectiveness (e.g. supplier uptake, extent of land 
enrolled, tree retention) when designing contracts while sellers weigh the risks and reward of 
those contracts (Table 3.3). 
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Table 3.3. Trade-offs between efficiency and effectiveness of schemes 
Variables Scheme 1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3 
Farmer uptake Medium High High 
Area enrolled Low Medium Medium 
Displacement Medium Low Low 
Risks (to farmers) High Low Low/Med. 
Transaction costs* High Low High 
Payment costs* Low Med High 
* These are reasonable estimates of the costs to buyers involved in mounting the schemes 
Hudson and Lusk (2004) found that autonomy of farmers plays an important role in the 
context of risks and transaction costs in contracting decisions. In our experiment, landowner 
autonomy under results-based schemes (1 and 3) can be perceived to be limited with respect 
to higher transaction costs for the buyer (since these schemes both required monitoring). 
Scheme 3 potentially gives landowners more autonomy than Scheme 1 in deciding how many 
trees to plant in relation to the extent of land to be enrolled. Our results indicated that 
landowners are unlikely to enrol more land under results-based payment (Scheme 3) than 
action-based grant (Scheme 2) despite higher payoffs in the long run. This may be attributed 
to loss of autonomy, especially since monitoring could be viewed as an annoyance, implying 
a loss of utility. It is also possible that Scheme 1 could invite principal-agent problems (e.g. 
hidden action). For example, participants in results-based loan could potentially use planting 
funds to rehabilitate abandoned lands and deliberately allow native trees to die in order to 
plant productive trees in their place. While it is important to increase uptake in PES schemes 
by reducing risks, allowing landowners autonomy in contracting decisions should be used 
with caution in contracts that are liable to invite principal-agent dilemmas, thus increasing 
transaction costs for buyers.  
Aside from a prohibitively small sample size that limits using more robust parametric 
analysis, other issues and limitations of this study include whether respondents were able to 
fully grasp these types of schemes in order to make better assessment of their risks and 
reward. An example of this includes a quote by respondent # 20 who, even though he chose 
to participate in Scheme 2, viewed Scheme 3 to be too risky. This type of response poses an 
anomaly. On one hand, it might suggest that some landowners may not believe future 
payments would in fact occur under results-based payments for ‘unproductive’ species (since 
Scheme 3 carried no higher risk than Scheme 1), but trusted they could make repayments 
(Scheme 1). On the other, it highlights difficulties in assessing risks associated with schemes 
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presented since landowners’ perceptions towards risks and uncertainty often vary and may 
have been biased by the order of the schemes presented. This may have also explain why 
opportunity costs were fairly ubiquitous. 
Many studies have found that participation in asset-building PES is contingent upon farm-
based incomes (i.e. opportunity costs), farming systems (e.g. available marginal lands), 
landholding size, and age (Zbinden and Lee 2005; Pagiola et al. 2008; Bastiaensen and Van 
Hecken 2009; Cole 2010; Liu et al. 2010). My results suggest that consideration of 
opportunity costs was ubiquitous amongst respondents, especially if they could foresee 
possibilities of bringing land in disuse back into cultivation, or even the prospects of the 
value of their land increasing in the future. Respondents in my sample owned modest size 
holdings in comparison to other countries, and may have been conservative with how much 
land they would be willing to enrol. This is especially true if they believed payments may not 
have been sufficient enough to cover future revenues foregone. This is to be expected in the 
context of an agricultural sector that is changing rapidly with emigration of rural households, 
combined with urbanisation and increasing land prices in some areas. Perceived opportunity 
costs are difficult to assess in many respects since future land-use is highly speculative and 
contingent upon various factors. Landowners’ opportunity costs could also vary from one 
parcel to the next, and perhaps even within the same parcel (Wunder 2007). For instance, 
while present opportunity costs of arable land that is currently in use would be higher than 
marginal abandoned cropland or remote rangelands94, this could inevitably change in the 
future if new infrastructure was developed (Crabtree et al. 2001). Hence, landowners would 
have to consider important trade-offs when selecting plots with the lowest opportunity costs, 
such as direct costs of planting and irrigating seedlings on difficult terrain. This is particularly 
critical for less experienced tree planters who may underestimate the level of difficulty or 
work involved, especially for those who are quite aged.  
The overall success of an asset-building PES programme in Lebanon requires not only long-
term tree retention, but would also have to factor in the programme’s potential for displacing 
agriculture. According to the latest agriculture census, there is an estimated 9,800 ha of 
abandoned farmlands in the six districts where my study was conducted, more than half of 
which are considered to be suitable for agriculture (Salibi 2007). Many are abandoned due to 
                                                 
94 While it is not uncommon for landowners to rent these lands out to herders, there were none in my sample 
that indicated this for any of their plots. 
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lack of access to water and roads, in which case road-building and agricultural development 
projects could potentially increase opportunity costs. Further, they could potentially threaten 
future tree retention if an asset-building PES programme were implemented, and these 
infrastructural improvements could be stimulated by the programme itself. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This paper examined the potential for PES to incentivize landowners to plant diverse native 
trees on private property. The objective of this mixed-methods study was to examine how 
Lebanese landowners perceive PES schemes and how different forms of conditionality might 
affect participation. Combined qualitative and quantitative methods enabled me to gauge 
landowners’ perceptions towards schemes, helping to identify factors that would influence 
uptake, land enrolment and establishment of native trees on private property in the long run. 
Lebanese landowners from montane villages are heterogeneous in their occupations, 
landholdings, and preferences. Despite this, many (over 60% in my sample) appeared willing 
to participate in asset-building PES aimed at enhancing biodiversity. Qualitative probing 
revealed some of the constraints and challenges perceived by landowners, which helped 
strengthen my quantitative results. I found that the addition of results-based payments 
(Scheme 3) did not increase participation or land enrolment, possibly due to a lack of trust in 
long-term programmes, especially in a society facing constant turmoil. I also identified the 
importance of uncertain future opportunity costs in a rapidly changing rural context. This 
study demonstrates the importance of combining qualitative and quantitative data collection 
in studies of PES and shows that the potential for tailoring PES schemes to supply off-farm 
ecosystem services will depend on understanding landowners’ perceptions. 
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4 Prioritising Native Tree Species for Reforestation Efforts in Lebanon 
Choosing species for reforestation often requires making trade-offs between different 
objectives. Reforestation stakeholders may have different preferences for species based on 
their perceived biodiversity conservation value and the ecosystem services that they are 
expected to provide. I surveyed stakeholder preferences for species to be included in 
reforestation within an ecologically important region in North Lebanon. Of the 30 native tree 
species being produced in Lebanese nurseries, 22 were identified as ecologically suitable by 
experts. Stakeholders (n=34) in Lebanon’s public, private and academic sectors were then 
asked to rate these 22 species according to conservation priority and ecological suitability. 
Different methods of ranking species were then compared in order to select the top 10 
species. Non-parametric analysis was conducted to determine whether there were significant 
differences between stakeholders from biodiversity- and forestry-focused sectors. While 
forestry-focused respondents rated broadleaved species higher and conifers lower than 
biodiversity-focused ones, results indicated that no significant differences in species ratings 
existed between the two stakeholder groups. The variability in preferences between 
stakeholders, including the considerable within-group variability that I found, highlights 
some of the challenges with soliciting preferences from multiple stakeholders when selecting 
species to be used in reforestation efforts. 
Keywords: native species; reforestation; Lebanon; stakeholders; non-parametric tests; 
preferences; ranking; species rating 
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4.1 Introduction 
Despite continued deforestation and forest degradation, agricultural abandonment has led to 
the recovery of some forests (Sitzia et al. 2010), particularly in Mediterranean Europe 
(Poyatos et al. 2003; Bonet 2004). However, active restoration (e.g. re/afforestation) is often 
necessary on lands lacking natural regeneration, particularly landscapes where soil and gully 
erosion is prevailing (Scarascia-Mugnozza et al. 2000; Rey-Benayas et al. 2008; De Baets et 
al. 2009). Decisions on the species used in restoration are quite often geared towards meeting 
short term objectives, such as mitigating on-site degradation. But species selection decisions 
also have important implications for biodiversity and other ecosystem services in the future 
(Aronson et al. 1993; Lamb et al. 2005; Carnus et al. 2006; Bullock et al. 2011). 
4.1.1 Species Selection in Restoration 
The literature on species selection for restoration has largely focused on biophysical and 
ecological assessments in order to determine suitability and desirable outcomes. These 
include selecting species based on biomass yields, survivability, and other biophysical 
attributes of trees (Pedraza and Williams-Linera 2003; Delagrange et al. 2008) while Matías 
et al. (2009) determined the seed dispersal rate by analysing species-selection patterns by 
post-dispersal seed predators. Methods for selecting candidate (or focal) species of fauna for 
structuring site-based conservation have also been developed (Coppolillo et al. 2004). Others 
have taken a more landscape-level approach to enhancing biodiversity, such as through 
enrichment planting (Martínez-Garza and Howe 2003) or the development of framework tree 
species aimed at biodiversity recovery in tropical forest restoration (Elliott et al. 2003). 
Technical aspects with respect to seedling production, site-selection, planting techniques, 
post-planting maintenance, and the appropriate selection of species all contribute to the 
overall success in reforestation (Castro et al. 2004; Healy et al. 2008; Garen et al. 2011). Yet 
species selection becomes contentious when there are multiple decision-making stakeholders 
(e.g. experts, policymakers, and practitioners) with varying aims and objectives in restoration. 
The importance of stakeholder participation in facilitating more adaptive co-management of 
complex social-ecological systems has been well documented (Fraser et al. 2006; Stringer et 
al. 2006; Reed 2008; Kofinas 2009; Berkes 2010; Plummer et al. 2013). Stakeholders 
involved in restoration or other conservation measures often face difficult trade-offs between 
social, economic and ecological objectives. Restoration objectives that support 
multifunctional landscapes often require the assessment of a suite of potential scenarios in 
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order to minimise future ecosystem services trade-offs (Reed et al. 2013). Understanding the 
aims and objectives of various stakeholders is therefore crucial for identifying trade-offs in 
order to better deliver environmental benefits to a wider range of beneficiaries. For example, 
Reubens et al. (2011) have emphasised the importance of incorporating stakeholder attitudes 
towards and preferences for different restoration strategies. Similarly, McDonald et al. (2003) 
have shown the importance of turning to local stakeholders for evaluating and selecting 
indigenous tree species, which benefits practitioners as well as meeting the needs of local 
communities. Yet stakeholder preferences for species may vary by subjective tastes and the 
extent of knowledge individuals have about the species and their ecology. Eliciting 
preferences that are often subjective and with a considerable degree of heterogeneity is a 
challenging yet necessary means of engaging multi-stakeholder participation in policy and 
practice (Ananda and Herath 2003; Caparrós et al. 2011; Newton et al. 2012; Reed et al. 
2013).  
Re/afforestation can potentially provide multiple ecosystem services both on- and off-site; 
including erosion prevention, soil amelioration, and creating shade/windbreaks, as well 
carbon sequestration, landscape beauty and biodiversity enhancement (Caparrós et al. 2010; 
Hall et al. 2011a). Selecting hardier and more adaptable (e.g. to harsh climates) species that 
are readily available (or easy to produce) may be a more cost-effective means of meeting 
some of these objectives, but may compromise others: certain species may also be unsuitable 
or even detrimental to local biodiversity, especially if they are exotic and potentially invasive 
(Le Maitre et al. 2011; Jellinek et al. 2013; Levin et al. 2013). Many have argued that 
re/afforestation with narrow objectives, such as planting fast-growing exotics for timber or 
climate regulation, have resulted in the deterioration of biodiversity and other ecosystem 
services, and even detrimental to local livelihoods (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006; Bremer 
and Farley 2010; Barr and Sayer 2012; Lindenmayer et al. 2012). Perhaps there are 
competing aims between those with professional interests (or foci) in forestry and those with 
interests in conserving biodiversity. Despite both fields having some overlapping aims and 
objectives in reforestation (e.g. increasing and/or maintaining forest cover), the motive was to 
assess whether conflicts between forestry and biodiversity conservation exist as some studies 
have found (Niemelä et al. 2005; Angelsen et al. 2012). Evidently, decisions based on what 
the expected or desired benefits from reforestation will be for society ultimately influence the 
types and quantities of tree species to be established in a given area (de Koeijer et al. 1999; 
Wossink and Swinton 2007; Nelson et al. 2009; Barraquand and Martinet 2011). 
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4.1.2 Research Objectives 
The main objective of this study was to identify native tree and shrubby tree species that are 
considered to be of the highest conservation value for use in reforestation according to 
stakeholders in forestry and biodiversity conservation sectors in Lebanon. The resulting 
priority species list served as one of three reforestation options within a choice experiment 
survey that I conducted with landowners in villages from Bcharre and Zghorta-Ehden 
districts of North Lebanon (chapter 5). This research site is one of twenty newly designated 
Important Plant Areas (Yazbek et al. 2010) in Lebanon95. Aside from its ecological 
importance96, landscape-scale re/afforestation in this region has been planned over the next 
few decades by national stakeholders (pers. comm. LRI, July 2012). 
In addition to identifying priority species for the next chapter, I also aimed to explore the 
consistency of preferences across individual stakeholders and to determine whether ratings 
differed systematically between respondents with a professional focus on biodiversity versus 
forestry. 
4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Developing the Candidate List of Species 
The first stage involved compiling a preliminary list of all native tree and shrub species in 
Lebanon. I used an existing database developed by researchers at the American University of 
Beirut’s Nature Conservation Center (AUB-NCC). The database used earlier literature on 
flora in Lebanon and the Levant region (Post 1932; Mouterde 1966) and later updated it with 
the most recent reference on Lebanese flora (Tohmé and Tohmé 2007), noting that 
nomenclature often differed97. New species tentatively included were those that were found 
in recent journal articles, e.g. Tilia silvestris intermedia (Tohmé and Tohmé 2009). 
Nomenclature for species gathered in the preliminary list was later cross checked and updated 
using international (online) indices (International Plant Names Index 2005). A basic analysis 
using search engines and online databases (Royal Botanic Garden Edinburgh 1998; The Med-
                                                 
95 Please refer to chapter 2 for details on Important Plant Areas 
96 There are four protected areas; two Natural Reserves and two UNESCO World Heritage Sites. 
97 AUB-NCC conducted field research that included collection of voucher specimens and photographing key 
morphological features (e.g. flowers, seeds, leaves, etc.) in addition to obtaining locations through GPS. 
Collected specimens and images were later cross-referenced with existing literature and Internet searches for 
more in-depth identification. 
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Checklist 2007; Encyclopedia of Life 2011; Euro+Med Plantbase 2011; Lebanon FLORA 
2013; The Plant List 2013; Catalogue of Life 2014) was used to cross-check taxonomic 
names and other relevant information with the list of native trees prepared by AUB-NCC. 
This was followed by web-based research into whether any information on the conservation 
status of the species existed (e.g. IUCN 2014). 
4.2.2 Ecological Suitability and Availability 
The preliminary species list was later shortlisted based on 1) their suitability for the research 
sites and 2) their availability in commercial tree nurseries in Lebanon. For the former, this list 
was revised with the help of experts at AUB-NCC in order to identify which species were 
thought to be suitable for planting in the research area, the mountainous region of North 
Lebanon, within an altitude range of 1,000 – 1,500 m.a.s.l. For the latter, organisations 
involved in the Lebanon’s forestry sector were contacted to determine which nurseries were 
producing native forest trees. These nurseries were then contacted to provide me with a list of 
native species that they are currently producing.  
4.2.3 Eliciting Stakeholder Preferences 
An online survey was conducted with stakeholders in both English and Arabic. The survey 
was delivered via personalised email invitations with a brief description of the study and a 
link to the online survey98. Respondents were first asked to rate each of the 22 species listed 
as either: ‘High’, ‘Medium’, or ‘Low’ conservation priorities for inclusion in reforestation in 
the research site (which was described in the email). They also had the option to select 
‘Ecologically Unsuitable’ if they believed the species should not be planted in the site 
described, or ‘Don’t know this species’ if they had insufficient knowledge of the species99. A 
hyperlink was provided next to each species directing the respondents to the ‘Euro+Med 
PlantBase’ website (2011) providing extra details of the species (e.g. nomenclature reference, 
distribution, etc.).  
An optional second question asked participants to list up to five additional species that were 
both suitable for this research site and which they would consider as high conservation 
priority for reforestation. The third and fourth part of the online survey asked respondents to 
                                                 
98 A copy of the email and survey are provided in Appendix 4.1-4.2 
99 The pilot survey included an option ‘Not sure’ that was later removed since the relationship between knowing 
the species yet unsure about its habitat is the same in the context of this study. 
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describe their profession (‘Academia’, ‘Gov’t / Public sector’, ‘Private sector’, and ‘Other’) 
and sectorial focus (Biodiversity conservation, Forestry, Agriculture, and Other100). 
Stakeholders selected to participate in this online survey were identified with the help of 
colleagues from AUB-NCC who provided us with contacts from their professional networks. 
Contact details and additional candidates were also obtained through searching the public 
domain and through snowballing (word-of-mouth). Invitees included researchers, 
policymakers, forestry specialists, and natural resource managers from both public and 
private sector institutions and organisations. This included individuals in sub-sectors of 
forestry and biodiversity conservation, such as forest ecology and agro-ecology. The online 
survey was created and administered using LimeSurvey®. Statistical analyses were conducted 
using SPSS® (version 20). 
4.2.4 Ranking Species for Reforestation 
There are numerous ways to prioritise species based on diverse stakeholder preferences. All 
are inherently subjective, and depend on the respective weight put on ordinal ratings of 
importance (high, medium and low), unsuitable classifications and how missing ratings 
(where respondents did not know a species) are treated. For example, numerous missing 
values (indicating that a species was poorly known) could indicate that it is of marginal 
importance in that habitat, or that it is rare, in which case we could argue it having high-
conservation-value. Similarly, respondents’ preferences might be weighted according to their 
knowledge (e.g. ratings by respondents who admitted ignorance of several species might be 
down-weighted) but there is a risk of confounding caution with a lack of expertise.  
I used the following procedure in order to derive a list of 10 priority species for chapter 5: 
1. Species with seven or more missing values (‘Don’t know this species’) were omitted 
given that the rate of respondents fell below 80% for those species; 
2. Species with median ratings of ‘High’ were then selected that had the fewest 
‘Ecologically Unsuitable’ ratings; 
3. Where species were tied on median ratings and numbers of ‘Ecologically Unsuitable’ 
ratings, I then selected species with median ratings of ‘Medium’ with fewest ratings 
of ‘Low’. 
                                                 
100 Respondents were asked to provide details if they chose ‘other’ as their profession or focus 
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4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Stage 1: Preliminary Species List 
The preliminary list consisted of 74 tree and shrubby tree species native to Lebanon. Sixty-
four of those species were obtained from the AUB-NCC database and an additional 10 from 
other sources101. Some of these additional species included were considered to be 
‘naturalised’, e.g. sweet chestnut (Castanea sativa Mill.) and Old World walnut (Juglans 
regia L.). The 74 species were later analysed for their conservation status through IUCN’s 
Red List database (Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1. Lebanese native trees/shrubs searched in IUCN RedList website search engines 
Category No. of species 
Vulnerable (populations decreasing) 1 
Near threatened (lower risk) 3 
Least concern (lower risk) 14 
Not assessed (as of yet) but listed in Catalogue of Life  39 
Not listed in IUCN Red List or Catalogue of Life 17 
Total 74 
The conservation status provided by the IUCN Red List was available for only a portion of 
the species native to Lebanon and neighbouring countries (broad endemics). Over half of the 
species have yet to be assessed, and approximately a quarter were not listed (as of 09/2013). 
Most of the rare and endemic plant species in Lebanon that are listed in current references 
(e.g. Tohmé and Tohmé 2007) have not yet been listed and/or updated for their conservation 
status in Internet-accessible databases, e.g. IUCN, Catalogue of Life. 
4.3.2 Stage 2: Ecological Suitability and Availability 
As of spring 2013, just over 30 species of native trees were being produced in local nurseries 
and were available in the market102. With the help of experts from AUB-NCC, 22 of these 
species were considered suitable based on their natural range in mountainous areas (1000-
1500 m.a.s.l.) on the east-facing mountain range surrounding the Qadisha Valley (a UNESCO 
                                                 
101 While there are many other woody species of shrubs identified by experts (Tohmé and Tohmé 2007), I 
included only those with growth potentials over 1 metre. 
102 Some nursery owners/producers mentioned new species they had just begun propagating that would be 
available by the following year; however, these were not included in the original list of species for this study. 
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World Heritage Site) watershed in North Lebanon. Species with altitudinal ranges well below 
1,000 meters above sea level were discarded from the list, e.g. carob (Ceratonia siliqua L.). 
The majority of the species selected are found naturally at various elevations along the east-
facing habitats of mountainous landscapes in North Lebanon, along with a few once-
abundant species that are now relics, such as Taurus maple (Acer hyrcanum subsp. 
tauricolum)103. 
4.3.3 Stakeholder Preferences 
In total, 80 individual invitations (with LimeSurvey tokens) were sent to respondents from 
various academic and professional backgrounds. Thirty-four respondents fully completed the 
survey from early May to mid-June, 2013 (44% response rate). Eleven recipients did not take 
the survey and there were 35 incomplete responses104. Four invitees emailed me personally 
explaining they did not have sufficient expertise in this field to make any meaningful 
contributions. The sample included respondents largely from academic institutions (50%) and 
NGOs (30%), with professional foci split between forestry and biodiversity conservation105 
(Figure 4.1). 
                                                 
103 This was mentioned to me by key informants in a previous study (pers. comm. July 2012). 
104 Having received only completed responses, I did not have access to incomplete surveys (IRB regulations for 
ensuring confidentiality) and was therefore unable to assess how incomplete responses were. However, I suspect 
that these respondents opened the link but never went any further.  
105 Two respondents that stated ‘Agriculture’ as their focus were involved in agro-biodiversity research and 
therefore placed under Biodiversity. 
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Figure 4.1. Respondents classified according to Sector / Profession and Focus. Participants who 
selected ‘Other’ under Sector / Profession indicated forestry expert, international agencies, and 
researcher as open responses. 
The 34 completed responses were transferred into SPSS v. 20 for statistical analyses. 
Categorical responses were coded as follows: 
- 0 = ‘Ecologically Unsuitable’ 
- 1 = ‘Low’ 
- 2 = ‘Medium’ 
- 3 = ‘High’ 
- N/A = ‘Don’t know this species’ (treated as missing values) 
An initial analysis of the ratings showed that there were four species with median ratings of 
‘High’, three between ‘High’ and ‘Medium’, thirteen with ‘Medium’, one between ‘Medium’ 
and ‘Low’, and one with ‘Low’ (Table 4.2). Cedar of Lebanon (Cedrus libani Rich.) received 
the largest number of ‘High’ ratings by respondents (n=26, 77% of respondents). Grecian 
juniper (Juniperus excelsa M.-Bieb.) received the most ratings for ecologically unsuitable 
(n=5). Only six of the 22 species were rated (i.e. were known) by all respondents. Eight of the 
22 species were unfamiliar to six or more respondents. 
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Table 4.2. Summary of responses (n=34) to the online survey divided by foci 
Species (22) Biodiversity (n=17) Forestry (n=17) Combined 
(alphabetical order) Don't 
know 
EU* Median Don't 
know 
EU* Median Don’t 
know 
EU* Median 
Abies cilicica 0 1 3.0 1 2 2.5 1 3 3.0 
Acer hyrcanum 0 2 2.0 2 0 3.0 2 2 2.0 
Acer monspessulanum 3 1 2.0 3 1 2.0 6 2 2.0 
Alnus orientalis 4 2 2.0 2 2 2.0 6 4 2.0 
Cedrus libani 0 1 3.0 0 0 3.0 0 1 3.0 
Celtis australis 1 2 2.0 2 2 1.0 3 4 1.0 
Crataegus monogyna 0 0 2.0 0 0 2.0 0 0 2.0 
C. sempervirens† 1 0 2.0 0 0 2.0 1 0 2.0 
Fraxinus angustifolia 5 1 2.0 3 2 2.0 8 3 2.0 
Fraxinus ornus 5 1 2.0 2 0 2.0 7 1 2.0 
Juniperus excelsa 1 3 3.0 0 2 2.0 1 5 3.0 
Ostrya carpinifolia 4 1 2.0 4 0 3.0 8 1 2.0 
Pinus brutia 0 2 2.0 0 0 2.0 0 2 2.0 
Pinus pinea 0 1 1.0 0 2 2.0 0 3 1.5 
Prunus cocomilia 4 0 2.0 2 0 2.0 6 0 2.0 
Prunus dulcis 1 1 2.0 2 0 2.0 3 1 2.0 
Pyrus syriaca 1 0 2.0 0 0 2.0 1 0 2.0 
Quercus brantii 4 0 2.0 0 4 2.0 4 4 2.0 
Quercus cerris 0 0 3.0 0 0 2.0 0 0 2.5 
Quercus infectoria 0 0 3.0 0 0 2.0 0 0 2.5 
Sorbus flabelifolia 2 0 3.0 5 0 2.5 7 0 3.0 
Sorbus torminalis 2 0 2.0 4 0 3.0 6 0 2.5 
*Ecologically unsuitable 
†Cupressus 
4.3.4 Variability in Species Ratings 
There was significant variation in ratings across respondents (n=23) for those species (n=14) 
that were unknown to fewer than five respondents (Friedman’s ANOVA, χ2 (13) = 64.02, p < 
0.001). An analysis was conducted to determine whether this variability between respondents 
was explained by their foci (see Table 4.2 above). Friedman’s tests on each subset of 
respondents indicated no significant variation between respondents within the biodiversity 
foci (Friedman’s ANOVA, χ2 (6) = 36.64, p = 0.18) but variation of respondents within the 
forestry foci was significant (Friedman’s ANOVA, χ2 (10) = 50.15, p < 0.001). Post-hoc 
Mann-Whitney U tests showed no significant difference (p < 0.05) in ratings between 
forestry- and biodiversity-focused respondents for the 22 species, even before correction for 
multiple comparisons (Table 4.3). 
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Table 4.3. Non-parametric test results for the 22 species (listed in alphabetical order) 
Species Mann-Whitney U Z Asymp. Sig.a  
Abies cilicica 105.00 -1.28 0.20 
Acer hyrcanum 96.00 -1.30 0.20 
Acer monspessulanum 95.00 -0.16 0.88 
Alnus orientalis 81.50 -0.80 0.43 
Cedrus libani 143.50 -0.05 0.96 
Celtis australis 91.50 -1.21 0.23 
Crataegus monogyna 139.00 -0.21 0.83 
Cupressus sempervirens 113.50 -0.86 0.39 
Fraxinus angustifolia 76.00 -0.44 0.66 
Fraxinus ornus 73.50 -0.89 0.37 
Juniperus excelsa 100.00 -1.51 0.13 
Ostrya carpinifolia 62.00 -1.23 0.22 
Pinus brutia 136.50 -0.29 0.77 
Pinus pinea 126.00 -0.67 0.50 
Prunus cocomilia 79.50 -1.01 0.32 
Prunus dulcis 101.50 -0.80 0.43 
Pyrus syriaca 128.50 -0.30 0.76 
Quercus brantii 65.50 -1.98 0.05 
Quercus cerris 118.00 -1.01 0.31 
Quercus infectoria 115.50 -1.11 0.27 
Sorbus flabelifolia 82.50 -0.40 0.69 
Sorbus torminalis 92.50 -0.25 0.80 
a 2-tailed; corrected for ties 
 
Median ratings were equal for respondents in both groups (Figure 4.2) for 12 of the 22 
species. There were eight species that differed in median ratings by 1 (scaled at 0-3) between 
the two foci. Two of those species received ‘Low’ median ratings: Celtis australis by 
forestry-focused and Pinus pinea by biodiversity-focused respondents (Figure 4.2). 
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Figure 4.2. Medians of respondents’ rating of species split between two foci – ‘Biodiversity 
Conservation’ and ‘Forestry’. The other two categories (‘Agriculture’ and ‘Other’) were omitted from 
this graph. 
Ratings between biodiversity- and forestry-focused individuals were similar for ‘High’, 
‘Ecologically Unsuitable’ and ‘Don’t know this species’ (based on averages of counts). 
However, forestry-focused respondents gave more ‘Low’ ratings while biodiversity-focused 
more ‘Medium’ ratings (Figure 4.3). 
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Figure 4.3. Average number of respondents’ rating of species divided by foci. Error bars are one 
standard deviation. 
 
4.3.5 Additional Species Provided by Respondents 
Respondents were also given the option to include up to five other species (Question 2 in the 
survey) that they would consider to be a high conservation priority for inclusion in 
reforestation efforts. Eighteen of the 34 respondents listed additional species106. A total of 26 
species from 16 genera were suggested, 22 of which were broadleaved. Ten of those species 
were mentioned by more than one respondent. Kermes oak (Quercus coccifera L.) had the 
highest frequency, mentioned by six respondents. Of the respondents who listed additional 
species, ten were forestry-focused, providing 34 additional species and eight were 
biodiversity-focused providing 18. Ten respondents were from the academic sector, five from 
the private sector (mainly NGOs), and three from the public sector (Table 4.4). 
  
                                                 
106 One respondent listed Quercus brantii, which was one of the 22 species rated. 
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Table 4.4. Additional native species mentioned by 18 respondents showing frequency mentioned and 
availability in the market 
  Frequency  
Species 
Family Biodiversity 
(n=8) 
Forestry 
(n=10) 
Total 
Available* 
Quercus coccifera a Fagaceae 3 3 6 √ 
Crataegus azarolus Rosaceae 2 3 5  
Malus trilobata Rosaceae 1 4 5 √ 
Styrax officinalis Styracaceae 1 4 5 √ 
Juniperus oxycedrus Cupressaceae 2 2 4  
Juniperus drupacea Cupressaceae 1 2 3  
Myrtus communis Myrtaceae 
 
2 2 √ 
Pistacia palaestina Anacardiaceae 1 1 2 √ 
Prunus argentea b Rosaceae 1 1 2  
Quercus cedrorum Fagaceae 1 1 2  
Acer hermoneum Aceraceae 
 
1 1 √ 
Arbutus andrachne Ericaceae 
 
1 1 √ 
Ceratonia siliqua Fabaceae 
 
1 1 √ 
Cornus sanguinea ssp. australis Cornaceae 
 
1 1  
Cydonia spp. (Quince) Rosaceae 
 
1 1  
Juniperus foetidissima Cupressaceae 
 
1 1  
Laurus nobilis Lauraceae 
 
1 1 √ 
Pistacia atlantica Anacardiaceae 1 
 
1  
Pistacia lentiscus Anacardiaceae 1 
 
1 √ 
Platanus orientalis Platanaceae 
 
1 1 √ 
Prunus arabica c Rosaceae 1 
 
1  
Prunus mahaleb Rosaceae 
 
1 1  
Pinus halepensis Pinaceae 
 
1 1 √ 
Quercus cerris var. cerris Fagaceae 1 
 
1 √ 
Quercus brantii Fagaceae 1 
 
1 √ 
Quercus pinnatifida Fagaceae 
 
1 1  
Total                  26 13 18 34 52 14 
a Basionym: Quercus coccifera subsp. calliprinos (Webb.) Holm 
b Synonymous with Amygdalus orientalis Mill. 
c Synonymous with Amygdalus spartioides Spach. 
*From private nurseries at the time of the survey 
4.3.6 Ranking Species for Biodiversity-Enhancing Reforestation 
The top 10 species ranked as detailed in the methods is shown below in Table 4.5. Grecian 
juniper (Juniperus excelsa) was excluded given the high frequency of ‘Ecologically 
Unsuitable’ (EU) ratings. There were a total of 13 median ratings of ‘Medium’ where those 
with the fewest EU and ‘Low’ ratings were selected. 
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Table 4.5. Final list of 10 species selected based on respondents’ ratings 
Rank Species 
Biodiversity   Forestry Med. 
(Aver.) Med. DKTS1 E.U. Low   Med. DKTS1 E.U. Low 
1 Cedrus libani 3.0 0 1 1 
 
3.0 0 0 2 3.00 
2 Acer hyrcanum 3.0 2 2 1 
 
3.0 2 0 2 3.00 
3 Sorbus torminalis 3.0 2 0 2 
 
3.0 4 0 2 3.00 
4 Abies cilicica 3.0 0 1 0 
 
2.5 1 2 1 2.75 
5 Quercus infectoria 3.0 0 0 0 
 
2.0 0 0 3 2.50 
6 Quercus cerris 3.0 0 0 1 
 
2.0 0 0 4 2.50 
7 Crataegus monogyna 2.0 0 0 1 
 
2.0 0 0 2 2.00 
8 Pyrus syriaca 2.0 1 0 1 
 
2.0 0 0 2 2.00 
9 Acer monspessulanum 2.0 3 1 0 
 
2.0 3 1 2 2.00 
10 Prunus cocomilia 2.0 4 0 1   2.0 2 0 3 2.00 
1 ‘Don’t know this species’ 
4.4 Discussion 
The objective of this study was to understand how stakeholders would prioritise native tree 
species for reforestation on the basis of conservation priority, how variable those preferences 
were, and whether stakeholders with similar professional foci had similar preferences. The 
preferences elicited were used to select ten species for use in a choice-experiment study with 
private landowners (chapter 5). I found that there was a great deal of variability in 
preferences between individual respondents. Moreover, this variability was not explained by 
accounting for professional focus (biodiversity- and forestry-focused): there was no clear 
difference of ratings between these two groups. This could be because these categories failed 
to adequately represent respondents’ perspectives (e.g. perhaps they were too arbitrary). 
However, most respondents (91%) readily self-identified with one or other of these 
categories. An alternative explanation is therefore that even within these groupings, 
preferences are diverse, something which has implications for planning biodiversity-focussed 
reforestation. Conflicts or disagreements to policies exist between stakeholders in forestry 
and biodiversity conservation (Niemelä et al. 2005; Angelsen et al. 2012), especially with 
regards to international-scale policies such as REDD+ (e.g. Pistorius et al. 2012). Yet results 
from this study suggest that even where there seem to be no differences in opinions or 
preferences between groups of stakeholders, disagreements may exist amongst stakeholders 
within those groups. These results also suggest that stakeholders exhibit heterogeneous 
preferences for species they consider to be of high conservation priority in reforestation, 
despite their professional foci being geared more towards either forestry or biodiversity 
conservation. But more importantly, heterogeneity in ratings makes it extremely difficult to 
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detect differences relative to a sample size, which was to be expected given that there are few 
professionals in Lebanon within these fields.  
Another caveat about these results concerns the behaviour of participants in surveys like this, 
which require considerable engagement on the part of respondents (e.g. Manski 2004; 
Behrend et al. 2011). Although the response rate in this survey was fairly high for an online 
survey (86%, aided presumably by the personalised invitations) a large proportion (44%) of 
the original sample started the survey but did not complete it. It is therefore possible that 
those respondents who completed the survey did not maintain concentration throughout. The 
variability in completed surveys also raised questions about respondents’ level of 
engagement, and perhaps even their understanding of my research objective. For instance, 
there were a few additional species respondents suggested that had been omitted from the list 
of candidate species due to their natural altitudinal limits (e.g. Arbutus andrachne and 
Ceratonia siliqua). Missing values (i.e. ‘Don’t know this species’) from both foci also 
suggest that many respondents were either unfamiliar with the species and/or their natural 
habitats, or perhaps the nomenclature used. For example, a subspecies of Montpellier maple 
(Acer monspessulanum subsp. microphyllum (Boiss.) Bornm) is classified as a synonym of 
Mount Hermon maple (Acer hermoneum)107 according to some sources (The Plant List 2013). 
This underlines the need for standardising and updating the ever-changing taxonomic 
nomenclature. This is one instance where there is an opportunity and need for stakeholders in 
the forestry and conservation sectors to work collectively towards improving plant 
identification in Lebanon and help make knowledge dissemination more effective. 
Disseminating biodiversity knowledge to the general public, particularly with regards to 
native trees, has already begun with recent technical and educational publications (Navarrete-
Poyatos et al. 2011; Talhouk et al. 2014). 
The results also confirm that our understanding of how these two fields differ cannot be 
based solely on affinity to species, thus requiring further research into how individuals rate 
species in general, particularly when ratings are subjective (Albert et al. 2009; Steg et al. 
2012). For example, why would respondents consider certain species to be of a higher 
conservation priority than others, or unsuitable for including in reforestation altogether? Were 
respondents rating species based on the rarity of those species in the wild, or on the basis of 
                                                 
107 Acer hermoneum (Bornm.) Schwer. 
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their importance in underpinning ecosystem functioning or in supplying particular ecosystem 
services? For example, there were candidate species from the original list that experts 
consulted did not consider should be included in the survey given their abundance in the wild, 
such as Kermes oak (Quercus coccifera). This resilient evergreen species is grazed heavily 
year round in the wild and has remarkable post-fire recovery (Perevolotsky and Seligman 
1998; Pausas et al. 2008). While not included in the ratings, it was listed by six respondents 
(three from each foci) as additional species, suggesting that respondents were not 
predominantly considering rare species.  
A shortcoming of this study was not asking respondents about the reasoning behind their 
ratings108. The main reason for not doing so was to minimise the burden on respondents. To 
assume these questions would require organising focus-groups with stakeholders to 
encourage discussion and social learning as done in other parts of the Mediterranean region 
(Patel et al. 2007). Of course, other factors need to be considered when determining the 
appropriateness of species, beyond their conservation value, particularly local soil and 
climate characteristics. Just as important are the preferences of local people who will be 
directly involved in (and therefore affected by) reforestation. This is also true for lay 
members of the public who may hold existence values for species and habitats, even if they 
lack expert ecological knowledge. Yet what is evident from this study is that a greater 
understanding of stakeholder typologies is needed in order to facilitate collaborative 
engagement between stakeholders from different research and policy fields (or foci), 
including social scientists and local stakeholders involved in community-based projects. 
These efforts would help various stakeholders become more familiar with each other’s 
perspectives and thus help generate a better understanding of both shared and diverse 
perspectives. For example, Reed et al. (2009) developed key typologies for analysing the 
complexities of stakeholder participation and inter-(and intra-)group relationships in various 
aspects of natural resources management and decision-making. One possible strategy would 
be to analyse these relationships through the process of social learning by inviting 
stakeholders to participate in open-discussions and deliberations in order to understand where 
perceptions and preferences diverge or come together (Bouwen and Taillieu 2004; Stringer et 
al. 2006).  
                                                 
108 This was considered in the design stage, but rejected. 
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Multi-stakeholder engagement efforts are vital yet challenging objectives needed for 
maintaining resilient forest and woodland ecosystems, biodiversity conservation, and human 
well-being. Yet for reforestation to succeed, heed must be paid to the preferences of 
landowners and managers who will be the main caretakers. We need to understand what costs 
they will bear and what preferences they hold for species. This will be addressed in chapter 5, 
which focuses again on the supply-side of PES for reforestation. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Diversifying reforestation is a costly and difficult task that requires special attention in order 
to maintain resilient forest ecosystems for the future. This study highlights the importance of 
eliciting preferences for native species to be considered in Lebanon’s reforestation efforts 
through involving a broad sample of stakeholders from various sectors and foci. In particular, 
it demonstrates that considerable diversity may exist within, as well as between, groups of 
stakeholders. In addition, the results of this study were essential for informing my own 
fieldwork by helping me to identify species for one of three reforestation options presented to 
landowners who participate in a choice experiment survey. 
Websites109 
International Plant Names Index – http://www.ipni.org/ipni/plantnamesearchpage.do  
Euro+Med Plantbase – http://ww2.bgbm.org/EuroPlusMed/query.asp 
Flora Europaea – http://rbg-web2.rbge.org.uk/FE/fe.html 
IUCN Red List – http://www.iucnredlist.org/ 
Lebanon Flora (USJ) – http://www.lebanon-flora.org/default.php 
Encyclopaedia of Life (Flora of Lebanon) – http://eol.org/collections/5984 
Catalogue of Life – http://www.catalogueoflife.org/ 
The Plant List – http://www.theplantlist.org/ 
Med-Checklist – http://ww2.bgbm.org/mcl/home.asp 
Botanical Gardens Conservation International – http://www.bgci.org/plant_search.php 
                                                 
109 Websites listed here are largely databases that were accessed regularly for cross-referencing. 
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5 Can Ecosystem Services be Bundled? Quantifying Trade-offs in 
Payments for Reforestation in Lebanon 
Payments for ecosystem services (PES) are becoming widely employed globally as a strategy 
to increase the provision of non-market ecosystem services. However, re/afforestation efforts 
aimed at cost-effectively meeting narrow objectives (e.g. increasing forest cover) tend to use 
limited numbers of highly productive species. Integrating biodiversity co-benefits into forest 
restoration may therefore pose difficult trade-offs between forest cover or biomass and 
diversity. In order to derive a production possibility frontier (PPF) for species diversity and 
quantity of trees planted for a given budget, I conducted choice experiments with Lebanese 
landowners (n=106) to determine their willingness to accept payments for reforestation with 
three different species mixes. The reforestation options offered were A) monoculture native 
stone pine (Pinus pinea L.) with direct use values (pine nuts); B) 50/50 stone pine & 
Lebanese cedar (Cedrus libani Rich.) mix with direct use and conservation values; and C) 
mixed native woodland species considered to be of high-conservation-value by stakeholders 
in Lebanon, but with limited use value. Overall willingness-to-accept (WTA) reforestation 
incentives was 75.5%. The majority of plantings would occur on abandoned lands, suggesting 
low agricultural displacement. Multinomial logit (MNL) results indicate that on average 
landowners require substantially higher payments (and are willing to commit less land) for 
the mixed-species option (option C) than for productive stone pine (option A) implying a 
strong trade-off between potential area (hectares) reforested and biodiversity. Landowner 
preferences were then modelled using latent class analysis (LCM) that showed there was 
considerable heterogeneity in landowner preferences: at least 10% of landowners sampled 
had strong positive preferences for mixed native species and another group of 8% for stone 
pine and cedar, both groups with low utility scores for the payment attribute. A larger 
segment of respondents (28.5%) showed high utility scores for the payment attribute with 
preferences split between stone pine (Option A) and stone pine & cedar mix (Option B). 
Disaggregated utilities were estimated using hierarchical Bayes (HB) regression to simulate 
the proportion of landowners who would subscribe to the three reforestation options, for 
given payment levels. Simulation models showed that 10.7% of landowners would prefer 
mixed species even if the lowest payment level was offered for all reforestation options 
(equating to a total present value cost to the buyer of US$23,000 ha-1 at a discount rate of 5% 
over 15 years). This rises to 26.1% uptake if payments for mixed species were increased to 
the highest level (total present value cost of US$107,137 ha-1). From these I derived a PPF for 
hectares reforested and Shannon-Wiener species diversity, for given budget constraints. The 
PPF allows the identification of Pareto optimal reforestation schemes: due to the 
heterogeneity of landowners’ WTA, a suite of reforestation contract options are 
recommended in order to maximise area reforested and species diversity for any given 
budget. 
Keywords: Agro-ecosystems; choice experiments; hierarchical Bayes regression; landowners; 
Latent Class; market simulator; native species; production possibility frontier (PPF)  
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5.1 Introduction 
Payments for ecosystem services (PES) are increasingly employed globally to increase the 
supply of environmental benefits from private lands (Wunder et al. 2008; Ferraro 2011; 
Schomers and Matzdorf 2013). Their implementation as a policy measure for incentivising 
re/afforestation in agricultural landscapes has been well documented (Pagiola et al. 2004a; 
Bennett 2008; Engel et al. 2008; Paquette et al. 2009). In use-restricting PES and Reduced 
Emission from Deforestation and Degradation plus (REDD+), biodiversity can be conserved 
as a co-benefit bundled together with carbon in cases where effective deforestation or forest 
degradation avoidance targets species-rich forests (Wendland et al. 2010; Visseren-Hamakers 
et al. 2012; Busch 2013). However, when PES is applied to asset-building strategies such as 
re/afforestation (Wunder 2008), trade-offs between ecosystem services like carbon and 
biodiversity110 become more relevant in decision-making (Venter et al. 2009; Harvey et al. 
2010; Angelsen et al. 2012; Phelps et al. 2012).  
Plantation forests, which are predominantly composed of limited though highly productive 
species, have increased in their extent globally while natural forests continue to decline (FAO 
2010; Brockerhoff et al. 2013). Recent studies argue that asset-building PES are often geared 
towards a narrow suite of ecosystem services (ES), such as carbon sequestration from 
monoculture plantations, with lack of consideration for biodiversity and future livelihoods 
(Jindal et al. 2008; Putz and Redford 2009; Barr and Sayer 2012). One possible explanation 
for this is that carbon is more easily quantifiable than other ES (e.g. cultural) and is therefore 
more amenable to inclusion in PES contracts (Engel et al. 2008; Corbera et al. 2009). In 
contrast with species-diverse reforestation, monoculture plantations of fast-growing trees 
(e.g. eucalypts) will often be more cost-effective at delivering carbon than diversified species 
that deliver biodiversity and carbon simultaneously (George et al. 2012). Hence there is a risk 
that PES focussed solely on meeting single objectives (e.g. increasing forest cover) could 
have damaging consequences for biodiversity and other ES (Niesten et al. 2002; Alpízar et al. 
2007; Bremer and Farley 2010; Boyd 2010; Lindenmayer et al. 2012).  
Policymakers and firms often face difficult trade-offs when deciding how much to spend on a 
specific production or outcome. The production possibility frontier (PPF), based on the 
concept of Pareto efficiency, models these trade-offs expressing the opportunity cost of one 
                                                 
110 I present the arguments for considering biodiversity as an ecosystem service in chapter 1. 
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good in terms of the other (Dasgupta and Heal 1979; Robertson and Swinton 2005). If all tree 
species cost the same amount to plant, sequester the same amount of carbon per hectare, and 
landowners were indifferent to the species offered, then there would be no trade-off between 
carbon and biodiversity in incentivised reforestation schemes. Trade-offs arise if farmers’ 
willingness-to-accept (WTA) payments for reforestation are not equal for different species or 
if species differ in their rates of carbon sequestration. Thus, diverse, slow growing species 
with little use value may lock up less carbon for a given budget than productive 
monocultures. But as discussed in chapter 1, biodiverse forests are thought to be more 
resilient (having better functioning ecosystems) and have been shown to produce a variety of 
goods and services (including carbon sequestration) more efficiently than mono-cropped 
plantations (Gamfeldt et al. 2013; Hulvey et al. 2013). In contrast, plantations may be a more 
cost-effective means for restoring heavily degraded ecosystems and biodiversity through 
facilitating faster recovery of habitats for other species (Brockerhoff et al. 2008). Trade-offs 
may also exist in cases where increasing forest cover through tree planting is the main 
objective (rather than carbon payments based on biomass) resulting in a range of ecosystem 
services (of which carbon stocks are one). Under such instances, it is possible to test whether 
trade-offs may be extensive between the area planted (measured in hectares of increased 
forest cover) and diversity / mixture of native species used. An important question to consider 
therefore in the context of PES is: how much of a trade-off really exists between biodiversity 
and forest cover (or extent) in reforestation? Answering this question requires assessing how 
landowners’ WTA payments for reforestation varies depending on the species mix used.  
In this chapter, I model trade-offs between biodiversity (quantity and abundance of native 
tree species) and area enrolled (or potential forest cover that would be gained) on results from 
choice experiments conducted with Lebanese landowners from highland villages surrounding 
the Wadi Qadisha watershed located within one of Lebanon’s 20 Important Plant Areas 
(IPAs). The main objective of this study was to estimate the marginal cost of planting high-
conservation-value tree species of little direct use value on private lands compared to a more 
productive monoculture species, stone pine (Pinus pinea L.). Choice experiments were 
designed to gauge Lebanese landowners’ WTA one of three hypothetical reforestation 
schemes offered based on their payment levels (details below). The three hypothetical 
reforestation schemes were: A) stone pine plantation, B) 50/50 stone pine and Lebanese cedar 
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(Cedrus libani Rich.), and C) even mixture of ten native species111. Three payment levels 
accompanied each of the reforestation options as US$2,000, 6,000 and 10,000 ha-1 yearr-1. 
Land-use/land-cover (LULC) classes and the area (ha) of landholdings was also collected and 
used to assess past, present and future plantings, as well as for identifying the extent (ha) of 
reforestation and the LULC classes that would potentially be displaced. I then estimated the 
production possibility frontier (PPF) for ecosystem services that would be generated from 
having forests established via re/afforestation efforts (e.g. regulating services) measured as 
trees per hectare planted for a given budget and biodiversity (based on the Shannon-Wiener 
index for tree species diversity). My three research questions are as follows: 
1. What is the cost of paying landowners to plant diverse native tree and shrub species 
of high-conservation-value on private lands relative to a single productive species? 
2. What is the form of the production possibility frontier for biodiversity (i.e. species 
richness and evenness) and forest cover / extent (measured in hectares)? 
3. What types of land-use and land-cover would be affected by incentivised 
reforestation? 
This chapter is divided into five sections. In the remainder of the introduction (section 5.1), I 
review the literature on estimating WTA payments using choice experiments. I then set out 
the conceptual framework for assessing trade-offs using the PPF for the three proposed 
reforestation schemes. In section 5.2, I present the materials and methods used in designing 
the choice experiment and provide an overview of the analytical tools used for estimating 
costs, followed by results (section 5.3) and discussion (section 5.4). I conclude with some 
general recommendations and future prospects in section 5.5. 
5.1.1 Literature Review 
As payments for ecosystem services (PES) are becoming more prevalent, technical and 
institutional challenges have emerged as a consequence (Pirard 2012; Robert and Stenger 
2013; Banerjee et al. 2013; Lockie 2013). Much of this stems from the complexity of 
defining ecosystem services in the context of policy and decision-making and the 
quantification of certain ecosystem services (ES) (Boyd and Banzhaf 2007; Fisher and Turner 
2008; Bateman et al. 2011). For instance, numerous factors may affect the quality and flow of 
fresh water from watersheds, beyond that of removal of natural vegetation (King et al. 2005; 
                                                 
111 These species were selected based on ratings given by national stakeholders (see chapter 4, section 4.3.6) and 
are listed in the methods, below. Lebanese cedar was one of the ten species. 
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Brauman et al. 2007; Quintero et al. 2009). Similarly, quantifying biodiversity in terms of the 
presence of species diversity, abundance and ratios (or evenness), its services (e.g. 
supporting, cultural, and final goods), and its value to society can be unduly onerous 
(Magurran 2004; Christie et al. 2006; Wallace 2007; Daily et al. 2009). In contrast, it is 
generally easier to estimate above-ground carbon sequestration (or the extent of forest surface 
area planted) than the quantity of most other ES. Quantification becomes substantially more 
complicated when dealing with multiple services, confounded by difficulties with predicting 
ecosystem service flows in the future (Bennett et al. 2009; Nelson et al. 2009). 
Stated preference techniques are widely employed for determining the costs and benefits of 
goods and services not currently traded in markets (Louviere et al. 2000). These techniques 
have been widely used to elicit people’s willingness-to-pay (WTP) or willingness-to-accept 
(WTA) payments in compensation for hypothetical changes (positive or negative) in the 
environment (Hanley et al. 2007). While revealed preference techniques may be more robust 
(relying as they do on actual behaviour), their applicability is limited in environmental 
valuation due to the lack of proxy markets for most environmental goods (Bateman et al. 
2002). In cases where PES have not yet been implemented, stated preference techniques can 
help to estimate potential suppliers’ WTA, aiding in the design of PES contracts (Bennett and 
Blamey 2001). Landowners’ preferences for reforestation options (or schemes) offered can 
then be modelled to determine whether there are strong trade-offs (or opportunity costs) 
between different ES to be provided (de Groot et al. 2010). Choice experiments are one 
possible means for estimating marginal costs of re/afforestation through eliciting the 
willingness of landowners to accept payments (or compensation) for reforestation based on 
trade-offs they make on hypothetical contracts (or schemes) with different attributes (Vedel et 
al. 2010; Broch et al. 2013). While many WTA studies employing choice experiments have 
emerged recently (Espinosa-Goded et al. 2010; Christensen et al. 2011; Beharry-Borg et al. 
2013; Kaczan et al. 2013), the present study is unique in explicitly examining trade-offs 
between species diversity and extent of forest cover (hypothetical gains) through 
investigating landowner preferences for reforestation options with different species mixes at 
different payment levels.  
5.1.2 Case-Studies: Choice Experiments for Estimating Costs of Incentives  
Choice experiments (CE) are increasingly being used to estimate costs in agri-environmental 
schemes (AES) through gauging landowners’ WTA payments (or compensation) in return for 
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supplying additional environmental services on agricultural lands (Espinosa-Goded et al. 
2010; Broch et al. 2013; Beharry-Borg et al. 2013). Many of these studies have shown that 
heterogeneity in respondents’ willingness to subscribe to AES depends largely on farm and 
farmer characteristics (Espinosa-Goded et al. 2010; Christensen et al. 2011; Garrod et al. 
2012; Broch and Vedel 2012; Beharry-Borg et al. 2013). Broch et al. (2013), for example, 
show that farmers’ preferences for afforestation schemes were linked to the kinds of on-farm 
services that would result, which varied due to the heterogeneous spatial characteristics of 
their holdings. Heterogeneity of preferences is also a major obstacle in the design and 
targeting of incentives mechanisms, where CE have proven to be useful. In an effort to 
explain the heterogeneity in UK farmer’s willingness to join a PES programme, for example, 
Beharry-Borg et al. (2013) used latent class models to segment farmers based on their 
preferences for attribute levels of hypothetical contracts112. In an analysis of EU-wide 
acceptance of joining AES, Ruto and Garrod (2009) found that farmers in general required 
higher financial incentives under longer-term contracts (using multinomial logit), while latent 
class models found a large segment of ‘low resistance adopters’ willing to join for lower 
payment levels than ‘high resistance adopters’. Studies have also found that heterogeneous 
preferences to choice attributes range from a mixture of financial and non-financial factors, 
such as non-timber amenities from forests (Majumdar et al. 2008). Correspondingly, studies 
on afforestation adoption in Wales and Ireland found that policies aimed at increasing forest 
cover require a better understanding of how farmers perceive such schemes within the 
context of local farming culture (Duesberg et al. 2013; Wynne-Jones 2013b). Indeed, not all 
incentives have to be monetary, and many farmers would prefer to see more support through 
extensions services, knowledge (and technological) exchange, and better information 
regarding markets and costs in production (Van Hecken and Bastiaensen 2010a; Kinzig et al. 
2011).  
5.1.3 Production Possibility Frontier of Ecosystem Services  
Governments and firms face trade-offs when deciding how to allocate scarce resources to the 
supply of competing goods. Allocating more land or money to the production of one ES may 
reduce the supply of others. The production possibility frontier (PPF) is a way of representing 
these trade-offs. PPFs have been used extensively for estimating trade-offs between multiple-
function strategies such as timber production and biodiversity conservation (Rohweder et al. 
                                                 
112 These and other models used for estimating utilities (e.g. preferences) are detailed in Methods. 
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2000; Calkin et al. 2002; Nalle et al. 2004; Polasky et al. 2008; Löf et al. 2010; Hauer et al. 
2010). For instance, Barraquand & Martinet (2011) modelled the trade-offs between intensive 
agriculture and biodiversity conservation through examining the probability and persistence 
of species under various farming systems. In another example, Barton et al. (2009) evaluated 
these same trade-offs to aid in more cost-effective PES targeting in Costa Rica. While some 
theoretical studies have addressed ecosystem (or environmental) services trade-offs in the 
context of PES (e.g. Nelson et al. 2008; Robert and Stenger 2013; Busch 2013), there are few 
if any empirical studies using PPF to calculating trade-offs between competing ES asset-
building PES, to my knowledge. 
5.1.4 Conceptual Framework 
In this study, I estimate the PPF for the extent of reforestation (as an indicator of a broad 
range of ecosystem services, as well as a policy goal in its own right) and biodiversity 
(Shannon-Wiener diversity of tree species)113. Below I provide a conceptual illustration of the 
PPF (Figure 5.1) where each bundle of goods along the frontier is Pareto efficient (Baumol 
and Oates 1988; Lockwood 2008). In Figure 5.1a, the opportunity cost in area planted (y-
axis) is relatively small when only a few species are added, but increases substantially when 
many more are added (x-axis). In other words, the quantity of one good (forest cover / extent) 
cannot be increased without decreasing the quantity of the other (number of tree species). 
Moving along the PPF from a point closer to the x- or y-axis to a point further away entails 
relatively low opportunity cost in terms of the good foregone.  
                                                 
113 The Shannon-Wiener H is a widely used index that takes into account the number of species and the relative 
numbers of each (Magurran 2004). Spellerberg and Fedor (2003) suggest that species richness be used to refer 
to the number of species in a given sample, and that ‘species diversity’ is retained given that it is “an expression 
or index of some relation between number of species and number of individuals” (p. 178). As a widely used and 
understood index, I used Shannon-Wiener as a measure that captures both species diversity and evenness for 
illustrative, noting that the same approach could be repeated with other measures of diversity. 
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Figure 5.1. (a) Example PPF diagram showing gradually increasing opportunity costs in hectares of 
trees planted as more species are added; (b) Example PPF showing strong heterogeneous societal 
preferences represented by indifference curves (inverted dashed curves), with some stakeholders 
preferring biomass (near y-axis) and some tree diversity. This diagram is based on Pareto’s optimality 
theory that are also referred to as Pareto efficiency curves (Lockwood 2008). 
In the context of my study, trade-offs may exist for at least three reasons: 
1. Monocultures of certain species may grow faster and thus provide a range of ES more 
efficiently or sooner (e.g. locking up more carbon ha-1 year-1) than diverse natives; 
2. Landowners might prefer to plant monocultures of productive, low conservation value 
species, therefore these would cost the PES “buyer” less per hectare; 
3. Productive species may tend to be planted on different land, or by different types of 
landowners, than mixed native species.  
Ecosystem Services of Lebanese Forests 
Lebanon’s forests, comprising approximately 13% (134,876 ha) of the country’s land area 
(10,452 km2), store around 1.795 million tonnes of above- and below-ground carbon C 
(Estephan 2010). This equates to approximately 71.88 tC ha-1. While biomass estimates are 
only available for the main forest types (e.g. stone pine plantations, mixed conifers, 
broadleaved), per hectare carbon uptake for most native forest species in Lebanon are not 
available in the published or grey literature (Dalsgaard 2005). Rough estimates can be 
averaged broadly for forest type given that there is data on pure stone pine, pure cedar, and 
mixed (broadleaved-conifer) forests (at least 20% conifers), which are presented in Table 5.1.   
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Table 5.1. Estimated biomass (in million tonnes) and carbon (tonnes per hectare) under reforestation 
options (Dalsgaard 2005) 
Reforestation Option Forest type† Total Biomass tC/ha-1 
Stone pine plantation (Option A) Conifer 0.185 1.33 
Stone pine & cedar (Option B) Mixed conifer 0.143 1.02 
Mixed woodlands (Option C) Mixed forest* 0.220 1.58 
*Conifer and broadleaved (both evergreen and deciduous) 
†Closest associated forest type for which data was available 
Given the scarcity of reliable data on carbon and biomass for individual species, and also on 
rates of growth, these averages do not provide sufficient information for analysing carbon 
uptake for the three potential forest types. Biomass and carbon estimates must take into 
account biogeoclimatic (e.g. climate, rainfall, temperature, soil type) and topographical (e.g. 
slope, aspect) factors (Jandl et al. 2007; Cañellas et al. 2008). They must also consider both 
sink and source effects from management regimes (e.g. thinning) and forest fires (Río et al. 
2008). Moreover, these factors can vary considerably amongst villages within the same 
region (or even parcels within the same village) despite sharing similar attributes. All of these 
contribute to difficulties in estimating biomass or carbon uptake for the 11 tree species used 
in my study, particularly for the mixed species option (details in section 5.2.3 of this chapter). 
Relative to tropical or temperate forests, Mediterranean forests are less productive due to 
climatic constraints (e.g. low precipitation and high temperatures), which can be further 
exacerbated by climate change and increasing forest fires (Lindner et al. 2010). Although 
carbon benefits of reforestation in Lebanon are uncertain, they are likely to be low114. Thus 
re/afforestation in the Mediterranean is unlikely to be cost-effective enough for private 
carbon markets compared to avoided deforestation or afforestation elsewhere (Caparrós et al. 
2011). Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that Lebanese forests provide numerous 
ecosystem services115 such as watershed maintenance, soil conservation, cultural and 
landscape values. Many government-financed re/afforestation initiatives use area as a proxy 
for other ecosystem services (e.g. Bennett 2008; Clement et al. 2009; Wynne-Jones 2013a). 
                                                 
114 I discuss these issues within Lebanon in relation to other Mediterranean countries in chapter 6, section 6.4.2. 
115 There are also a wide range of economic benefits that Mediterranean forests provide from non-timber forest 
products (NTFPs), such as honey, wild mushrooms and medicinal / aromatic plants (Croitoru 2007). 
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In essence, the overall objective of re/afforestation by Lebanese reforestation stakeholders116 
is to reach 20% forest cover (or a 7% increase from its current cover) over the next few 
decades (chapter 1) and this is considered a greater priority than carbon sequestration. This 
target suggests that the Lebanese government expects several ecosystem services to correlate 
with forest extent, perhaps including wood and non-wood forest products, as well as habitats 
for biodiversity, soil and water conservation, and landscape beauty.117.  
The focus of this chapter is to explore point 2 above (landowner preferences)118. Assuming 
that most landowners would be willing to enrol more land (as a whole) for planting 
productive forest trees for less money than mixed species offering little private benefits, this 
would cost PES buyers less money towards reforestation. If buyers are more focused on cost-
effectively meeting forest cover targets as their main objective119, we could expect a social 
optimum on the PPF towards the y-axis (Figure 5.1b). But if buyers were more biodiversity-
focused, then efficient outcomes would occur on the PPF near the x-axis with more species 
planted on fewer hectares.  
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Study Area 
The study area for this chapter comprised villages surrounding the Qadisha Valley watershed 
and villages lying north of the Tannourine Cedar Reserve. This is an important region from 
both ecological and cultural perspectives, which includes UNESCO World Heritage Sites 
(Qadisha Valley and Bcharre Cedar Forest) and Nature Reserves (Tannourine and Ehden 
forests)120. The region is also within three adjacent IPAs (Radford et al. 2011). This area is 
characteristic of eu-mediterranean (> 1,000 m.a.s.l.) to oro-mediterranean (> 2,000 m.a.s.l.) 
                                                 
116 The Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and the Ministry of Environment (MOE) as well as NGOs whose work 
is closely aligned the government’s reforestation policy, e.g. National Reforestation Plan of the MOE and 
National Forest Programme of the MOA. 
117 As well as acting as a proxy for carbon sequestration, area reforested is also frequently a policy objective in 
its own right (including in Lebanon) and may be related to the provision of other ecosystem services. 
118 Also to collect some information pertinent to point 3 regarding displacement of agricultural production. 
119 While there were no specific ecosystem services officially mentioned by reforestation stakeholders in 
achieving a 20% forest cover target, some of them gave me a range of benefits including soil protection, 
fuelwood and non-timber forest products, cultural and landscape values, and biodiversity (pers. comm. 2011-12, 
LRI, AFDC, MOA).  
120 Previous research with landowners in villages within IPAs of Mount Lebanon was also conducted in this 
study area (chapter 3). 
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bioclimatic zones. Average annual precipitation in this region ranges from 850-950 mm, 
mainly from October to May with the heaviest occurring between December and March 
(Jomaa 2008). The vegetation types are typical of Mediterranean forest, woodland and scrub 
communities containing coniferous, deciduous and mixed forest/woodlands (Abi-Saleh and 
Safi 1988). Forests, woodland and scrub communities in this region are under severe pressure 
from urbanisation, agricultural expansion, mining (stone and sand quarries) and overgrazing, 
as well as fires (Darwish et al. 2010a; Sattout and Caligari 2011). Long-term reforestation has 
been proposed by national stakeholders aimed at connecting the corridor between the Bcharre 
and Tannourine forests (MOA and LRI, pers. comm. 2012).  
5.2.2 Sampling 
A total of 32 villages were identified within three adjacent districts (Batroun, Bcharre, and 
Zghorta-Ehden) and IPAs (LB01, LB09, and LB11). Key informants121 from 29 out of the 32 
villages that were contacted helped provide contacts of landowners, which totalled 229 names 
(Table 5.2). A small number of landowners were also approached opportunistically in the 
village of Hadchit). Surveys were conducted with 130 landowners122, of whom twenty were 
part of the pilot study for calibrating the choice experiment design. Of the 110 surveyed using 
the final experimental design, four were omitted from the sample post hoc as their 
landholding status was atypical123. The original intention was to survey 150 respondents (see 
choice experiment design, below) using the final survey, but fieldwork had to be curtailed 
due to a deterioration in the security situation in Lebanon. The criteria used for eliciting 
participants for our study were landowners that are the main decision-makers for their 
holdings, preferably with at least 1 hectare of land. The criterion for landholding size was 
determined from the results of chapter 3 while our motive for seeking single decision-makers 
was to ensure that the respondents had the authority to determine the use of the land in 
question. 
  
                                                 
121 These included: mayors, representatives from local agricultural cooperatives and NGOs, and representatives 
from the Ministry of Agriculture’s Bcharre and Zghorta extension offices. As in Chapter 3, this method of 
recruiting respondents was necessary given the security situation in the area. 
122 Of the 99 landowners for whom contact details were obtained but that we did not succeed in interviewing, 
more than 60% were unreachable (e.g. telephone lines no longer in service). The rest that were contacted did not 
participate due to scheduling conflicts (e.g. weekend residents only), lack of time or interest, as well as 
inheritance issues. 
123 These respondents were decision-making representatives of large religious estates (e.g. head priests). 
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Table 5.2. Participant recruitment process 
Villages in sample No. of landowners 
(contact list) 
No. of survey 
participants 
District Population 
Ehden 46 18 Zghorta-Ehden >24,000 
Bcharre 34 23 Bcharre 12,001-24,000 
Haddath 28 13 Bcharre 2,001-4,000 
Hasroun 21 15 Bcharre 4,001-12,000 
Bane 15 12 Bcharre <2,001 
Bekaa Kafra 15 8 Bcharre 2,001-4,000 
Hadchit 9 6 Bcharre 4,001-12,000 
Mazraat Beni Saab 9 6 Bcharre <2,000 
Blaouza 8 2 Bcharre <2,000 
Qnat 8 6 Bcharre 2,001-4,000 
Dimane 7 6 Bcharre <2,000 
Kfarsghab 7 5 Zghorta-Ehden N/A 
Al-Bouhayrat 5 2 Zghorta-Ehden N/A 
Ayto 4 1 Zghorta-Ehden <2,000 
Aintourine 3 2 Zghorta-Ehden <2,000 
Billa 3 2 Bcharre N/A 
Serael 3 1 Zghorta-Ehden <2,000 
Barhalioun 2 1 Bcharre N/A 
Qnaywer 2 1 Bcharre N/A 
19 229 130 2  
 
5.2.3 Reforestation Options in the Choice Experiment 
Option A – Stone pine plantation 
Stone pine (Pinus pinea L.) is the most common native124 forest species managed on private 
lands in Lebanon. There are approximately 8,000 ha of total aggregated stone pine forests of 
over 10% crown cover on public (municipal) and private lands (Estephan 2010). While only a 
fraction of total coniferous forests (< 18%), it has the highest growth stock and second 
highest total biomass (above and below ground) of the most common managed forest species 
in Lebanon (Talhouk et al. 2001). Stone pines are largely managed as monoculture 
plantations for the production of pine nuts and generally well protected by owners against 
exogenous threats. Often heavily pruned for the purpose of increased yield, they are less 
susceptible to crown fires than other forest species such as Pinus brutia (Talhouk et al. 2001), 
and are therefore likely to store greater quantities of biomass. Much like other forest trees, 
                                                 
124 Some have argued that it is a naturalised species, naturally occurring in other Mediterranean countries 
(Martínez and Montero 2004). 
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stone pines require fewer inputs (e.g. agrichemicals) and much less water and general 
maintenance than most fruit trees. Preference for stone pine under a hypothetical PES was 
expected to be high, particularly amongst active farmers in Lebanon. 
On the other hand, there is a considerable time gap of around 10-15 years from planting stone 
pine seedlings (< 2 years old) to cone production stage125. The species also prefers sandy 
soils (Lower Cretaceous substrata), and cone production and quality may be much lower if 
planted in other soil types (Masri et al. 2006). Lastly, collection of cones on mature trees can 
be extremely risky and requires skilled climbers for whacking cones off branches while 
others collect (pers. comm., K. Sleem, 2012). A subsequent drying process is then required in 
order for cones to open, which then go through two additional processing stages before 
entering the market as a final product. The advantages and disadvantages of adopting stone 
pine may not be as straightforward as described. They need to be contextualised in current 
commodity-driven production systems. For example, the net benefits of apple production 
might be more competitive in the short term due to faster returns; however, costs may be 
higher in the long-term due to high inputs, unstable market conditions, and climate change 
affecting pollination, pests, and water availability. The fact that stone pines are not new or 
unfamiliar to most landholding farmers in Lebanon, and that demand for pine nuts continues 
to increase, suggests that decisions to invest in them are contingent upon a number of factors.  
Option B – Stone pine and Lebanese cedar (50/50) 
Cedar of Lebanon (Cedrus libani Rich.) is both a culturally and ecologically important 
species. It is the most widely planted forest species in Lebanon at elevations between 1,000 – 
2,000 m.a.s.l. There are currently 15 fragmented forests presently covering around 5% 
(approx. 2,300 ha) of its estimated natural range in Lebanon (Khuri et al. 2000). Cedars also 
received the highest aggregated rating by national stakeholders (chapter 4) as a conservation 
priority in reforestation from a list of 22 native species. 
Both stone pine and cedar have been extensively planted in national re/afforestation 
campaigns since the MOA’s Green Plan was launched in the early 1960s (Regato and Asmar 
2011). Substantial numbers of these two species were produced in public nurseries for the 
campaign that ended with the start of the civil war in 1975 (Chaney and Basbous 1978). Both 
                                                 
125 Some studies have suggested that prime production capacity of cones for P. pinea begins when trees are at 
least 25 years old (Mutke et al. 2005; Masri et al. 2006). 
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species continue to be employed in reforestation efforts today by public sector (MOA/MOE) 
and third sector (non-governmental) organisations.  
I expected the utility of Option B (50% stone pine / 50% Lebanese cedar) to be lower than 
Option A due to the lower production value of cedar. This reforestation option was offered in 
order to gauge whether landowners would make trade-offs with at least one other non-
productive species of high conservation and cultural significance (but little use126) value. 
Option C – Mixed native woodland species 
Until recently, there were limited species produced in Lebanon for re/afforestation purposes. 
However, Lebanese academic institutions (American University of Beirut, University of Saint 
Joseph, Balamand University) and NGOs (AFDC, LRI, Jouzour Loubnan) have begun 
initiating efforts to diversify native tree and shrub species through seed collection and 
seedling production. There are currently over 30 species of trees and shrubs available from 
mostly private Lebanese nurseries. The top ten species ranked for conservation by 
stakeholders (chapter 4), including cedar but not stone pine, were selected as the third 
reforestation option (Option C) in the choice experiment. All can be found naturally 
occurring with varied abundancies in forests and abandoned lands in the region. This option 
was selected because it was more diverse than the other two, although even re/afforestation 
under this option could potentially displace some native species, particularly understory 
endemics (both plant and animal). 
5.2.4 Data Acquisition and Survey Instrument 
A questionnaire survey was conducted in Arabic by my field assistant while I observed, 
asked questions when appropriate, and prepared choice cards. Surveys were conducted in the 
participants’ villages, either at their farm, home, workplace, or the municipality office. Each 
participant was given an introduction to the study, and an explanation of how and why they 
were contacted. The introduction was kept general in order to reduce biased responses. 
Informants were presented with a written consent form prior to commencing127. Each survey 
took approximately 40-50 minutes to complete on average. Respondents received two native 
tree saplings as a thank-you gift for their participation following the interview. 
                                                 
126 It is currently illegal to cut cedars, even on private property, without permits issued by the MOA. 
127 The study received ethics approval from both Bangor University and AUB review boards. 
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The survey was divided into four sections128. Section 1 focused on past, present and intended 
future land-use strategies, followed by the choice experiments (section 2), open-ended 
debriefing questions on future plans following hypothetical reforestation schemes (section 3), 
and ending with a few socioeconomic questions (section 4). Follow up questions were also 
used during the choice experiments, to gather spatial and land-use/land-cover (LULC) data, 
while also aimed at understanding perceptions and constraints to participation.  
In section 1 of the survey, spatial and temporal LULC data was obtained by asking 
respondents the number of plots they own, types of land-use for each of these plots (e.g. 
abandoned, commercial farming, recreation, etc.), type of land-cover on these plots (e.g. 
orchards, forest/woodland, vegetable/cereal/forage crops, native forest/shrubs, etc.), and the 
number of years since last major planting. Plots were sketched on an A4 sketchbook with 
appropriate LULC codes, areas (in m2 and later converted to ha) and approximate elevations. 
Respondents were also asked to list the types of vegetation occurring on abandoned lands (if 
known) to determine the extent and kinds of natural regeneration taking place. Future 
intentions for tree planting were elicited, followed by reasons for not wanting to plant for 
those who had no intentions to do so. Additional questions were also asked to determine 
whether respondents were sole decision-makers, renting land from or to anyone, main source 
of irrigation, and whether they received external assistance (e.g. MOA, municipality, farmer 
cooperatives, etc.).  
During the choice experiment section of the survey (section 2), participants were given a 
simulation of a hypothetical reforestation programme. My field assistant set the stage by 
asking participants to imagine we were an independent reforestation agency interested in 
paying landowners to plant forest trees on their property. Participants were then shown three 
A4 posters with landscape photographs to help illustrate each reforestation options (Appendix 
5.2). Accompanying the mixed native woodland options (C) was a fourth poster with 
photographs of the individual species (Appendix 5.3a)129. A fifth poster showing a diagram of 
the hypothetical reforestation programme was then presented (Appendix 5.3b).  
                                                 
128 Please see Appendix 5.3 for a copy of the survey. 
129 Participants were informed that these species were selected based on results from an online survey conducted 
with professionals and stakeholders in the forestry and conservation sectors (chapter 4). 
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In this programme, regardless of which reforestation option was chosen, each subscriber 
would receive free saplings (1-2 year old) and a standard payment US$3 per sapling for 
planting a minimum of 1,000 m2 (commonly referred to as 1 Turkish dunum). We averaged a 
maximum of 800 saplings ha-1 at roughly 4*4 metre spacing, or 80 saplings/dunum. 
Participants were informed that these were to be considered as fixed costs that apply to any 
one of the reforestation scheme, which would be followed by annual payments that varied in 
three of the choice cards that were about to be presented to them. The programme would 
consist of performance payments following four monitoring sessions to estimate survival 
(payments-by-result based on percentage survival) over the course of 15 years. Technical 
assistance (e.g. planting and post-planting care) and a 24-hour hotline service would also be 
provided at no cost. Once the preamble for the hypothetical reforestation programme was 
described, participants were asked if they had any questions before proceeding with the 
choice experiment. 
Participants were then presented with the three choice cards showing the three reforestation 
options with randomised payment levels (different for each reforestation option) plus a card 
indicating a ‘None’ option (i.e. ‘I don’t want any of these choices’)130. They were presented 
with five choice tasks in total and spatial/LULC data was gathered after each choice task131. 
Responses from the choice experiments were logged into a response matrix that included four 
columns per task (including the ‘none’ option), a column indicating plot number, and another 
column indicating planting area (see Appendix 5.4). 
5.2.5 Choice Experiments: Theoretical Underpinnings  
Choice experiments (CE) were initially developed in marketing and consumer research as a 
technique for studying consumer behaviour and predicting consumer preferences for novel 
products (Louviere and Hensher 1983). Louviere defines CE as “samples of choice sets or 
choice scenarios drawn from the universe of all possible choice sets” (2001:13). The logic of 
CE is grounded in random utility theory (RUT) of decision-making behaviour in economics 
and psychology (Manski 1977; Louviere et al. 2000; McFadden 2001). Under RUT, utility is 
described as a latent construct that may or may not exist in the psyche of consumers, which 
                                                 
130 Choice cards were all written in Arabic and included the same photographs presented in the A4 posters. 
131 I referred to the sketches prepared during section 1 of the survey. For instance, when respondents selected 
one of the three concepts other than the ‘None’, they were asked 1) which plot and 2) how much area (in 1,000 
m2) they would be willing to enrol. 
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cannot be directly observed by a researcher. Yet through eliciting the subject’s preferences 
for a set of alternatives (in a given choice set), the researcher is able to explain and measure a 
sizeable proportion of the unobserved utility, or part-worth, even while the rest remains 
stochastic from the viewpoint of the researcher (Louviere 2001:15). The random utility 
function is expressed as follows:  
Uan = Van + ɛan       (5.1) 
Where U is the latent (unobserved) utility for choice alternative a held by consumer n, Van is 
the observable (or explainable) portion of the latent utility that consumer n has for option a, 
and ɛan is the random (unexplainable) component of the latent utility associated with option a 
and consumer n. The stochastic nature of predicting preferences leads to formulating a 
probability of choice expression: 
   P(a|Cn) = P[(Van + ɛan) > (Vjn + ɛjn)],     (5.2) 
Where all j options exist in choice set Cn, the equation states that “the probability of 
consumer n choosing a from choice set Cn is equal to the probability that the systematic and 
random components of option a for consumer n are greater than the systematic and random 
components of option j for consumer n in choice set Cn.” (Louviere 2001:16).  
Depending on assumptions about the distribution of the random component (ɛs), linear 
regression models such as multinomial probit (MNP) and multinomial logit (MNL) are 
commonly used for calculating the probabilities. Unlike MNP, MNL models are based on 
assumptions that ɛs are independently and identically distributed Gumbel random variables 
(Louviere 2001:16). The MNL model can be used to estimate the rate at which consumers (or 
respondents) are willing to make trade-offs between attributes such as a non-marketed 
attribute (e.g. forest cover or biodiversity) and a monetary attribute. An implicit price or ‘part 
worth’ is therefore determined through dividing the first coefficient by the second and 
multiplying through by –1 (Bennett and Adamowicz 2001:63). While MNL models give 
fairly good aggregated representations of preferences based on choice responses, examining 
unobserved preferences requires different techniques.  
Given the heterogeneity of individual preferences, aggregated part-worth utilities fail to 
capture underlying differences and similarities from a sample of respondents. Latent class 
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models (LCM) and hierarchical Bayes (HB) regression reduce the problems associated with 
‘independence from irrelevant alternatives’ (IIA).  
5.2.6 Latent Class Models 
An approach to pooling often scarce and unobservable information (β’) across respondents 
widely being used in modelling choice-based conjoint data in many recent environmental 
valuation studies is latent class (Campbell et al. 2011; Broch and Vedel 2012; Garrod et al. 
2012; Beharry-Borg et al. 2013; Kaczan et al. 2013). Latent class models (LCM) group 
respondents according to homogenous classes that best fit their preferences based on an 
unobservable (or latent) membership likelihood function that classified individuals into one 
of a number of segments based on latent variables, e.g. attitudes, perceptions, tastes (Boxall 
and Adamowicz 2002). As specified by Allenby and Ginter (1995), LCM employ a set of 
finite mass points (with χ2 rather than normal distribution) to capture heterogeneity. However, 
while LCM assumes that these are groups of homogenous consumers and identifies them 
based on membership likelihood, they do no specifically associate covariates with part-worth 
estimates, but rather estimate them with “the size of the point mass” (Allenby and Ginter 
1995:401). Analysing this complexity of heterogeneous preferences requires estimating 
individual (or disaggregated) part-worth utilities. 
5.2.7 Hierarchical Bayes Regression 
Grounded in the laws of conditional probability, the Bayes theorem “provides a means of 
moving from probability statements about the outcome of events assuming we know how the 
world works, to statements about how we think the world might work based on what we 
observed in the data” (Allenby et al. 2005:9). HB estimates individual coefficients for each 
respondent based on a hierarchical upper model (or the alpha matrix) of the sample of 
respondents (Allenby et al. 2005).  
The Bayes theorem is expressed as: 
Posterior ∝ Likelihood × Prior     (5.3) 
where "∝" indicates the proportionality of likelihood times prior odds.  
Hierarchical Bayes (HB) is mathematically identical to mixed logit, with the added advantage 
of modelling disaggregated (rather than segmented) part-worth utilities (Train 2009). HB 
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provides a unified treatment of the three components mentioned (equation 1.3). It also 
enables analysis of covariates with respect to individual part-worths (Orme 2013). 
The Bayesian procedure can be used to estimate the parameters of a mixed logit model with 
an error component (Train 2009). Following Train (2009: Ch.12), assume that the utility (U) 
person n obtains from alternative j in time period t is denoted as:  
  Unjt = ’n xnjt + εnjt       (5.4) 
Where εnjt is the independently and identically distributed (iid) extreme value and giving n a 
normal distribution, n ~ N (b, W), where b (normal with unbounded large variance) and W 
(inverted Wishart with K degrees of freedom) are priors (equation 1.3). Assuming the error 
term εnjt is independently and identically distributed, the logit model is often employed to 
produce relatively efficient estimates of part-worth utilities from choice experiments (Allenby 
et al. 2005):  
Pni = 
exp(𝛽′𝑥𝑖)
∑𝑗exp⁡(𝛽
′𝑥𝑖)
       (5.5) 
This procedure is often referred to as hierarchical Bayes given the hierarchy of parameters 
(posterior and prior): n are the individual-level (or lower model) parameters (e.g. tastes, 
preferences) for person n; and where the n’s are distributed in the population with mean b 
and variance W, where b and W are the population-level (or upper model) parameters (Train 
2009). Rossi and Allenby (2003:304) argue that since consumers inherently possess 
heterogeneous preferences, researchers in market-based studies need to statistically analyse 
three important components: 
1. Within-unit (n, or individual consumers’) behaviour (the conditional likelihood); 
2. Across-unit (N) behaviour (the distribution of heterogeneity); 
3. Action: the solution to a decision problem involving a loss function (or trade-off)132 
Utilities (part-worth or linear coefficients) generated from HB models for each attribute level 
can then be used to simulate different scenarios (or combinations of these attribute levels) 
                                                 
132 The authors contextualise these three components under Bayesian decision theory, which involves two 
critical components, 1) loss function and 2) the posterior distribution, the former associated with “a state of a 
nature and an action, l (a, θ), where a is the action and θ is the state of nature (parameter). They show that 
optimal decision-makers will choose an action so as to minimise loss (a quadratic function), in which case “the 
optimal ‘action’ is an estimator taken to be the posterior mean of the parameters” (p. 317).  
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using Sawtooth’s SMRT (market simulator) to project shares of preferences for new products 
or concepts (Orme 2002). 
5.2.8 Choice-Based Conjoint Design 
I used the traditional full-profile Choice-based Conjoint CBC design under Sawtooth's SSI 
Web program (Sawtooth Software 2013), with two attributes (reforestation and payment 
options) each having three levels (see Appendix 5.5.). Conditional relationships and 
prohibition options were initially explored, e.g. prohibiting higher payment level for stone 
pine, but were abandoned in the final design. Fixed-choice tasks were also initially included 
in two of five tasks, but were later changed to full random choice-tasks. These changes 
helped improve the design considerably in terms of estimated errors and maintaining 
orthogonal design parameters.  
The software calculated the parameters of the CBC design based on the number of 
questionnaires generated. I estimated recruiting around 5-10 landholding farmers from 
approximately 20 villages (150-200 participants) within two adjacent districts in North 
Lebanon (Bcharre and Zghorta-Ehden), located between 1,000-1,500 m.a.s.l. I therefore 
chose a maximum sample frame of 150 respondents based on my capacity and possible 
constraints faced (i.e. time, financial resources and security risks). CBC designs generally 
require relatively large sample sizes; however, this also depends on the complexity of a 
design. For example, the more attributes and levels included in a CBC design, the higher the 
sample size required (Sawtooth Software 2013).  
One hundred-fifty questionnaire versions using the ‘Shortcut’ method with five random 
choice tasks were generated using the SSI Web software. This method was considered to 
have minimal overlap, i.e. identical consecutive choice tasks (Sawtooth Software 2013). 
There were three concepts per choice task excluding the ‘none’ option. There were 750 total 
choice tasks generated for 150 versions (at five per version). 
Once the design was finalized, and following the piloting stage, 150 HTML versions (i.e. 
browser-based interviews with five tasks per version and three concepts per task plus a 
‘None’ option per task) were created using the ‘Paper-and-Pencil’ option. Each HTML 
version contains five choice tasks for each respondent. These are normally displayed on a 
laptop or PC as a web-based interface, but in my case involved transferring onto a 
spreadsheet for displaying choice cards for my respondents. 
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The Sawtooth SSI-Web software is largely geared towards the marketing sector as a web-
based interface for conducting CBC experiments online. In this context, the program saves 
and processes each respondent’s completed results online, whereas the ‘Paper-and-Pencil’ 
method requires manually inputting results into an ‘Accumulated Data File’ (.csv) and later 
uploading the datasets (spreadsheets) back into the software in order to process the data into 
another file types (.dat, .cho). These files can later be analysed using other CBC modules 
provided by Sawtooth (e.g. hierarchical Bayes, CBC/Latent Class, Logit). The Market 
Simulator software, for instance, is aimed at projecting market sales through simulating 
hypothetical products (or scenarios in my case) in order to estimate the shares of preferences 
(number of respondents who would “buy” a novel product) based on results from CE surveys 
(Orme 2002). This was very similar to my intended use, hence my choice of Sawtooth 
software. 
5.2.9 Focus Groups and Piloting 
Informal focus groups were first conducted with reforestation experts from the American 
University of Beirut to discuss contract design options for a hypothetical reforestation 
programme. I then sought opinions from local landowners in Bcharre village regarding 
farmers in the region and how they would perceive my experiment. A similar focus group 
was conducted with a small group of farmers in Bcharre with the same objective. A forestry 
expert from a local NGO in Bcharre also provided me with some very helpful information 
pertaining to planting costs that aided in designing the hypothetical PES programme and 
approach133. A few changes were made to the land-use/land-cover survey following the 
piloting phase; however, the CE section of the survey underwent a series of adjustments. 
Initial designs were tested prior to formal piloting. Modification of later designs included 
adjustments made to the payment levels (increased payments) as well as to the random 
generation methods (i.e. from ‘Complete enumeration’ to ‘Shortcut’) in order to reduce 
overlapping concepts within each version. 
                                                 
133 I initially piloted the CE with a minimum payment level set to US$500 ha-1 year-1, but local farmers and 
forestry experts helped to clarify that this was an extremely low figure and aided me in determining what would 
be an acceptable (or minimum) annual payment level for one hectare by landowners in the area. Experts also 
recommended that the duration of the programme be 15-20 years to ensure that trees become established. 
Similarly, incentivised re/afforestation projects in African countries (e.g. Tanzania) used contracts for 20 years 
or more (Jindal et al. 2008). 
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5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Landowner Attributes 
Respondents were sampled from 17 villages within the Bcharre and Zghorta-Ehden134 
districts (74.5% from the former) with landholdings ranging from 800-2300 m.a.s.l. (µ = 
1491.2, σ = 243.6). All but two respondents were male with a median age of 53 at the time 
the surveys were conducted135. Most (83%) were married and the median size of households 
was four members. The majority (72%) were permanent residents, 27% spent 
weekends/holidays and summers in the villages, while two were non-residents (Figure.5.2). 
Around a quarter of the respondents indicated that they were full-time farmers, 43% earned 
off-farm incomes (either as employees or self-employed), 23% were ‘hobby farmers’ 
(working or retired), and just under 10% were non-farmers. 
 
Figure.5.2. Land-based occupation divided by residency status of respondents (n=106). 
 
                                                 
134 Ehden is part of the Zghorta district, the latter located closer to the coast just south of Tripoli. 
135 Median age of respondents from previous fieldwork (chapter 3) was 57. 
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5.3.2 Farm / Landholding Attributes (past & present) 
All respondents interviewed owned at least one parcel of land (median of 3; max 7 parcels) 
averaging approximately 3.4 ha per respondent (σ = 4.59); however, 16% owned less than 1 
ha. Approximately 36% of the aggregated total of 360.6 ha of land was abandoned (i.e. land 
in disuse), 58% was cultivated (>99% orchards), the remainder being mixed land-uses136 
(Table 5.3). 
Table 5.3. Land-use and land-cover data 
Land-use & Land-cover Subtotal Area (Ha) 
Land in use (e.g. commercial farmlands) 
 
208.34 
Of which (land-cover):  208.34 
 Orchard crops 206.24 
 Other crops 2.10 
 Land in disuse (e.g. abandoned farms or rangelands) 129.14 
Of which (land-cover):  129.14 
 
Range, scrub & shrub 89.77 
 
Forest/woodland 39.17 
 
Other/unknown 0.20 
 
Mixed land-use/land-cover (e.g. some farming)   23.07 
Total   360.55 
 
Of the land in disuse, 25% was described as open range, scrub or shrub type systems and 
11% as forest/woodland systems. Around 83% of the respondents mentioned natural 
regeneration taking place on land in disuse (Table 5.4).  
Table 5.4. Native species mentioned by respondents as occurring on land in disuse 
Species Common name No. of responses  
Prunus cocomilia Bear plum 27 
Quercus spp. Oaks 23 
Pyrus syriaca Syrian pear 17 
Crataegus monogyna Hawthorn 15 
Quercus coccifera Kermes oak 13 
Juniperus excelsa Grecian juniper 9 
Pinus brutia Turkish pine 9 
Quercus infectoria Aleppo oak 6 
Spartium junceum Spanish broom 6 
Pistacia spp. Wild pistachio 4 
 
                                                 
136 Landholdings were consolidated for ease of analyses categorised under these three major land-use types. 
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Average length of time since major plantings (or other major land use changes) was 32.4 
years. Three respondents mentioned no major changes taking place on plots that were 
range/scrublands for 100 or more years. Six mentioned no major changes taking place on 
cultivated lands for 60 or more years. 
5.3.3 Future Planting Objectives 
Around 53% of the respondents with plans for future planting of crops provided spatial and 
LULC details137 (Figure 5.3); in total 32 ha of planting was planned for land in disuse, 12.9 
ha on land under cultivation, and 22.9 ha on mixed land-use, totaling 67.8 ha (µ = 0.99, σ = 
1.11). Of these respondents, over half intended to plant commercial trees (fruit and/or nut)138 
and around 30% were not sure what crops to plant139. High costs and lack of suitable land 
were the main reasons for not planting more trees in the future mentioned by at least 12 of the 
30 respondents. High risks (or concerns about success/failure), lack of support (e.g. family, 
government, community), and lack of interest (or need) were also mentioned as major 
constraints to future planting of commercial trees or other crops. 
                                                 
137 Sixty-six respondents indicated future planting plans of which six were unsure and four mentioned replacing 
dead trees annually. 
138 Five respondents intended to plant stone pine. 
139 It may have also been likely that they did not want to share this information. 
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Figure 5.3. Land-use types and area for landowners (n=59) with plans to plant more crops in the 
future. Note: an outlier with 10 ha of intended planting on mixed land-use was removed for the 
purpose of displaying this graph. 
 
5.3.4 Land Tenure 
Seventy per cent of respondents were sole decision-makers of their holdings. Around 30% 
shared ownership with other family members (mainly siblings), and six respondents shared 
land-based decisions with non-familial property owners. Eleven respondents mentioned 
renting/leasing their property to others and seven rented or leased from other people.  
5.3.5 Other Farm-Related Attributes 
Water resources for agriculture were largely from springs managed by local cooperatives or 
municipalities (83%), followed by private wells or reservoirs (26%)140. Thirteen per cent 
mentioned other third party resources, mainly hill lakes constructed by the MOA or other 
                                                 
140 Total percentages > 100% since most farmers indicated more than one source of water. 
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agriculture development agencies. Four respondents mentioned planting only rain fed crops 
(including trees such as cherry) due to a lack of water supplies. Two others indicated having 
to truck water in to fill reservoirs during the summer months. Fifty-eight per cent of 
respondents involved in farming claimed to receive no support from any third party 
organisation (e.g. MOA, NGOs). Twenty-five per cent mentioned receiving support from the 
MOA’s Green Plan and around 20% from their municipality, local associations, NGO’s or 
agricultural coops. 
5.3.6 Results from Choice Experiments 
Eighty of the 106 respondents chose at least one of the reforestation concepts offered out of 
the five choice tasks presented. The remaining twenty-six respondents selected the ‘None’ 
(status quo) option in all of the tasks presented141. The main reasons given (in order of the 
frequency reported) were: lack of suitable land, high opportunity costs, concerns about losing 
tenure, and risk-aversion (or not wanting to take on these kinds of responsibilities). Only four 
respondents mentioned a lack of interest in planting forest trees and two others mentioned 
distrust in these kinds of schemes altogether.  
Aggregated results 
Multinomial logit (MNL) models estimate average preferences for the aggregated sample 
(Figure 5.4). The stone pine option (Option A) generated the highest utilities for the 
reforestation attribute as a whole with preferences nearly equaling the status quo (‘None’) at 
the lowest payment level (US$2,000 ha-1 year-1) offered. The mixed species option (Option 
C), on the other hand, only becomes competitive with the status quo around $10,000 ha-1 
year-1, with the stone pine and cedar mix (Option B) being intermediate. However, MNL 
models often fail to take into account heterogeneity of the sample and are thus prone to the 
independence from irrelevant alternative (IIA) problem discussed earlier (Louviere and 
Woodworth 1983). 
                                                 
141 Where respondents chose the status quo in the first three choice tasks, I terminated the choice experiment as 
there was a risk of antagonising the respondent. 
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Figure 5.4. Estimated utilities of attribute concepts using multinomial logit (MNL). Utilities were 
rescaled from zero-centred differentials using the antilog * 10. 
 
Group membership (latent class models) 
Latent class models (LCM) segment respondents into groups (or classes) according to the 
strength of preferences for attribute levels. Latent class runs were conducted for two to five 
groups (four replications each). The solution for five groups was selected as the best 
supported model142. The first three groups in Table 5 and Figure 5 include respondents who 
had positive preferences for one of the reforestation options. Thus, although the MNL results 
show that on average this sample of landowners preferred Option A (stone pine) over Option 
B (stone pine and cedar), and Option B over Option C (mixed species), the LCM show that 
each of these options was the most preferred reforestation option for at least some 
respondents (Figure 5.5). In addition, the LCM identified a group of respondent who 
favoured no reforestation (none) even at the highest payment levels offered, and a group that 
                                                 
142 Lowest Consistent Akaike Info Criteria (CAIC) selected with high relative Chi-square (Boxall and 
Adamowicz 2002). 
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were split between Option A and Option B. The model also showed that for respondents who 
preferred the mixed species or stone pine and cedar options (Option C and B, respectively), 
the reforestation attribute had substantially higher importance than the payment attribute, 
whereas for the group split between Options A and B, the payment attribute had a relatively 
larger importance (Table 5.5). 
Table 5.5. Latent class runs with five groups segmented based on percentage of attribute importance 
Part Worth Utilities 
Stone Pine 
(A) 
S.P. / Cedar 
(B) 
Mixed spp. 
(C) 
Split w/ 
A&B None 
Segment Size (% of 
sample) 29% 7.8% 10.2% 28.5% 24.5% 
No. of Respondents  31 8 11 30 26 
      
Attribute Importance (%) 
     Reforestation option 54.7 88.5 93.5 38.4 47.6 
Payments level 45.3 11.5 6.5 61.6 52.4 
59.9% Certainty; 705.4 CAIC; χ2 = 794.8 (Relative χ2 = 33.12) 
 
Figure 5.5. Latent class model for five groups showing all respondents (n=106) segmented based on 
average attribute importances (utility estimates). 
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5.3.7 Estimating the PPF 
The choice-based conjoint hierarchical Bayes module (CBC/HB) was used to estimate 
respondents’ disaggregated part-worth utilities of the reforestation attribute (dummy-coded) 
and a linear coefficient for payment level (2, 6, and 10). Utilities were imported into 
Sawtooth’s SMRT simulator to develop a set of 27 scenarios containing different 
combinations of attribute levels to determine the share of preferences (the proportion of the 
sample of landowners who would choose each reforestation option, given the payment levels) 
for each scenario. An example of the first three scenarios is shown in Table 5.6. 
Table 5.6. Sub-sample of simulated scenarios showing the share of preferences (%) for each concept 
  Payment Level (hectare-1 year-1) 
Scenario Stone pine (A)   S.P / Cedar (B)   Mixed spp. (C)   None 
1 2,000 45% 
 
2,000 18% 
 
2,000 11% 
  
26% 
2 6,000 55% 
 
2,000 10% 
 
2,000 9% 
  
25% 
3 10,000 58%   2,000 8%   2,000 9%     25% 
 
This allowed me to determine 1) the number of landowners in my sample that would choose 
the option, and hence the number of hectares that would be planted under each reforestation 
option143, 2) total cost per hectare for each option (including fixed costs of planting trees plus 
variable costs of the payments), 3) number of hectares that could be planted for each 
reforestation option under two possible budgets (US$500,000 and US$1,000,000)144, and 
finally 4) the trade-off between the diversity of species and hectares that would be planted 
with a given budget (two examples are given for illustrative purposes in Figure 5.6). Species 
diversity was determined using the Shannon-Wiener index below: 
𝐻⁡ = ⁡−∑ (p𝑖)(Lnp𝑖)𝑠𝑖=1      (5.6) 
Where H is the index of species diversity, s is the number of species, and pi is the proportion 
of the total hectares planted with the ith species (Magurran and McGill 2011). 
  
                                                 
143 The number of respondents was multiplied by the mean planting area (1.10 ha-1 σ = 1.55) that would be 
enrolled by the 80 respondents who chose a reforestation option (26 consistently opted out after a minimum of 
three choice tasks were presented). 
144 Because it proved impossible to extract raw coefficients for individual landowners from Sawtooth, I assumed 
that all landowners who would choose a particular option would be paid (and would need to be paid) the same. 
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Figure 5.6. The production possibility frontier (PPF) illustrating the trade-off between diversity of 
species and hectares that would be planted (ha) under two budget options (500k = US$500,000 and 
1m = US$1,000,000). Scenarios on the PPF are Pareto optimal (no increase in diversity is possible 
without a decrease in area). 
Results from the simulation indicate that a large portion of the scenarios are Pareto inefficient 
(Figure 5.6). Four scenarios from each of the two budget examples lie on the production 
possibility frontier (PPF). Three of those scenarios had the lowest possible payment levels for 
reforestation options A and B, and the highest payment levels for the mixed species options 
(Option C). Interestingly, one scenario on the PPF included an intermediate payment level for 
the stone pine and cedar (Option B), and this scenario appears to kink the estimated PPF 
outwards, suggesting that other combinations of payments that were not included in the 
original choice experiment might mean the true PPF lies even further from the origin.  
5.3.8 Analysis of Displacement under Reforestation Options 
The spatial and LULC data gathered allowed me to assess the level of agricultural 
displacement. For respondents who chose at least one reforestation option (n=80) the land 
proposed for reforestation was classified as either 1) land in disuse, 2) land in use, and 3) 
mixed land use (Figure 5.7), similar to section 5.3.2 above. 
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Figure 5.7. Land-use types and their associated areas that would potentially undergo reforestation 
based on responses from choice experiments by respondents (n=80). 
Most reforestation would take place on land in disuse, however a higher proportion of stone 
pine would be planted on land in use and land with mixed land-use (Figure 5.3). 
5.3.9 Foreseeable Land-uses Changes and Factors Ensuring Tree Retention 
Respondents who would participate in a future PES programme were asked whether they 
could foresee any land-use changes after planting. Twenty-six of the 80 stated they would not 
foresee any changes, 25 mentioned building or construction on the plots that would be 
reforested, five mentioned selling land and another five mentioned passing land onto their 
children. 
The main factors that would help to ensure tree retention were amenity or aesthetic values of 
forest trees (e.g. which increases land value) mentioned by 24 respondents. On-farm benefits 
were mentioned 21 times and intrinsic values seven times. Many respondents compared 
planting trees to having and raising children as reasons for retaining trees. On the other hand, 
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the potential for prices of agricultural products (e.g. apple) increasing were mentioned by 
roughly 15% of respondents as factors that may result in removing planted trees ex post.  
5.4 Discussion 
The main objective of this study was to determine whether a significant trade-off exists 
between potential area reforested (or that extent of forest cover that would be achieved) and 
tree species diversity, for a given budget. The simulations showed that there is indeed a 
strong trade-off, for example between attaining extensive forest cover (approx. 43 ha) using 
fewer species (the Shannon-Wiener H index = 1.15) than with higher diversity 
re/afforestation (approx. 17 ha; H = 1.75), for an arbitrary budget of US$1m. It is also 
important to note that there are other possible Pareto efficient outcomes along the production 
possibility frontier (Figure 5.6). Interestingly, the multinomial logit model captured these 
trade-offs by showing that most landowners would likely reforest with stone pine (Option A) 
at the lowest payment level offered (US2,000 ha-1 yr-1) while it would require much higher 
sums to induce the planting of diverse native species (Option C; Figure 5.4). However, these 
aggregated models give us an incomplete picture and provide us little insight on what 
preference heterogeneity may exist, as discussed earlier. Results from the latent class models 
(LCM) were therefore important in demonstrating that there is a small proportion of 
landowners (roughly 10%) that would prefer reforesting with mixed species (Option C), and 
another group (roughly 8%) who would prefer the stone pine and Lebanese cedar mix 
(Option B; Figure 5.5). This model also found a fairly large proportion of landowners (nearly 
30%) that were more or less indifferent between Options A and B, and would be swayed by 
payments levels, but would not consider Option C regardless of payment level (within those 
tested). Interestingly, simulations predicted that at baseline payment levels (US$2,000 ha-1 yr-
1) for Options A and B, landowner preferences for mixed species (Option C) at the highest 
payment level (total present value cost of US$107,137 ha-1 discounted after 15 years) 
increased from 10.7% to 26.1%. 
Results from the analyses are consistent with similar studies using production possibility 
frontiers to model trade-offs between competing (ecosystem) goods and services (e.g. Robert 
and Stenger 2013). Such models are also very useful for policy, particularly in aiding 
decision-making when resources are scarce and demands are often competing. Recent studies 
have drawn attention to the importance of understanding trade-offs between different 
ecosystem services, particularly how provisioning services such as food production have 
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undermined most non-market environmental goods and services (Pretty 2008; Foley et al. 
2011; Bowman and Zilberman 2013; Reed et al. 2013). Yet studies have found 
multifunctional landscapes that combine various land-use practices145 provide more public 
benefits from the environment than highly modified and productive (of provisioning services) 
landscapes (O'Farrell et al. 2010; Kremen and Miles 2012; van Noordwijk et al. 2012). 
However, policymakers and practitioners will likely face difficult trade-offs when deciding 
on the kinds and quantities of ecosystem services being paid for, as well as what ES are likely 
to be displaced. For example, paying for regulating services such as carbon sequestration, 
either through forest protection or re/afforestation, could potentially displace provisioning 
services, or commodities like agriculture and timber, elsewhere. Minimising these trade-offs 
may therefore require incentivising the management of ecosystems for multiple services as 
proposed by Reed et al (2013). 
The results also raise another important issue with respect to farmer (or landowner) attitudes 
and behaviours. For example, Espinosa-Goded et al. (2010) found that farmers are often 
reluctant to join incentives-based schemes for fear of losing tenure, or at least the ability to 
continue cultivating their lands. Perhaps many Lebanese landowners who are farmers 
consider planting diverse forests a threat to their livelihoods, particularly since there are legal 
implications restricting them from accessing land and resources (including planted trees) in 
the future. Other issues mentioned were perceptions that native species invite pests, and 
therefore even planting them at the periphery of their orchards (given that this may be the 
only land available) was considered a threat (shade was another issue). These issues not only 
echo opt-out responses from landowners interviewed in chapter 3, but were also mentioned in 
other case-studies (Zubair and Garforth 2006). In addition to this, and as discussed in the 
chapter, there are constraints to both buyers and sellers of ES generated from reforestation 
given the long time-frame required for planted forest to become established before generating 
those services. This can be financial burden for buyers required to pay a much higher 
premium for high-conservation-value species (e.g. those presented as Option C) than for 
productive species such as stone pine, which would require much lower payments and more 
willing adopters. However, as the results from the choice experiment suggest, there are also 
                                                 
145 This includes reductions of inputs (e.g. agrichemicals) or adopting alternative techniques or land-uses that 
reduce negative outputs, e.g. no-till farming. 
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willing adopters of high-conservation-value reforestation payments that would be cost-
effective for buyers. 
Preference heterogeneity is one of the major challenges faced by researchers using 
environmental valuation techniques such as choice experiments. Heterogeneity of preferences 
could be across or even within regions, based on farm and farmer characteristics, and 
influenced by the institutional setting and environmental or other exogenous factors 
(Espinosa-Goded et al. 2010). Yet there are also preferences (or land-based decisions) that 
many landowners share, particularly with regards to LULC types. For instance, we could 
expect that landowners would rationally choose to enter PES/AES schemes for land with the 
lowest opportunity costs. Hence they would likely choose to plant forest trees on less fertile, 
marginal lands that would otherwise prove too difficult or costly to convert to orchards. As 
Hanley et al. (2012) pointed out, ES buyers will likely invest first in changes that involve the 
lowest cost and still be compatible with improving biodiversity. Identifying those who are 
willing to accept payments to plant diverse native trees offering fewer private benefits is 
amongst the many challenges of cost-effective targeting with PES. 
Results from this study indicate that a substantial portion of Lebanese landowners from the 
Bcharre-Ehden IPA would be willing to accept payments for reforestation (> 75%). Yet it is 
also important to assess whether biodiversity-enhancing reforestation would be cost-effective 
with private landowners. One way to compare this is to look at the costs involved with 
current reforestation efforts in Lebanon, which are mainly taking place on municipal lands 
with municipalities as managing beneficiaries. The Ministry of Environment’s (MOE) 
National Reforestation Plan was initiated in 2001, yet only direct planting and administrative 
costs were estimated (MOE 2001). More recently, the office of the MOE made a public 
announcement of its plans to partner with 27 municipalities in planting at least 135 ha, 
amounting to roughly US$1m (L’association du Local Liban 2010). This equates to 
approximately US$7,400 ha-1 as a one-time cost. Although the present value of the schemes 
considered in this study would be higher than this (on average approximately US$23,000 ha-1 
at a discount rate of 5%), it is also necessary to consider the maintenance costs (e.g. irrigation 
and protection from grazing) on the one hand, and transaction costs (e.g. monitoring to ensure 
compliance) on the other. These components and their related costs are often required for 
ensuring optimal survival outcomes and long-term tree retention. Since there are no 
provisions for ongoing payments based on performance as part of the MOE’s reforestation 
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scheme (at least to my knowledge), ensuring long-term tree retention is limited despite short-
term (e.g. 2-3 years) maintenance costs being covered. In contrast, landowners who joined 
the hypothetical reforestation programmes would receive conditional payments over a period 
of 15 years contingent upon tree survival and retention. 
Constraints to effective uptake into PES include opportunity costs (e.g. agricultural and land 
prices increasing), inheritance issues surrounding tenure, laws prohibiting cutting of conifers, 
and lack of suitable land. Constraints to ensuring the efficacy of a PES programme 
(particularly for buyers) includes the high cost of reforesting with landowners, especially 
since tree retention requires long-term payments. Yet as discussed previously (chapter 3), 
reforestation is generally a costly endeavour given that a great deal of funds has to be 
frontloaded to cover planting costs while benefits (both private and non-private) may take 
many years to come into effect. In other words, the additionality of various forest ES from 
asset-building PES schemes take place slowly and incrementally over long temporal scales. 
This raises important questions for policy, particularly whether more funding should be 
directed towards managing existing forests. Furthermore, results from this study are 
preliminary in the context of future research prospects in this field. If asset-building PES 
were to become a reality in Lebanon, adopted as a policy instrument by the Lebanese 
government and the handful of NGOs aligned with their policies, more studies would be 
needed. A more pragmatic approach to estimating costs when private information is costly to 
obtain would be through reverse auctions, which has been adopted in applied research in 
various asset-building PES studies (Groth 2011; Ajayi et al. 2012; Jindal et al. 2013). Using 
reverse auctions by inviting landowners to place silent bids on the payments offered could 
help reveal their true opportunity costs and aid in identifying willing adopters of various 
kinds of PES schemes being offered. Moreover, just as it would be desirable to explore 
stakeholder preferences on the trade-off between extent and diversity, it would be good to 
explore stakeholder preferences for the balance between richness and evenness. 
5.5 Conclusion 
There is a growing need to develop institutions through new markets and policies for efficient 
delivery of multiple ecosystem services that will lead to more sustainable means of land-
based production (Robertson and Swinton 2005; Bryan 2013). Yet we often face an 
undersupply of non-commodity ecosystem services such as biodiversity when we fail to pay 
for them, and carry on treating them as public goods or externalities. This study has 
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investigated the potential for asset-building PES with Lebanese landowners from highland 
villages, in a region with ecological and cultural significance. I examined how landowners 
trade-off hypothetical reforestation options with payment levels, and modelled those utilities 
to illustrate potential production possibility trade-offs. Most Lebanese landowners would 
prefer stone pine plantations as a reforestation option, suggesting a strong trade-off for 
reforesting with mixed species under budgetary constraints. However, latent class models and 
hierarchical Bayes estimates helped identify subgroups of respondents that can enable for 
more cost-effective targeting of PES to achieve at least some level of reforesting primarily 
with mixed native species. The results from this study reinforce the need for recognising 
heterogeneity of preferences amongst landowners. Doing so will enable for more diverse PES 
designs that will attract a variety of landowners capable of supplying different kinds of 
ecosystem services. Navigating policies towards achieving multiple objectives will ultimately 
push the frontiers of many production possibilities in the future for Lebanon. 
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6 Discussion 
Conversion of forests or other natural landscapes to agriculture occurs because many of the 
ecosystem services provided by these landscapes are undervalued in the market. Payments for 
ecosystem services (PES) are increasingly employed as a strategy to correct this market 
failure by internalising environmental externalities (van Noordwijk et al. 2012). However, 
there are numerous complexities associated with such markets because of transaction costs, 
or the inevitable ‘friction’ between transacting parties (Jack et al. 2008; Gibbons et al. 2011), 
and principal-agent problems such as imperfect (or asymmetric) information and hidden 
action (Ferraro 2008; Jindal et al. 2013). These issues are especially problematic in the 
context of less tangible ecosystem services (like biodiversity), because they are hard to 
measure and are often public goods (non-rivalrous and non-excludable), and therefore non-
payers cannot be excluded despite enjoying them for free.  
My thesis has explored ways of delivering biodiversity co-benefits alongside reforestation in 
Lebanon. In chapter 2, I found that if biodiversity-enhancing reforestation incentives are 
restricted only to public or municipal lands, they should be targeted towards municipalities 
with clearly defined cadastral boundaries and institutional mechanisms for ensuring tree 
retention. Given that these types of municipalities are scarce in highland villages of Lebanon, 
and many lack available lands for reforestation (or already have enough forest), alternative 
strategies should be considered, including contracting directly with private landowners. In 
chapter 3, I explored the attitudes of private landowners to PES for reforestation, and found 
that there are constraints on incentivising biodiversity-enhancing reforestation on private 
lands as well, despite a general acceptance by landowners of this type of scheme. 
Encouraging uptake of reforestation schemes requires understanding how heterogeneous 
landowners perceive the risks of participation, particularly future opportunity costs and land 
tenure issues affected by current forest policies. In chapter 4, I considered the demand side, 
and found considerable heterogeneity among reforestation stakeholders who are likely to be 
PES buyers in the future. Results from the choice experiments conducted in chapter 5 show 
that Lebanese landowners would likely participate in reforestation incentives, yet also found 
a great deal of heterogeneity in their preferences for different reforestation options relative to 
payments offered. Although a small proportion of landowners had positive preferences for 
diverse species, the remainder would require significant premiums to diversify planting. This 
implies a significant opportunity cost (in terms of extent reforested or carbon sequestered) of 
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supplying biodiversity co-benefits alongside reforestation, at least on some lands. 
Recognising the heterogeneity in landowners’ preferences, the characteristics of their 
holdings, and their capacity to manage lands effectively, will play a critical part in designing 
effective asset-building PES schemes for Lebanon.  
Below I discuss some of the key themes that emerge from this research that I believe could 
help inform asset building PES policy in Lebanon and elsewhere. The overarching issues I 
discuss relate to general constraints on reforestation, heterogeneity amongst stakeholders and 
potential suppliers, and the trade-offs between single and multiple objectives when 
incentivising reforestation. 
6.1 Constraints on Reforestation 
6.1.1 Land Tenure 
Lebanon’s reforestation stakeholders are primarily interested in reforesting municipal lands, 
though they are more engaged with integrating municipalities and local members of those 
villages than they had been in the past. However, insecure tenure is likely to be a key 
constraint in reforesting municipal lands. Incursions by competing land-uses, particularly 
goats (as well as recreationists, e.g. snowmobiles), were reported by many local authorities 
(chapter 2). Many municipalities lacked clear cadastral maps delineating municipal lands, 
thus making it difficult to reduce encroachment and ensure reforestation does not conflict 
with other land-uses. Whether planting forest trees on public or private lands, lack of secured 
property rights could result in reduced planting survival and tree retention, because land 
managers lack the incentives or ability to protect trees. This may discourage potential ES 
buyers from seeking investments under such circumstances as shown in other case-studies 
around the world (Swallow et al. 2010; Corbera et al. 2011; van Noordwijk et al. 2012). In 
other contexts, lack of sufficient enforcement of property rights could result in weak land 
tenure, despite landowners having proper titles. Börner et al. (2010), for instance, found how 
insecure tenure has negatively impacted REDD projects in the Brazilian Amazon due to 
pervasive illegal encroachment and land grabbing, and concluded that PES would require 
parallel coercive measures under such contexts. Therefore, even when contracting with 
individuals with formal land titles, securing those titles requires strong formal institutions at 
various administrative levels often reinforced through informal norms, rules and customs 
(Jack et al. 2008; Corbera and Brown 2008).  
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Given Lebanon’s socio-political complexity (including ethnic, religious, and class-based 
divisions), it is important to recognise that enforcement of land tenure is not exclusively the 
role of public institutions, but involves social and political capital (Korf 2009). Such issues 
may also influence landowners to be more risk-averse, especially if planting forest trees on 
private lands is viewed as losing tenure. Landowners, particularly farmers, may be reluctant 
to join reforestation schemes fearing they will lose some part of the bundle of rights they 
have over their property. Similarly, there was a sense of discontent shared by many Lebanese 
farmers pertaining to laws prohibiting the cutting or removal of forest trees without formal 
permits. While these measures may have aided in gradual forest recovery, they may also be 
contributing to forest loss from arson (as a means of regaining tenure). Since asset-building 
PES has never been done with Lebanese landowners, it is not surprising that they would view 
it more cautiously than if they had (or heard of) previous experiences. Similar instances 
relating to policies preventing rights to access natural resources, particularly tree tenure, have 
been shown to deter rather than encourage effective reforestation and forest management 
objectives (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006). Moreover, while results from chapters 3 and 5 
suggest that Lebanese landowners (whether active farmers or not) are accepting of 
incentivised reforestation schemes, many expressed concerns about inheritance issues tied to 
tenure. If property rights are secured and factors affecting long-term tree retention were 
purely within the landowner’s control, incentives would in theory only have to cover the 
direct costs in planting and each landowner’s opportunity costs.  
6.1.2 Variable Opportunity Costs 
Findings from my research suggest that landowners’ opportunities costs varied considerably. 
For the most part, reforestation would take place on land that is considered to be of poor 
quality for orchard crops, thus it is unlikely that agriculture would be displaced. Preference 
for planting marginal land of poor quality over that of productive lands appears to be 
common place in other asset-building PES and reforestation-related studies (e.g. Kelly and 
Huo 2013). But this would also require that payments are kept relatively low enough to not 
incentivise agricultural displacement and land-use change at larger scales. Furthermore, land 
in disuse could range from degraded scrub (or garrigue-type systems) to recently abandoned 
farms. The former might have more disadvantages for potential ES suppliers given the poor 
conditions for ensuring high enough survival rates. In addition, more remote lands with lower 
opportunity costs may face greater threats from other factors like grazing. An important 
question for future PES buyers in Lebanon is whether they are willing to invest in many 
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agents with smaller parcels, or would they prefer targeting landowners with relatively large 
holdings willing to enrol substantial areas. The latter might reduce transaction costs and 
improve contiguity of habitat, but may also increase opportunity costs, as well as increasing 
agricultural displacement. It is also likely that landowners with relatively larger holdings are 
limited in numbers, and their capacity for effective land management could also be much 
lower than more active farmers. Farmers focus on short-term opportunity costs and expected 
revenues from their holdings, while reforestation schemes require much longer contract terms 
to ensure additionality. Given that Lebanon’s agricultural export sector is largely restricted to 
Arab-speaking nations in the MENA region, some of their more profitable markets have been 
lost to political crises (e.g. Syria, Libya and Egypt). My fieldwork took place during a period 
of economic hardship for many apple growers in Lebanon given these volatile circumstances 
in the region. In retrospect, responses to reforestation incentives could therefore change with 
fewer landowners showing interest if the market for agricultural products gains ground in the 
future.  
6.1.3 Impacts of Reforestation on Biodiversity 
The lack of institutional mechanisms for enhancing native tree diversity can also have 
negative repercussions for biodiversity and the resilience of ecosystems to deal with a 
changing climate. While attention to biodiversity and ecosystem services has focused largely 
on the tropics, sustainable land-use practices (including with re/afforestation) are also needed 
around the biodiversity ‘hotspot’ region of the Mediterranean basin (Blondel et al. 2010; 
Mittermeier et al. 2011; Caparrós et al. 2011). Moreover, protected areas alone provide little 
insurance for biodiversity conservation as isolated island (or fragmented) habitats vulnerable 
to edge effects (Dewi et al. 2013). They also restrict the natural range of species (particularly 
large mammals), thus impacting the flow of genetic diversity. In turn, protected areas do little 
for biodiversity-rich forests around their periphery that are liable to becoming agricultural or 
timber concessions (Margules and Pressey 2000; Wilson et al. 2007; Gibbs et al. 2010).  
As incentive-based mechanisms like PES are being implemented globally, questions remain 
about the long-term viability of schemes, particularly asset-building. Other important 
questions pertain to the objectives of future PES buyers, some which have been already 
mentioned. For instance, would buyers be happy with investing in a multifunctional 
landscape matrix with fragmented reforestation on marginal lands, or would they prefer 
contiguous forests (perhaps at a higher cost)? There are also important trade-offs to address, 
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particularly for policymakers deciding what services are in demand, how much they are going 
to cost (transaction and opportunity costs), and what guarantees are in place to ensure that 
they are getting what is being paid for (conditionality). All these factors remind us that it is 
important to recognise heterogeneity of stakeholders, from policymakers to buyers and 
suppliers. 
6.2 Heterogeneity of Stakeholders 
Stakeholders in my study ranged from local authorities, members of the public and private 
sector reforestation agencies, researchers, policymakers, and landowners. Designing effective 
PES schemes requires identifying the constraints on reforestation with these stakeholders in 
mind. A key strategy for accomplishing this is to recognise that stakeholders are all very 
different in their preferences, objectives, risk behaviour, and attitudes towards the 
environment or other public goods (Kenter et al. 2015).  
Recognising and making sense of preference heterogeneity is also one of the key objectives 
in many stated preferences studies on PES and related incentive-based mechanisms 
(Colombo et al. 2009; Reed et al. 2014). Choice experiments are widely employed as a 
technique for identifying unobserved preference heterogeneity by analysing how people make 
choices (or trade-offs) when presented with alternatives. While it is not uncommon to expect 
that most ES suppliers are likely to be profit maximisers, recognising that some are not is 
crucial for targeting the right payments to the right suppliers (Ruto and Garrod 2009; 
Espinosa-Goded et al. 2010). For example, my choice experiment design enabled me to 
identify a small portion of landowners willing to participate in biodiverse reforestation 
schemes with few private benefits at lower payment levels than the productive stone pine 
option (chapter 5). While it is also likely that these individuals are less farm-dependent and 
have more unused land of low agricultural potential, there were landowners who were not 
farmers with relatively large holdings that either preferred stone pine or not joining such 
schemes altogether. Similarly, there were also a few modest farmers whose livelihoods were 
largely farm-based who were keen on reforesting with mixed species, despite being offered 
higher payment levels for stone pine. 
I also found heterogeneity amongst municipal stakeholders’ in how responsive or accepting 
they were of reforestation initiatives, particularly with respect to how decisions are made and 
with whom they would prefer to partner. Evidence of preference heterogeneity was found 
amongst another important group of stakeholders; ones who are likely to develop and 
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implement PES programmes in the future (chapter 4). Considerable preference heterogeneity 
between stakeholders with different professional foci, including within-group variability, 
highlights the importance of soliciting preferences from multiple stakeholders when selecting 
species to be used in reforestation efforts. Future research will need to explore what trade-
offs PES buyers wish to make between biodiversity and other ecosystem services – i.e. to 
estimate the indifference curves illustrated in chapter 5, and to gauge marginal willingness-
to-pay estimates. Eliciting reforestation preferences would also have to go beyond decision-
making stakeholders and include a wider spectrum of the Lebanese public. A preferable 
means of estimating the environmental benefits and the trade-offs they entail would be to 
employ choice experiments (Kallas et al. 2007; Brey et al. 2007). Given the likelihood that 
there would be considerable preference heterogeneity amongst various potential ‘buyers’, it 
would be necessary to employ a more complex design (e.g. more attributes and levels) that 
offers many different reforestation options at different prices. In turn, this would also require 
corresponding with a greater number of respondents. 
6.3 Reforestation Trade-Offs in Lebanon 
Present and past reforestation decisions have been largely made with single objectives in 
mind. Lebanese cedar (Cedrus libani) and stone pine (Pinus pinea) were the main forest 
species used in past reforestation efforts on public and municipal lands (including protected 
areas) and continue to be today. Increasing forest cover from the current 13% to 20% is still 
the main objective of the MOA and MOE, and with virtually all taking place on public / 
municipal lands. But preferences are beginning to change amongst some key reforestation 
stakeholders (both public and private sector) who are being guided by research and 
experiences taking place both in Lebanon and abroad. Given that the costs (both fixed and 
variable) of reforestation are high, single objectives could potentially lead to a significant 
waste of resources: although chapter 5 demonstrated that there are trade-offs between 
reforestation objectives, it also found synergies. Increasing the diversity of reforestation from 
the current low level is likely to require modest trade-offs (Figure 6.1) and might help ensure 
more resilient forest ecosystems. Recognising these trade-offs will require targeting a wide 
variety of potential suppliers who are more likely to provide these services over longer time 
frames. Recognising landowner heterogeneity, and designing PES accordingly permits buyers 
to target a wider variety of ES producers for a given budget, thus allowing the (future) 
production possibility frontier of planned reforestation to be pushed outwards (Figure 6.1).  
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Figure 6.1. Inner production possibility frontier (PPF) highlights past and present reforestation in 
Lebanon geared toward single objectives / ecosystem services (forest extent) illustrated by the 
indifference curve; future PPF (outer curve) with multiple objective indifference curves would result 
in trade-offs between tree diversity and forest cover in reforestation incentives. 
 
6.4 Reflections – Success, Limitations, and Recommendations 
Landowners I interviewed appeared genuinely honest in their responses, which is indicative 
that face-to-face interviews, or surveys with supplementary qualitative methods, help validate 
environmental valuation studies as addressed elsewhere (Arriagada et al. 2009; Entenmann 
and Schmitt 2013). For example, when asking landowners (particularly farmers) who would 
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not even consider the highest payment level offered for mixed species why they would still 
opt to plant stone pine at the lowest payment, many simply said “money is not an issue”146 
(chapter 5). This suggests there are other factors affecting certain landowners’ decisions, 
perhaps the intrinsic nature of farming behaviour, often overlooked in policies aimed at 
environmental improvements (Duesberg et al. 2013; Wynne-Jones 2013a). Hence there are 
potential instances where PES can become a perverse incentive or crowd out other 
institutions and pro-environmental behaviours as discussed in chapter 2.  
6.4.1 Critical Reflections on the Limitations of the Study 
There were some key methodological limitations in my research that need clarification. One 
was the use of a trained field assistant for conducting semi-structured interviews as opposed 
to a translator (chapter 2), and the other was the impact of the order of which reforestation 
schemes were presented to respondents (chapter 3).  
In the semi-structured interviews conducted for the study in chapter 2, I hired two field 
assistants to conduct the interviews. My field assistants were selected based on the strengths 
of English and Arabic (both written and spoken), their experience in social studies interviews, 
and their capacity to translate Arabic to English text efficiently. We conducted extensive 
pilots, beginning in-house (with colleagues at AUB-NCC) and in the field. One of the 
limitations of this research was the decision to conduct interviews through a trained field 
assistant as opposed to me conducting interviews through a translator. This decision was 
chosen based on the assumption that it was a more efficient means of conducting interviews, 
particularly since initial telephone calls using standardised scripts were made by my field 
assistants. My ability to follow the Arabic interviews enabled me to ask my field assistants to 
make clarifications (or translations) in English, which allowed me to ask certain follow-up 
questions where appropriate (that was then translated by my assistants). The use of a 
translator as an interview medium may have enabled me to ask more in-depth probing 
questions, which would have resulted in more detailed explanation of underlying constraints 
or weaknesses informants face with respect to reforestation. However, there were 
opportunities where I asked follow-up questions in a number of interviews, and the majority 
of our informants provided us with sufficient responses for this study using this approach. 
                                                 
146 In contrast, when asked how much more he would expect to be paid to change from the stone pine option to 
the mixed native species one, one respondent (who was not even a full-time farmer) replied that he would 
require a minimum of US$100,000 per hectare annually. 
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While the majority of those interviewed were generous in sharing information, there were a 
few who were reluctant to give details for reasons unknown. It may have been possible to 
probe further, which I had done in a few cases early on. I realised this was neither appropriate 
nor ethical after I was prompted by my field assistant that we should stop interviewing. This 
reminds us that there are ethical considerations that are often overlooked when trying to meet 
research objectives with limited funds and time that place researchers and their respondents 
in difficult and uncomfortable situations. This is particularly true when dealing with sensitive 
questions that could unravel complex issues that are political or socially-embedded. In 
addition, the AUB’s institutional review board (IRB) required that all questionnaires be 
reviewed and all researchers and their assistants to complete an exam after undertaking an 
online course before fieldwork can even begin (and this included piloting of 
questionnaires/surveys). 
In chapter 3, the order the schemes were presented to respondents in the consecutive order for 
the purpose of gauging their acceptability by starting with the most plausible (or least 
‘giveaway’) option, and building towards the least familiar (and most plausible) option. They 
were not, therefore, intended to test the effect of randomisation. I believe this was the best 
way to explain the options (or schemes) and further elaborated using follow-up questions to 
gauge their perceptions to these hypothetical scenarios. The objective in using this ordered 
rather than randomised method of presenting schemes was to investigate whether 
respondents’ acceptability differed substantially from a higher risk scheme (results-based 
loan) to a risk-neutral scheme (action-based grant), and whether there was a substantial 
difference in uptake / land enrolment when presented with a scheme characteristic of 
additional benefits with equal risk (i.e. results-based payments) to a results-based loan. The 
results suggest that the majority (n=21) of respondents would be interested in any of the 
schemes as potential adopters and gave reasons as why. Eight of those chose to enrol the 
same amount for all three schemes, seemingly disregarding risks and benefits of each (or 
perhaps this was the maximum potential area they would be willing to plant). There were five 
respondents who would not participate in any of the schemes and gave reasons for not 
accepting (e.g. lack of land, don’t like native species, don’t trust these schemes, simply not 
interested, etc.). Finally, there were some that viewed advantages increasing incrementally 
from the ordered schemes, and there were a few that did not fit in (asymmetric attitudes to 
risks and benefits). It is quite possible that some respondents may not have fully grasped the 
concepts of the schemes or may have varying attitudes to risks or uncertainties they are 
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unfamiliar with. Further research could explore a randomised approach using similar schemes 
and asking respondents to rate them accordingly. However, this research focussed on more 
qualitative responses to support our understanding of landowner attitudes to risks and reward.  
6.4.2 Recommendations for Research and Policy Improvements 
There is a strong need for more adaptive forest management practices and policy reforms in 
Lebanon (chapter 2), particularly with respect to laws that counter effective management 
while discouraging reforestation, on both private and non-private lands. Managing existing 
forests are crucial for reducing fires while maintaining biomass accumulation, and possibly 
more cost-effective than re/afforestation, especially in regions with high natural regeneration 
capacity. For instance, De las Heras et al. (2013) found that silvicultural treatment (e.g. 
thinning to encourage productivity) of native Aleppo pine forests in Spain helps increase 
carbon uptake. In addition, re/afforestation (or natural regeneration) on abandoned farms has 
also been shown to increase biomass more efficiently relative to native forest and woodland 
systems (García Morote et al. 2012). Empirical data on the carbon sequestration potential of 
Lebanese forests and tree species is another potential area for future research. In Turkey, for 
example, Evrendilek et al. (2006) found Mediterranean coniferous forests to be significant 
carbon sinks. In another example, Gratani et al. (2013) quantified the carbon sequestration of 
high-density Mediterranean shrubland ecosystems (maquis) in Italy on average at 22 Mg C 
ha−1 year−1 and approximated the market value of carbon at around US$500 ha−1 year−1. This 
suggest that Mediterranean-type ecosystems also have potential for entering carbon markets, 
and therefore allometric data on Lebanese forest, woodland and shrub communities would be 
useful. Moreover, increasing our understanding of the costs and benefits of regulating 
services (e.g. carbon and watershed services) are critical in regions that are highly vulnerable 
to climate change and desertification (Grünzweig et al. 2007; Correia et al. 2010). 
There are, however, social and ecological constraints that would affect the probability of 
carbon being traded through the private sector in Lebanon. Aside from the biogeoclimatic 
characteristics affecting the productivity of forest carbon in the country, an overarching 
constraint in carbon-based PES contracts with Lebanese landowners include the increasing 
cost of real estate, driven both by touristic development and fluctuating agricultural interests. 
This is especially true in more developed parts of the Mt Lebanon region. While there are 
exceptions to this, particularly farmers from economically marginalised parts of Mt Lebanon 
range (e.g. Akkar and Dinniyeh), these areas contain some of the largest expanses of forests 
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in the country and therefore could not support extensive reforestation efforts (chapter 2). 
Generally speaking, carbon-focussed re/afforestation contracts with private landowners 
would not be as cost-effective for buyers as those targeting landowners (with much larger 
landholdings) from much lower income tropical countries.  
In contrast, further research is needed to determine WTPs for a variety of ecosystem services, 
including soil and water conservation (and other mitigating strategies from restoration in 
general, especially in the context of increasing desertification), watershed maintenance, 
fuelwood and NTFPs, functional (e.g. windbreak and air-filtering services from trees) and 
aesthetic values of landscapes, as well as biodiversity (including cultural and supporting 
services). People’s perceptions of forests also have important implications for the design of 
reforestation initiatives. Results from chapter 5 can be used to design a multi-attribute choice 
experiment to elicit preferences for different kinds of reforestation schemes in Lebanon. This 
would include gauging people’s perceptions to different kinds of ecosystem services 
generated from increasing forest cover. For example, in eliciting visitors’ stated preference 
for scenic values on reforestation, Caparrós et al. (2010) found that visitors preferred scenic 
values from cork-oak reforestation areas over that of eucalypts. The latter showed a much 
higher rate of carbon uptake based on the increase of forest surface area to that of the former. 
This case-study showed there were strong trade-offs in landscape preferences as one type of 
ecosystem services (e.g. cultural) over that of the more globally significant carbon 
sequestration (e.g. regulating). In our example, using carbon as a proxy ES may have been 
possible if eucalypts or other fast-growing trees were included in reforestation.  
While genetically-modified eucalypts have been shown to sequester significant amounts of 
carbon even in drier climates, their extent as monocultures can have severe impacts on 
biodiversity and other ES (Boyd 2010; Shekhawat et al. 2014). Moreover, there are potential 
pitfalls with using forest cover (or extent) as a proxy for measuring a range of ES. Using 
reforested area as a proxy under PES contracts can potentially lead to perverse incentives. For 
example, if the area planted with trees were only used, this could incentivise the 
monocropping of productive (or valuable) species as opposed to a mixture of native species 
that are beneficial for biodiversity. Alpízar et al. (2007) elaborated on these concerns with 
respect to Costa Rica’s national PES programme (Pagos por Servicios Ambientales): 
... The Costa Rican national initiative—probably the world’s most famous PES 
program—uses a simple proxy: whether a parcel is forested or not. The proxy does 
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not take into account variation in the levels of ecosystem services that forested plots 
provide due to the number and type of trees present, proximity to surface and to 
ground water, or slope. Such blunt proxies can be inefficient. Land managers in Costa 
Rica receive the same payments for a hectare planted with commercial teak as for one 
planted with native species. However, by definition, teak plantations harbor less 
biodiversity. In addition, it can actually contribute to soil erosion rather than 
preventing it because teak’s large leaves tend to concentrate rain droplets into more 
disruptive streams. The Costa Rican program would get more “bang for the buck” if 
it used a proxy that distinguished between types of forests. (22) 
While the extent of forested area may enhance biodiversity as well as a number of other ES, 
the relevant question here is whether participants should be paid the same amount regardless 
of which species and their associated mixes are used in reforestation. 
An important revelation for me, synthesised through my own empirical research and 
theoretical comprehension of PES, was that there are limitations and potential setbacks 
relating to single objectives. Ultimately, I see PES as a policy option, one that can only work 
properly if developed to become a genuinely flexible market-based instrument, and not 
treated as a panacea. The idea of designing PES as a policy option means that it would serve 
as an alternative type (or possibility) of production, where demand would incentivise supply, 
as we would see under any free market institution. As challenging as this will be, PES should 
be designed with multiple objectives in mind to attract heterogeneous suppliers willing to 
render those services effectively, and heterogeneous buyers willing to pay for (or invest in) 
those services. Since opportunity costs are expectedly higher on some types of land (e.g. 
orchards), keeping payments low will help to avoid agricultural displacement. There may be 
some potential suppliers that are willing to plant and care for rarer native tree species, 
perhaps ones that are difficult to produce in nurseries, assuming that some potential buyers 
are willing to make higher premiums. Others may be willing to plant only productive trees at 
much lower costs. Within these extremes, I predict we would find a much larger and diverse 
group of potential suppliers willing to accept a flexible scheme tailored to meet their 
expectations, thus minimising overall trade-offs. Accounted for together, I could foresee the 
possibilities of many different kinds of people being paid for producing multiple 
environmental goods and services. Recognising this heterogeneity and acknowledging the 
need for encouraging multiple objectives in reforestation or other asset-building incentive 
schemes will help raise our understandings of how to better govern complex and dynamic 
social-ecological systems. 
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Appendix 1.1. Matrix of Lebanon’s Key Reforestation Stakeholders 
Organisation/Institution Activities 
Year 
Est. 
Local Partners* 
Int'l 
Partners* 
Public Sector     
Ministry of Environment 
(MOE) 
National 
Reforestation 
Plan 
1993 AFDC UN-GEF 
     
Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) National 
Forest 
Programme 
1948 LU¹, AFDC, JL FAO, Sylva 
Med 
 
 
   
Private Sector     
Association for Forests, 
Development & Conservation 
(AFDC) 
Nationwide 
forestation 
1993 MOE, MOA, LRI, 
APJM, SCR 
IUCN, USFS 
     
Lebanese Reforestation 
Initiative (LRI) 
Nationwide 
forestation 
2010 AFDC, JL, APJM, 
CFC, NCC, RL, 
NCC 
USFS/IP2 
     
Jouzour Loubnan (JL) Nationwide 
forestation 
2007 MOA, MOE, LRI n/k 
     
Shouf Cedar Reserve & Society 
(SCR) 
District-level 
reforestation 
1996 MOE, AFDC, 
APJM, EFL 
IUCN, 
WWF, UN-
GEF 
     
Association for the Protection 
of Jabal Moussa (APJM) 
District-level 
reforestation 
2007 MOE, LRI IUCN, UN-
GEF 
     
Cedar Friends Committee 
(CFC) 
Village-level 
reforestation 
1985 LRI n/k 
     
TERRE Liban (TL) Village-level 
reforestation 
1995 -- UN-GEF 
     
Reforest Lebanon (RL) Village-level 
reforestation 
2010 LRI n/k 
     
Rotary Club of Baabda  - 
Trees4Lebanon (T4L) 
Regional tree 
planting 
2008 -- n/k 
     
Nature Conservation Center of 
AUB (NCC)  
Specialised 
tree planting 
2002 LRI USFS2 
* Forestry-related sector   ¹ Lebanese University 2US Forest 
Service /Int’l 
Programs 
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Appendix 2.1a 
Institutional Review Board: Protocol# FAFS.ST.05 
 
Recruitment Phone Script for Heads of Municipalities: 
Good day Mr. [Name], 
I am calling you on behalf of Mr Arbi Sarkissian, a PhD research student with Bangor 
University (UK) and the American University of Beirut. I am his fieldwork assistant, 
(Mohamad or Paul) and I am assisting Mr Sarkissian on a study about land use and natural 
resource management throughout Lebanon. We obtained your number from a public 
directory (e.g. OMSAR website, Ministry of Interiors and Municipalities website, or other*).  
[*contact number provided by person ‘x’ at the municipality HQ] 
We are contacting you today because your municipality was randomly selected for this 
study. We would like to ask if you would be interested in participating in this study and to 
share some of your experience and insights with us.  
This study is intended to help us gain a better understanding of challenges and 
opportunities involved in managing natural resources.  
[Provide mayor with more info if asked, e.g. objective of this study] 
We’d like to assure you that your participation in this study is completely voluntary. Please 
note that your decision to decline in participating will not affect you or your municipality in 
any way. Also, there are no foreseeable risks to you or to your municipality for your 
participation, and all information you provide will remain strictly confidential and used only 
for the purpose of scientific research.  
If you wish to participate with us, may I proceed to set a date and time for the interview as 
per your convenience? We would be more than happy to meet you at your village or 
another suitable location. I will call you one day prior to the interview date to confirm. 
I thank you for the time you have dedicated to this call. 
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Appendix 2.1b 
Consent for Participation in a Research Study 
Institutions and natural resource management: Exploring payments for ecosystem services 
(PES) to support decentralized community-integrated native tree planting in Lebanon 
Investigators:   Mr. Arbi Sarkissian – Thesis Student (TS) 
Dr. Salma Talhouk – Principal Investigator (PI)  
Co-investigators:  Drs. Neal Hockley & Amin Kamete (thesis advisors – Bangor 
University, UK) 
Fieldwork assistant: Mr. Edward Antoun and Ms. Marieange Saady 
Contact Details of Principal Investigator: 
Address   American University of Beirut 
   Bliss Street 
   Beirut, Lebanon 
Telephone:   01-350 000 Ext 4508 (AUB) 
Study sites:  Municipalities – public and private (or communal) land where 
seedlings are being planted and managed 
We would like your consent to participate in this doctoral (PhD) research project. 
Please take the time to read the information below before deciding whether you wish to 
participate in this study or not. We thank you for your interest and look forward to your 
participation. 
Description of the study and its objectives 
This study aims to address the various social, environmental and economic challenges 
and opportunities in managing natural resources in Lebanon with a special focus on 
tree planting. We have identified over 200 villages with municipal councils that are 
within ecologically important areas in three regions of Lebanon (North, Mt Lebanon, 
and South). Of these villages, we have randomly selected 50-60 to serve as a 
representative sample for Lebanon. We aim to conduct up to 60 interviews with heads 
of municipalities in the course of this study. 
We have prepared a set of basic questions about your municipality and community, 
along with some technical questions regarding trees, property, and management 
methods. With your permission, my fieldwork assistant will be conducting a one-hour 
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audio-recorded interview with you. Once the interview is finished, the recordings will 
be immediately transcribed and translated by him in order for the Investigators to 
analyze the data. The recordings will be coded to conceal identities and maintain 
confidentiality. Once the audio files have been transcribed and translated, they will be 
permanently deleted. Only the Thesis Student, fieldwork assistant, Principal 
Investigator and co-investigators will have access to the data. We will be happy to 
provide you with the results once the study has been completed.  
What is the benefit of participating in this study? 
There are a number of direct and indirect benefits we expect that will emerge from this 
study. Information on the cost-effectiveness of tree planting and natural resource 
management will be provided to the participants of the study and made available to 
researchers and practitioners. We also hope that the findings will enable us to develop 
new strategies for managing natural resources and improve the environment for future 
generations.   
What risks or discomfort might be experienced through participation in this 
study? 
Your participation in this study will not involve any risks beyond those you face on a 
daily basis.  
What are my rights? 
You are entitled to taking enough time to decide whether or not you wish to participate 
in this study. Your participation is completely voluntary, you may discontinue 
participation at any time, and your refusal to participate will not reflect negatively on 
you in any way. If you choose to discontinue participating in the study at any point, any 
information obtained up to that point will be deleted in your presence. You have the 
right to skip answering any question during the interview just by saying “skip.” A copy 
of this consent document will be provided to you for your records. Please feel free to ask 
me any questions you may have regarding this study. 
Please indicate whether or not you are willing to participate in future research activities 
and give permission for us to contact you: [ Yes ] / [ No ] 
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Statement by investigator: 
I have explained to the participant the study in detail including the proceedings and any 
disadvantages. I have answered all questions clearly to the best of my abilities.  
 
__________________________   _____________________ 
Name of researcher/representative   Signature of researcher or 
representative 
__________________________   _____________________ 
Date 
Consent of participant 
I have read this letter of consent and understood its content. All my questions have been 
answered. Accordingly, I hereby agree to participate in this study, and I understand that 
the Principal Investigator and co-investigators mentioned above will stand ready to 
answer my questions, and that I may contact the Principal Investigator at 01-350000 
ext: 4508. If my questions have not been answered, I can contact the University’s 
Institutional Review Board to discuss my rights on 01-350000 ext: 5445.  I understand 
fully that I am free to withdraw from this study at any time and this will not affect me in 
any manner. 
I, the undersigned, agree to participate in the study: 
___________________________        
Name of participant  Signature of participant/ representative 
___________________________   _________________________ 
Date  
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Appendix 3.1 
Call to Participate in Research Study 
American University of Beirut – Lebanon 
Bangor University, Wales – United Kingdom 
We would like to invite you to participate in survey for a doctoral thesis project. 
The main objective of this thesis project is to determine what incentives would 
encourage land managers to plant a diverse array of native trees and shrubs on 
their property. Our aim is to assess the risks and benefits of planting and 
conserving native species on both public and private lands. 
Research Objective 
Exploring incentives for natural resource management and alternative 
land-use strategies in Lebanon 
Who is eligible? 
Landowners with at least 1,000 m2 of unbuilt property who are sole decision-
makers of their holdings 
What your participation will entail? 
A maximum 1-hour anonymous survey that will entail 
o Open- & closed-ended questions on basic land management, such 
as types of crops being grown 
o Discussing the potential of different reforestation schemes on 
private lands as one land-use option 
Contact Information of Researchers: 
- Mr Arbi Sarkissian (doctoral student): 03/ 024 967 
o Email: arbi.sarkissian27@gmail.com 
- Mr Edward Antoun (fieldwork assistant): 71/ 203 803 
o Email: edantoun@gmail.com  
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Scientific Name Family English Common Name 
Arabic Common 
Name
Elevation 
 (range)
Height 
(aver)
Habitat
Abies cilicica (Antoine & Kotschy) Carrière Pinaceae               Cilician fir يكرت بونت 1500-1800 30-40m Dry
Acer hermoneum (Bornm.) Schwer. Aceraceae Mt. Hermon maple نومرح بقيق 1000-1500 < 3m Dry
Acer hyrcanum Fischer & C.A. Meyer ssp. tauricola  (Boiss. & Balansa) Aceraceae Taurus maple يسورط بقيق 1500-1800 5-10m Dry
Acer monspessulanum L. ssp. microphyllum (Boiss.) Bornm  Aceraceae Montpellier maple يدروك بقيق 1000-1500 10-15m Dry
Acer obtusifolium Sibth. & Sm. Aceraceae Syrian Maple يروس بقيق 0-1000 5-10m Dry
Alnus orientalis Decne. Betulaceae Oriental alder تغن 0-1200 5-10m Wet
Arbutus andrachne L. Ericaceae Strawberry tree بلطقلا 500-1200 5-10m Dry
Cedrus libani Rich. Pinaceae               Lebanese Cedar نانبل زرأ 1200-2000 30-40m Dry
Celtis australis L. Ulmaceae Mediterranean hackberry سيم 0-1000 20-25m Dry
Ceratonia siliqua  L. Leguminosae Carob بونرخلا 0-800 5-10m Both
Cercis siliquastrum L. Leguminosae Redbud/Judas tree سسرس قيرزمز 0-1200 5-10m Both
Crataegus azarolus L. (yellow) Rosaceae Mediterranean azarole رفصلأا رورعزلا 500-1500 5-10m Dry
Crataegus monogyna  Jacq. (red) Rosaceae Whitethorn رمحأ رورعز 500-1500 5-15m Dry
Cupressus sempervirens  L. ‡ Cupressaceae Mediterranean Cyprus يدومعلا ورسلا 0-1500 25-35m Dry
Ficus carica L. Moraceae Common fig نيت 0-1500 < 5m Dry
Fraxinus angustifolia  (Vahl.) ssp. syriaca (Boiss.) Yalt. Oleaceae Syrian ash يزاقوقلا رادردلا 0-1500 20-30m Wet
Fraxinus excelsior  L. Oleaceae European ash قسابلا رادردلا 500-1200 25-35m Dry
Fraxinus ornus L. Oleaceae Manna ash رهزملا رادردلا 1000-1200 15-25m Both
Juniperus drupacea  (Labill.) Cupressaceae Drupe-bearing arceuthos يروسلا ررعلا 1200-1800 10-20m Dry
Juniperus excelsa M. Bieb. Cupressaceae Greek juniper باّزل 1000-2200 10-20m Dry
Juniperus foetidissima Willd. Cupressaceae Fetid juniper ةحئارلا هيرك رعرعلا 1200-2200 15-25m Dry
Juniperus oxycedrus  L. Cupressaceae Prickly juniper رعرع 500-1800 10-15m Dry
Laurus nobilis L. Lauraceae Bay Laurel راغ 0-1200 10-15m Wet
Malus trilobata (Poir.) C.K. Schneid. Rosaceae   Three-lobed apple يرب حافت 1200-1500 10-15m Dry
Myrtus communis L. Myrtaceae Myrtle  ناحيرلا وأ سلآا بح 0-1000 < 1m Both
Ostrya carpinifolia Scop. Corylaceae Hop-hornbeam ناّرم 1200-1800 15-25 Dry
Phillyrea latifolia L. var. media  (L.) C. K. Schneid. Oleaceae Phillyrea دورز 0-800 5-10m Dry
Pinus brutia  Ten. Pinaceae Calabrian pine يكرت ربونص 500-1800 20-35m Dry
Pinus halepensis Mill. Pinaceae Allepo pine يبلح ربونص 0-500 10-15m Dry
Pinus pinea L. Pinaceae Stonepine رمثم ربونص 0-1200 15-25m Dry
Pistacia atlantica Boiss. ‡ Anacardiaceae Betoum يسلطا مطب 1200-1800 5-10m Dry
Pistacia lentiscus L. Anacardiaceae Mastic مطب 0-500 < 3m Dry
Pistacia terebinthus  L. Anacardiaceae Terebinth ينيطسلف مطب 0-1200 5-10m Dry
Pistacia terebinthus  L. ssp. palaestina (Boiss.) Engler Anacardiaceae Palestine pistachio يكلعلا مطب 0-1200 5-10m Dry
Platanus orientalis L. Platanaceae Oriental plane بلد 0-1500 20-30m Both
Populus bolleana Lauche Salicaceae White poplar ضيبأ روح 1000-1500 20-30m Both
Prunus arabica (Olivier) Meikle ‡ Rosaceae Plum-like Spanish broom لازولا يبش زول 500-1200 < 3m Dry
Prunus argentea (Lam.) Rehder ‡ Rosaceae Oriental almond يقرش زول 1200-1500 < 3m Dry
Prunus cocomilia  Ten. ‡ Rosaceae Bear Plum قورقرب 1000-1500 5-10m Dry
Prunus dulcis (Mill.) D.A. Webb. Rosaceae Common almond رم زول 500-1500 5-10m Dry
Prunus korshinskyi (Hand.-Mazz.) Bornm. Rosaceae Korschinsky's almond  يكسنشرك زول 1000-1200 < 3m Dry
Prunus mahaleb L. Rosaceae Mahaleb cherry بلحم 1500-1800 < 3m Dry
Prunus microcarpa C.A. Meyer ‡ Rosaceae Small-fruited cherry رامثلا ريغص زرك 500-1500 < 3m Dry
Prunus prostrata  Labill. Rosaceae Wild cherry يقلتسم خوخ 1500-1800 < 1m Dry
Prunus tortuosa (Boiss & Hausskn.) Aitch. & Hemsl. ‡ Rosaceae Tortuous cherry جرعتم زرك 500-1500 < 3m Dry
Pyrus syriaca  Boiss. Rosaceae Syrian Pear يروس صاجإ 1000-1500 5-10m Dry
Quercus brantii subsp look (Kotschy) Mouterde ‡ Fagaceae Mt. Tabor oak يناريإ طولب 1200-1800 5-10m Dry
Quercus cedrorum Kotschy ‡ Fagaceae Cedar oak زرلأا طولب 1500-2000 10-15m Dry
Quercus cerris  L. ‡ Fagaceae Turkey oak يرعشلا طولبلا وأ رذعلا 500-1800 25-35m Dry
Quercus coccifera  L.‡ Fagaceae    Kermes oak نايدنس 0-1200 5-25m Dry
Quercus infectoria  Olivier Fagaceae Cyprus or Aleppo oak ىصفعلا طولب وأ لوللم 0-1500 5-10m Dry
Quercus ithaburensis  Decaisne Fagaceae    Tabor oak روباط طولب 1000-1500 10-15m Dry
Quercus libani G.Olivier Fagaceae Mount Lebanon oak  ينانبل طولب 1000-1500 10-20m Dry
Quercus pinnatifida C.C.Gmelin ‡ Fagaceae Downy/Pubescent oak يشير طولب 1200-1800 < 5m Dry
Rhus coriaria L. Anacardiaceae Tanner's sumach قامس 0-1500 < 3m Dry
Salix libani Bornm. Salicaceae Lebanese willow   ينانبل فاصفص 0-1000 < 3m Wet
Sorbus flabellifolia (Spach) Schneider Rosaceae Fan-leaved service tree قرولا ةيحورم ةريبغ 1200-1800 < 5m Dry
Sorbus torminalis (L.) Crantz. Rosaceae Wild service tree ةريبغ 1200-1800 5-10m Dry
Styrax officinalis  L. Styracaceae Storax زوح وأ نابل 0-1500 < 5m Dry
‡ Contains basionym(s)
Note: coastal and lowland species (< 500 m) are not included in this list
Other species mentioned in references (e.g. basionyms)
Cupressus sempervirens var horizontalis
Pistacia mutica Fisch. & Mey.
Prunus spartioides (Spach.) Shneid.
Amygdalus orientalis Mill.
Prunus ursina Ky.
Prunus microcarpa C.A.Meyer subsp. Tortuosa
Prunus microcarpa C.A. Meyer
Quercus ithaburensis Decaisne
Quercus petraea subsp pinnatiloba (K.Koch) Menitsky
Quercus pseudocerris Boiss.
Quercus coccifera subsp calliprinos (Webb.) Menitsky or Holmboe
Quercus pubescens subsp crispata (Steven) Greuter & Burdet
Native Trees of Lebanon - AUB-NCC Species Database
Appendix 3.2. List of native trees and shrubs obtained from the AUB-NCC database 
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Appendix 3.3 
PES Survey – General understandings of respondents’ current or previous experience 
with tree planting 
Section 1 
Preamble 1 
We are conducting a study on tree planting efforts in Lebanon. In this phase of our study, we 
are conducting land-use surveys to know more about tree planting taking place on private 
lands.  
1) Have you done any tree planting (of any kind) on your property? [Y]/[N] – (If no, jump to 
Q7) – if yes, then: 
a) When did you last plant trees (EA to write year & season): __________/___________ 
b) Where have you planted these trees (EA to tick below and note the exact plot referred 
if there are many):____________________________________________________ 
i) In cultivated farmlands, e.g. terraced orchards (fruit, olive, stone pine) 
(1) Intermixed with crops 
(2) Along borders/margins 
(3) As woodlots (small batches) 
ii) In previously abandoned farmlands 
iii) In range/scrublands, e.g. jurd or rocky slopes/outcrops 
iv) In forests or woodlands, e.g. recently burned  
v) Along roadsides  
vi) Near residence  
vii) Other:______________________________________________________________ 
c) What kinds of trees did you plant, their approximate numbers, and approximate 
coverage (such as % of area) – see plot map in appendix: 
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Table of tree species – trees planted 
Q1c Species Numbers Coverage (%) 
Fruit 
1 Apple     
2 Citrus     
3 Stone fruits     
4 Avocado     
5 Pomegranate     
6 Other:     
Nut 
7 Stone pine     
8 Walnut     
9 Almond     
10 Chestnut     
11 Other:     
Oil/fruit 12 Olive     
Forest 
13 Cedar     
14 Cypress     
15 Poplar     
16 Oak     
17 Fir     
18 Melia     
19 Eucalyptus     
20 Other: 
   
2) Did you face any problems with the planting or management of the trees? [Y]/[N] – if 
yes, please explain (EA to tick any that apply): 
a) Difficulty in planting, e.g. rocky soils  
b) Difficulty in getting seedlings  
c) Difficulty in watering  
d) Poor survival due to pests, drought, poor seedlings, etc. 
e) Other:________________________________________________________________ 
 
3) Would you say that your efforts were successful? [Y]/[N] – Please explain (EA to tick 
any that apply and add details)  
a) High survival (%): ________________________________________________ 
b) High yield (e.g. fruit/nuts):__________________________________________ 
c) High growth rate: _________________________________________________ 
d) Other:_______________________________________________________________ 
 
4) Why did you plant these trees? 
a) Market the products, i.e. income  
b) Self-consumption, including wood products 
c) Erosion control 
d) Windbreak  
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e) Landscape beauty 
f) Healthy environment, e.g. clean air 
g) Likes to plant trees 
h) Other:________________________________________________________________ 
 
5) Did you get support or services from somewhere to help you plant these trees, either 
organizations or individuals? [Y]/[N] – if so, please provide details: 
a) Agricultural coop:__________________________________________________ 
b) MOA:___________________________________________________________ 
c) NGOs:___________________________________________________________ 
d) Agricultural expert:_________________________________________________ 
e) Municipality 
f) Family members 
g) Community 
h) Other:________________________________________________________________ 
 
6) Do you have plans to do any more of this or any other kind of tree planting? [Y]/[N]/[Not 
sure] – (if no, jump to Q7) – if yes, then: 
a) Where would you plant more trees? 
i) In cultivated farmlands, e.g. terraced orchards (fruit, olive, stone pine) 
(1) Intermixed with crops 
(2) Along borders/margins 
(3) As woodlots (small batches) 
ii) In previously abandoned farmlands 
iii) In range/scrublands, e.g. jurd or rocky slopes/outcrops 
iv) In forests or woodlands, e.g. recently burned  
v) Along roadsides  
vi) Near residence  
vii) Other:______________________________________________________________ 
b) What kinds of trees would you like to plant, how many of each and how much 
coverage [refer to map of original planting to determine which plot(s)]: 
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Table of tree species – trees to be planted 
Q6b Species Numbers Coverage (%) 
Fruit 
1 Apple     
2 Citrus     
3 Stone fruits     
4 Avocado     
5 Pomegranate     
6 Other:     
Nut 
7 Stone pine     
8 Walnut     
9 Almond     
10 Chestnut     
11 Other:     
Oil/fruit 12 Olive     
Forest 
13 Cedar     
14 Cypress     
15 Poplar     
16 Oak     
17 Fir     
18 Melia     
19 Eucalyptus     
20 Other: 
   
d) How are you planning on doing this: _____________________________________ 
i) Myself / on my own cost (time/labour) 
ii) Hiring someone 
iii) Help from 3rd party (e.g. NGO, MOA, etc.) 
(1) Details:________________________________________________________ 
iv) Other:______________________________________________________________ 
 
7) If you don’t plan on planting trees either now or in the future, what is the reason for this:  
a) Lack of know-how 
b) Lack of interest  
c) Cost/effort – inputs, labour, etc. (i.e. direct costs)  
d) Age (too old to take care of land; no interest from children/family members) 
e) Availability of suitable land  
f)  Prefer to use the land for other uses (i.e. opportunity costs)  
g) Availability of seedlings  
h) Concerns about success/risk of failure 
i) Other:________________________________________________________________ 
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Section 2 
Preamble 2 
We would like to present a set of hypothetical scenarios in which external organisations 
interested in conserving biodiversity would help landowners willing to plant native trees on 
their land. Here is a list of species we’ve identified along with some photos of the trees and 
shrubs. 
Scenario 1: 
Let’s imagine that you are given seedlings and technical advice free of charge. In addition, 
you were offered money to cover the costs of planting and managing seedlings in the form of 
an interest-free loan. The loan repayments would be annual over a period of 5 years. 
However, the repayments would be cancelled if the survival rate is over 80% each year from 
the initial planting. Hence, survival rates below 80% would reduce the cancellation 
proportionally and you would pay only for those seedlings which don’t survive. Or in other 
words, if you had 65% survival, your repayment would be 35%. 
If the project collapses for some reason, debts would be cancelled. Your role would be to 
plant and manage the seedlings given to you to ensure survival.  
8) Would you be interested in such a scheme? [Y]/[N] – (if no, jump to Q9) – If yes, then: 
a) Where would you plant the seedlings: ______________________________________ 
i) In cultivated farmlands, e.g. terraced orchards (fruit, olive, stone pine) 
(1) Intermixed with crops 
(2) Along borders/margins 
(3) As woodlots (small batches) 
ii) In previously abandoned farmlands 
iii) In range/scrublands, e.g. jurd or rocky slopes/outcrops 
iv) In forests or woodlands, e.g. recently burned  
v) Along roadsides  
vi) Near residence  
vii) Other:______________________________________________________________ 
b) How much land would you plant? (approx. area):____________units:_____________ 
c) What % of this area would you plant (or # of seedlings per 100 m²): ______________ 
d) Would this scheme change the existing planting plans you have (if applicable – refer 
to Sect. 1) [Y]/[N]/[maybe] 
i) Explain:____________________________________________________________ 
e) What would you see as the main benefits of this scheme?  
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i) Explain: ____________________________________________________________ 
 
9) If you wouldn’t be interested in such as scheme, please explain why (open-ended and 
coded): 
a) Don’t trust these kinds of schemes 
b) Don’t like taking on debt 
c) Age (don’t like taking on debt which might be passed onto next generation) 
d) Other land uses still more attractive (thus indicating would need payments) 
e) Worried about losing tenure / not being allowed to clear land 
f) Get better assistance (i.e. free seedlings etc.) from other NGOs or gov’t (probe to 
specify organisation and scheme, what species): 
i) Details:_____________________________________________________________ 
g) Don’t like these species – would prefer others 
h) Other:________________________________________________________________ 
 
Scenario 2: 
Now, let’s imagine that you are given seedlings and technical advice free of charge. In 
addition, you are given money to pay for labour in planting and managing the trees in the 
form of a grant or gift. In other words, you would receive the same assistance as the 
previous scenario, but it would be free with no repayments from you. 
10) Would you be interested in such a scheme? [Y]/[N] – (if no, jump to Q11) – If yes, then: 
a) Where would you plant the seedlings: _____________________________________ 
i) In cultivated farmlands, e.g. terraced orchards (fruit, olive, stone pine) 
(1) Intermixed with crops 
(2) Along borders/margins 
(3) As woodlots (small batches) 
ii) In previously abandoned farmlands 
iii) In range/scrublands, e.g. jurd or rocky slopes/outcrops 
iv) In forests or woodlands, e.g. recently burned  
v) Along roadsides  
vi) Near residence  
vii) Other:______________________________________________________________ 
b) How much land would you plant? (approx. area):____________units:_____________ 
c) What % of this area would you plant (or # of seedlings per 100 m²): ______________ 
d) Would this scheme change the existing planting plans you have (if applicable – refer 
to Sect. 1) [Y]/[N]/[maybe] 
i) Explain:____________________________________________________________ 
e) What would you see as the main benefits of this scheme?  
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i) Explain: ____________________________________________________________ 
 
11) If you wouldn’t be interested in such as scheme, please explain why (open-ended and 
coded): 
a) Don’t trust these kinds of schemes  
b) Don’t believe that receiving money for free (w/o conditions) would motivate me 
c) Age (don’t have the physical capacity to take on such responsibilities ) 
d) Other land uses still more attractive (thus indicating would need payments) 
e) Worried about losing tenure / not being allowed to clear land 
f) Get better assistance (i.e. free seedlings etc.) from other NGOs or gov’t (probe to 
specify organisation and scheme, what species): 
i) Details: ___________________________________________________________ 
g) Don’t like these species – would prefer others 
h) Other:________________________________________________________________ 
 
Scenario 3: 
In this scenario, you would be given seedlings and technical assistance for free, money to pay 
for the full direct costs of planting (but not income foregone), and annual payments based on 
survival rates. You would receive 10,000 LL (or about $7) per seedling planted in the first 
year, so the more you plant, the more payments you receive. Additional payments (around 
5,000 LL per seedling) would be made each year over a period of 5 years that are based on % 
survival (for example, 65% survival = 65% of the payment), but if it’s less than 25%, there is 
no payment. Annual payment rates are also based on difficulty of terrain being and the 
number of different native species being planted. 
12) Would you be interested in such a scheme? [Y]/[N] – (if no, jump to Q13) – If yes, then: 
a) Where would you plant the seedlings: _____________________________________ 
i) In cultivated farmlands, e.g. terraced orchards (fruit, olive, stone pine) 
(1) Intermixed with crops 
(2) Along borders/margins 
(3) As woodlots (small batches) 
ii) In previously abandoned farmlands 
iii) In range/scrublands, e.g. jurd or rocky slopes/outcrops 
iv) In forests or woodlands, e.g. recently burned  
v) Along roadsides  
vi) Near residence  
vii) Other:______________________________________________________________ 
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b) How much land would you plant? (approx. area):____________units:_____________ 
c) What % of this area would you plant (or # of seedlings per 100 m²): ______________ 
d) Would this scheme change the existing planting plans you have (if applicable – refer 
to Sect. 1) [Y]/[N]/[maybe] 
i) Explain:____________________________________________________________ 
e) What would you see as the main benefits of this scheme?  
i) Explain: ____________________________________________________________ 
 
13) If you wouldn’t be interested in such as scheme, please explain why (open-ended and 
coded): 
a) Don’t trust these kinds of schemes / not interested 
b) Don’t like taking on debt / these kinds of responsibilities  
c) Age (don’t like taking on debt which might be passed onto next generation) 
d) Other land uses still more attractive (thus indicating would need payments) 
e) Worried about losing tenure / not being allowed to clear land 
f) Get better assistance (i.e. free seedlings, etc.) from other NGOs or gov’t (probe to 
specify organisation and scheme, what species): 
i) Details:_____________________________________________________________ 
g) Don’t like these species – would prefer others 
h) Other:________________________________________________________________ 
 
Section 3 
Preamble 3 
We understand that circumstances change and that you might want to do other things with the 
plot of land that you planted (assuming they expressed interest in a least one scenario?). 
Regarding this: 
14) What are some of the possible land-use changes you would foresee in the future on these 
specific plots of land that you might consider planting native trees on: 
a) Building 
b) Changing crops 
c) Stopping cultivation 
d) Raising livestock 
e) Passing land onto children / family members 
f) Tourism 
g) Selling the land 
h) Other:________________________________________________________________ 
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15) In the long run (following the project), what factors would determine whether you would 
maintain the trees on the land once they were planted (open ended question, coded by 
interviewer)? 
a) Land prices for development, e.g. value of land increasing   
b) Agricultural product prices – i.e. competing land uses  
c) Biodiversity – intrinsic value motivations  
d) Environmental benefits – e.g. erosion control, windbreaks, etc.  
e) Amenity/aesthetic benefits – increase landscape beauty 
f) Passing on land to descendants  
g) Other decision makers (family members, etc.)  
h) Whether the NGO (other any other 3rd party) maintained its interest  
i) Opinion of neighbours, community, etc. 
j) Other:________________________________________________________________ 
If yes to one or more of the options above: 
16) What other incentives would encourage you to plant more of your land with forest trees? 
a) Financial support, e.g. longer term payments 
b) Technical support, e.g. consulting 
c) Market support, e.g. access to market 
d) Help with infrastructure, e.g. roads, irrigation, etc. 
e) Other:________________________________________________________________ 
 
17) Would you be interested in longer term agreements, to receive payments say every 5 
years conditional on survival [Y]/[N] 
a) Explain:_____________________________________________________________ 
 
18) In your opinion, how do you think planting of forest trees on private land should be 
encouraged by organisations interested in native biodiversity? 
a) Explain:______________________________________________________________ 
Section 4  (socioeconomic details) 
19) Participant ID # (internal): _______________ 
20) Year of birth: ______________________ 
21) Sex:  [M] / [F] 
22) Married: [Y] / [N] – Other (optional, only if mentioned):_________________ 
23) Number of household members: ________________  
24) Amount of time spent in village (near plot of land being surveyed/studied):  
a) Permanent/year round [    ] 
b) Weekends and holidays only [    ] 
c) Summer only [    ] 
d) Rarely – non-resident [    ] 
25) Residency details (near plot of land being surveyed/studied): 
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a) Family house, i.e. reside with parents, siblings, in-laws, etc.  [    ] 
b) Own residence [    ] 
c) Rental [    ] 
26) How much non-residential land do you own? (approx. m²):________________________ 
a) Is this property contiguous? [Y]/[N] 
27) Occupation:  
a) Full-time farmer [    ] 
b) Part-time farmer, e.g. hobby [    ] 
c) Subsistence [    ] 
d) Employee (private sector) [    ] 
e) Employee (public sector) [    ] 
f) Self-employed/entrepreneur; freelancer [    ] 
i) Details: ________________________________________ 
28) Education (highest level): 
a) Primary/école primaire [    ] 
b) Secondary/lycée [    ] 
c) Baccalaureate [    ] 
d) Technical school [    ] 
e) University [    ] 
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Appendix 4.1 
Dear Ms/Mr/Dr …, 
I hope this email finds you in good health. 
I am conducting my PhD thesis on reforestation with native species in Lebanon and would 
like to ask if you could take a few minutes to complete a very short survey of 4 questions.  
The aim is to get your opinion on which native tree species you consider to be the highest 
conservation priority for planting in villages within the eastern part of Bcharre and 
Batroun districts. This area is between 1000-1500m in altitude and averages between 1000-
1200 mm/yr. precipitation.  
I have compiled a preliminary list of 22 suitable native species. I would be grateful for your 
own opinion on their ecological suitability and conservation importance. This survey aims to 
understand which species conservationists would most like to see included in 
reforestation efforts.  
The survey is completely voluntary and anonymous – no personal information will be 
collected. Data will be used for my thesis and I will be happy to share the results with you 
once the study is completed. 
Please click on this link for the survey (it should take less than 10 minutes of your time):  
LimeSurvey 
Please don’t hesitate to contact me if you have any questions or would like more details about 
my research project. 
Thank you,  
 secidneppA   
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 حضرة السيد .......السيدة................
 تحية وبعد
  لة وأنتم بصحة جيدةعلى أمل أن تصلكم هذه الرسا
من وقتكم  بواسطة الأشجار الموطنية. لذا أود أخذ القليل لبنان إعادة التحريج في عن أطروحة الدكتوراهإنني بصدد إعداد 
للمحافظة  يةأولولملئ هذه الإستمارة عبر البريد الإلكتروني بهدف معرفة  أي نوع من الأشجار الحرجية برأيكم يعتبر ذا 
متر من سطح  0051الى  0001. تقع هذه المنطقة على إرتفاع البترونو بشريشرق قضائي  البلدات فيعليه وزرعه 
  م.م.  0021و  0001سنويا ًما بين ال هطول الأمطار ويقدر فيها المعدل الإجمالي ل ،البحر
  نوع من الأشجار الحرجية.  22من  لائحة أولية لقد جمعت
  وأهمية المحافظة عليها. ئية لهذه الأصنافملاءمة البيأود معرفة رأيكم عن مدى ال
  معرفة رأي الناشطين في مجال البيئة حول الأصناف التي يجب إدراجها على هذه الائحة. إلى هذه الدراسة تهدف
  فيها. معلومات شخصية أيحيث أن لا حاجة لإدراج أسماء المشاركين أو  -إن هذه الإستمارة طوعية بالكامل وسرية
  الدراسة. من بمجرد الإنتهاء معكمتبادل النتائج نكون سعداء ل، وسوف في إعداد رسالة الدكتوراهعلومات الم سوف تستخدم
  دقائق من وقتكم 01لن تأخذ تعبئة الإستمارة أكثر من 
  الرجاء الدخول الى الموقع ،لملئ الإستمارة
 yevruSemiL
 
  مراجعتيرجاء لمزيد من المعلومات عن موضوع الدراسة او لللأستفسار أكثر ال
 شكراً 
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Appendix 4.2 
1. Please rate each of the following species as high, medium, or low conservation 
priorities for inclusion in reforestation of this site (between Bcharre and Tannourine). 
If you would not consider the species as being suitable for this area, despite its 
overall importance, please tick 'Ecologically Unsuitable' (E.U.). If you know the 
species but are unsure of its suitability in these sites, please tick 'not sure'. 
 
High Med Low E.U. 
Not 
Sure 
Abies cilicica (Antoine & Kotschy) Carrière - 
Cilician fir - حوش      
Acer hyrcanum ssp. tauricola (Boiss. & Balansa) 
Yalt. - Taurus maple - يسورط بقيق      
Acer monspessulanum ssp microphyllum (Boiss.) 
Bornm. - Montpellier maple - يدروك بقيق      
Alnus orientalis Decaisne - Oriental alder - تغن      
Cedrus libani Rich. - Cedar of Lebanon - نانبل زرأ      
Celtis australis L. - Mediterranean hackberry - سيم      
Crataegus monogyna Jacq. – Single-seeded 
hawthorn - رمحأ رورعز      
Cupressus sempervirens L. [C. sempervirens var. 
horizontalis] - Mediterranean cypress - يدومعلا ورسلا      
Fraxinus angustifolia ssp. syriaca (Boiss.) Yalt. - 
Syrian ash - ردلايزاقوقلا راد       
Fraxinus ornus L. - Manna ash - رهزملا رادردلا      
Juniperus excelsa M. Bieb. - Greek juniper - باّزل      
Ostrya carpinifolia Scop. - Hop-hornbeam - ناّرم      
Pinus brutia Ten. - Calabrian pine - يكرت ربونص      
Pinus pinea L. - Stone pine - رمثم ربونص      
Prunus cocomilia Ten. - Bear plum - قورقرب      
Prunus dulcis (Mill.) D.A. Webb. - Common 
almond - زول      
Pyrus syriaca Boiss. - Syrian pear - يروس صاجإ      
Quercus brantii ssp. look (Kotschy) Mouterde 
[syn: Q. ithaburensis Decne.] - Mt. Tabor oak - 
يناريإ طولب 
     
Quercus cerris L. [syn: Q. pseudocerris Boiss.] - 
Turkey oak - أرزعلايرعشلا طولبلا و       
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High Med Low E.U. 
Not 
Sure 
Quercus infectoria Olivier - Cyprus or Aleppo oak 
- لولملا وأ صفعلا      
Sorbus flabellifolia (Spach.) Schneider - Fan-
leaved service tree - غقرولا ةيحورم ةريب       
Sorbus torminalis (L.) Crantz. - Wild service tree - 
ةريبغ       
 
2. Please indicate if there are any other species you would consider to be suitable for 
these sites AND a high conservation priority for reforestation 
1.  
2.  
3.  
4.  
5.  
 
3. Please indicate which category best describes your occupation (whether active or 
retired) 
Academia - scientist, researcher, lecturer (University and/or research center) 
Environmental policy - biodiversity conservation, forest management and 
planning 
Private sector - NGO, consultancy, business 
Other (please specify) 
 
4. How would you best describe your professional focus? 
Biodiversity conservation 
Forestry 
Agriculture 
Other (please specify)  
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Appendix 5.1 
PES II Survey – mixed-methods choice experiment 
Section 1 – LULC characteristics 
Preamble 1 
In this part of our survey, we would like to ask you a few questions about current land-uses 
and tree planting.  
1) Do you own at least 1 hectare of land? Yes  No 
 
2) How many plots do you own and how would you characterize the land cover and land-use 
of each plot? [Interviewers will use sketchbook with participants to ID plots]  
Q2. Current land cover 
Plot # Land-cover code Land-use code Years past* Area (approx.) in dunums 
1         
2         
3         
4         
5         
6         
7 
    8 
         *Planted or abandoned since 
Land-cover code Land-use code 
1. Fruit trees & nut trees 1. Abandoned 
2. Vegetables or forage crops (no trees) 2. Commercial farming 
3. Natural forest / shrubland (garrigue)  3. Personal consumption farming 
4. Rangeland (little vegetation, rocky) 4. Recreational (hunting, fishing...) 
5. Other 5. Other (quarry, ecotourism...) 
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3) About the abandoned plots you mentioned [gesture to plots on map] could you tell us about any 
wild trees or shrubs that are growing on them? [Prompt to include abandoned lands identified as 
rangeland or other, as well as land cover codes 2&3] 
a) Yes – please specify kinds: ___________________________________________ 
b) No 
c) Not sure 
 
4) Do you plan on planting any (more) trees on your property?  
a) No, don’t intend to plant any trees (jump to Q. 5) 
b) Yes, what kinds [Coded by interviewer], estimated area and which plot? 
Q4. Forest/fruit trees to be planted 
Plot # Enter species code Est. Planting area 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
1. Fruit & nut trees (incl. walnut, chestnut, olives & grapes) 
2. Stone Pine 
3. Non-productive trees (aesthetic, recreational, landscape, etc.) 
 
4.Other: ____________________________________________ 
 
5) If you don’t plan on planting trees in the future, could you elaborate on the reasons why 
not? [Open-ended question, coded by interviewer, keep prompting until no further 
response is given] 
a) Lack of know-how 
b) Lack of interest 
c) Cost/effort – inputs, labour, etc. (planting and maintenance costs) 
d) Age (too old to take care of land; no interest from children/family members) 
e) Availability of suitable land 
f) Plans to sell land 
g) Prefer other land uses (i.e. opportunity costs) 
h) Availability of seedlings 
i) Concerns about success/risk of failure 
j) Other:____________________________________________________________ 
 
6) Do you rent or lease any of these plots from other people? 
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a)  No  
b)  Yes (plot #’s) _______________________  
 
7) Are you renting or leasing out any of your plots to other people (e.g. farmers, herders, 
quarrying, etc.)? 
a)  No  
 Yes  
Plot # _____ to (type) ____________________ 
Plot # _____ to (type) ____________________ 
 
8) Are you the sole decision-maker with respect to these plots of land? [Y] / [N] – if not, 
with whom do you share this responsibility? 
a) Spouse 
b) Parents 
c) Children 
d) Siblings 
e) Other family members (e.g. uncle, cousins, etc.) 
f) Owner of the land, if rented 
g) User of the land, if rented out 
h) Other: ___________________________________________________________ 
 
9) What is your main water source for cultivation (if applicable)? 
a) Private spring  plot #’s: _____________________ 
b) Drilled well / reservoir plot #’s: _____________________ 
c) Municipal  plot #’s: _____________________ 
d) Other:_______________________________________ 
 
10) Have you received any technical or financial support or services (including 
seeds/seedlings, fertilizers, etc.) either from organizations or individuals? 
a) None 
b) Agricultural coop:__________________________________________________ 
c) MOA – Green Plan , or: _____________________________________________ 
d) NGO or association:________________________________________________ 
e) Agricultural expert/consultant 
f) Municipality (e.g. building roads) 
g) Family members 
h) Community members 
i) Other:____________________________________________________________ 

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Section 2 – hypothetical reforestation programme  
Preamble 2 
PES reforestation schemes (options) – Attribute 1 
We would like to present you with a hypothetical reforestation programme. Imagine that an 
organisation, e.g. a non-governmental organisation, interested in reforestation is offering 
payments to landowners for planting native trees.  
There are three reforestation options in this hypothetical program to choose from. We would 
like to know which one you would be interested in (if any). You also have the option (Choice 
D) to refuse any of the reforestation options presented. Below are the options for planting a 
minimum of 1 dunum (dn) of your property: [Interviewers present three A4 reforestation 
options here]  
We would now like to find out what kinds of payment arrangements landowners would be 
willing to accept to plant native trees on their property. In this programme you would receive 
seedlings and technical assistance free of charge, a standard payment for planting a minimum 
of 1 dn of land, followed by three instalment payments over a ten year period. [Interviewers 
present A4 diagram below to participants illustrating the hypothetical reforestation 
programme] 
The programme would consist of 5 trips in total. As mentioned, seedlings will be provided on 
the first trip along with technical assistance (both free of charge) that includes an assessment 
of the property where the planting would take place, techniques on planting, irrigation and 
care. This would be followed by 4 monitoring trips to assess the planting outcomes in which 
payments will be made based on percentage of seedling survival, hence you will receive 
payments based on that percentage, e.g. 100% survival = full payment, 75% survival = 75% 
of full payment, 10% survival = 10% of payments, etc. Every monitoring session will be 
assessed from the original baseline when seedlings were first planted. The payments 
mentioned below are in today’s money, and would increase in line with inflation (i.e. the cost 
of living). 
There will be consultants who can be reached by phone if you run into problems or need 
technical assistance over the course of programme. Note that the seedlings are produced in 
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state-of-the-art nurseries for the purpose of reforestation efforts and require minimal 
irrigation if planted properly and in the right time of year (Oct-Dec). Also, native species 
such as the ones provided are naturally adapted to the climate and do not require as much 
care as most fruit trees do.  
There are a total of 5 sets that are random combinations of reforestation options and payment 
levels. Bear in mind that each choice set is like a new ‘programme’, so you can choose a 
different option for each choice set – and for different plots – if you wish. The 4 instalments 
relate to the payment levels (i.e. performance payments) that are made over the course of 15 
years and are conditional upon the survival outcomes mentioned earlier (refer to diagram). 
Our aim is to determine which of the combinations (reforestation scheme and payment level) 
are most attractive to you through this choice experiment. [Begin choice experiment] 
 
11) If you chose D0 (refuse option) for any of the choice sets, please explain why? [Open-
ended question, coded by interviewer, keep prompting until no further response is given; 
to be used after each choice set if applicable] 
a) Simply not interested 
b) Don’t trust these kinds of schemes / unfamiliar 
c) Don’t like taking on these kinds of responsibilities / too risky 
d) Don’t have enough land 
e) Age (don’t like taking on debt which might be passed onto next generation) 
f) Other land uses still more attractive (thus indicating would need more payments) 
g) Worried about losing tenure / not being allowed to clear land 
h) Don’t like these species – would prefer others, 
e.g.:_________________________________ 
i) Get better assistance (e.g. tech support, etc.) 
from:_________________________________ 
j) Other:____________________________________________________________ 
 
12) Are there any kinds of forest trees you would consider planting, whether from the list (i.e. 
Option C) shown or not? 
a) None 
b) Type 1:__________________________________________________ 
c) Type 2:__________________________________________________ 
d) Type 3:__________________________________________________ 
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Section 3 – future plans and challenges 
Preamble 3 
We understand that circumstances change and that you might want to do other things with the 
plot of land that you planted with trees under the scheme: 
13) What are some of the possible land-use changes you would foresee in the future on this 
specific parcel of land? [Open-ended question, coded by interviewer, keep prompting 
until no further response is given] 
a) Building, e.g. house, villa, chalet, etc. 
b) Growing crops 
c) Raising livestock 
d) Passing land onto children / family members that would want to do something 
else 
e) Tourism 
f) Selling the land 
g) Other:____________________________________________________________ 
 
14) After the last monitoring visit in 15 years’ time, what factors would determine whether 
you would maintain the trees on the land once they were planted? [Open ended question, 
coded by interviewer, keep prompting until no further response is given] 
a) Land prices for development, e.g. value of land increasing 
b) Agricultural product prices, i.e. competing land uses / high opportunity costs 
c) Intrinsic value motivations, e.g. nature-oriented benefits  
d) Functional environmental benefits, e.g. erosion control, windbreaks, etc.  
e) Amenity/aesthetic benefits, e.g. increase landscape beauty 
f) Passing land onto children 
g) Other decision makers (family members, etc.)  
h) Continued payments 
i) Opinion of neighbours, community, etc.  
j) Other:________________________________________________________________ 
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Section 4 – Socioeconomic info of respondents 
15) Participant ID #: ____________________ 
16) Year of birth: ______________________ 
17) Sex: [M] / [F] 
18) Married: [Y] / [N] – Other (optional, only if mentioned):_________________ 
19) Number of household members: ________________  
20) Amount of time spent in village (near parcel of land being surveyed):  
a) Permanent/year round 
b) Weekends and holidays (incl. summer and winter) only 
c) Summers only 
d) Rarely – non-resident 
21) Occupation:  
a) Full-time farmer (main source of income) 
b) Part-time farmer, e.g. hobby / self-consumption 
c) Employee (private sector) 
d) Employee (public sector) 
e) Self-employed/entrepreneur 
i) Details: ____________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix 5.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
يرمث ربونص ةعرزم – Option A: Stone pine plantation 
 صن- زرأو يرمث ربونص صن  – Option B: Stone pine & cedar 
mix 
 
ةيلحم ةيجرح راجشأ فانصأ ةطلخ  – Option C: Mixed native species 
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Appendix 5.3 
 
  
5.5a: A4 poster of mixed native species (Option C) shown to respondents 
5.5b: A4 poster of reforestation programme shown to respondents (dunum = 1,000) 
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Appendix 5.5 
CBC Design Efficiency Test 
Copyright Sawtooth Software 
9/17/2014 12:02:27 PM 
 
Task generation method is 'Shortcut' using a seed of 1. 
Based on 150 version(s). 
Includes 750 total choice tasks (5 per version). 
Each choice task includes 3 concepts and 2 attributes. 
 
 
A Priori Estimates of Standard Errors for Attribute Levels 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Att/Lev   Freq.   Actual    Ideal      Effic. 
 1    1       750 (this level has been deleted) Stone pine  (A) 
 1    2       750   0.0517   0.0516   0.9995    S.p. / cedar (B) 
 1    3       750   0.0517   0.0516   0.9989    Mixed species (C) 
 
 2    1       750 (this level has been deleted) $2,000 ha-1 year-1 
 2    2       750   0.0517   0.0516   0.9992    $6,000 ha-1 year-1 
 2    3       750   0.0517   0.0516   0.9988    $10,000 ha-1 year-1 
 
Note: The efficiencies reported above for this design assume an equal 
number of respondents complete each version. 
 
 
Two-Way Frequencies 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Att/Lev         1/1       1/2       1/3       2/1       2/2       2/3 
1/1             750         0         0       237       261       252 
1/2               0       750         0       247       241       262 
1/3               0         0       750       266       248       236 
2/1             237       247       266       750         0         0 
2/2             261       241       248         0       750         0 
2/3             252       262       236         0         0       750 
 
Logit Report with Simulated Data 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Main Effects: 1 2 
Build includes 150 respondents. 
 
Total number of choices in each response category: 
Category   Number  Percent 
----------------------------------------------------- 
       1     188   25.07% 
       2     174   23.20% 
       3     221   29.47% 
       4     167   22.27% 
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There are 750 expanded tasks in total, or an average of 5.0 tasks per 
respondent. 
 
Iter 1  Log-likelihood = -1036.58762  Chi Sq = 6.26630  RLH = 0.25105 
Iter 2  Log-likelihood = -1036.47256  Chi Sq = 6.49641  RLH = 0.25109 
Iter 3  Log-likelihood = -1036.46792  Chi Sq = 6.50570  RLH = 0.25109 
Iter 4  Log-likelihood = -1036.46773  Chi Sq = 6.50607  RLH = 0.25109 
Iter 5  Log-likelihood = -1036.46773  Chi Sq = 6.50609  RLH = 0.25109 
*Converged 
 
 
        Effect        Std. Err      t Ratio     Attribute Level 
1       0.07244       0.05764       1.25686    1 1 Stone pine  (A)  
2      -0.06346       0.05965      -1.06385    1 2 S.p. / cedar (B) 
3      -0.00898       0.05886      -0.15261    1 3 Mixed species (C) 
 
4      -0.06300       0.05966      -1.05593    2 1 $2,000 ha-1 year-1 
5       0.06273       0.05776       1.08592    2 2 $6,000 ha-1 year-1 
6       0.00027       0.05870       0.00465    2 3 $10,000 ha-1 year-1 
 
7      -0.14858       0.08782      -1.69191    NONE 
 
The strength of design for this model is 335.30501 
(The ratio of strengths of design for two designs reflects the D-
Efficiency of one design relative to the other.) 
 
